Compulsory E-Book Licensing

In 2020, New York legislators introduced bills to require book publishers to offer licenses to libraries to allow them to make digital copies of books (“e-books”) available to the public. The idea has spread to other states. Cokato attorney Tom James explains why these proposals do not rest on solid legal ground.

by Cokato attorney Tom James

In 2020, New York legislators introduced bills (S2890 and A5837) to require book publishers to offer licenses to libraries to allow them to make digital copies of books (“e-books”) available to the public.

The idea has spread to other states. Legislators in Rhode Island (H6246), Maryland (HB518 and SB432), Missouri (HB2210) and Illinois (SB3167) have introduced similar bills. Groups in Connecticut, Texas, Virginia, and Washington are lobbying for similar legislation in those states.

The New York bill passed out of the legislature, but Governor Kathy Hochul vetoed it. Maryland, on the other hand, enacted their bill into law. See Md. Code, Educ. §§ 23-701, 23-702 (2021). It was slated to go into effect on January 1, 2022. Bills in other states are still pending.

AAP lawsuit

The Association of American Press Publishers (AAP) filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of Maryland in federal district court in December, 2021, asserting that the new law is preempted by the federal Copyright Act.  The district court has granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the new law.

Preemption

Governor Kathy Hochul vetoed the New York bill because she believed that federal copyright law preempts the field of copyright regulation. Assuming it is not settled or dismissed, the AAP lawsuit should sort that question out. In the meantime, here is why I believe Governor Hochul is correct.

Express preemption

The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution makes the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For this reason, Congress may enact legislation expressly preempting state laws. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). Congress did this in § 301(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act:

“all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 . . . are governed exclusively by this title….”

17 U.S.C. § 301(a)

Of course, like nearly all legislation, the Copyright Act contains an exception (more familiarly known as a “loophole.”) Despite the preemption of state laws regulating copyrights, states may regulate “activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified in section 106.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), (b)(3). Those exclusive rights are the rights to reproduce, distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, and make derivative works based on a copyright-protected work.

Literary works are protected by copyright whether they are in paper or digital form. The question, then, is whether state laws creating what amount to compulsory licenses regulate or impinge upon the exclusive rights of copyright owners, or whether they regulate something else that is not covered by the Copyright Act. As indicated, the Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive rights to distribute, publicly display, and publicly perform their works. A state law dictating to a copyright owner how, when and to whom s/he may exercise those rights (such as by granting a license) would certainly appear to regulate and impinge upon the exclusive rights of copyright owners.

Implied preemption

Even if Congress had not expressly preempted state regulation of the exclusive rights of copyright owners, it seems likely that the same conclusion would be reached on other grounds anyway.

The United States Supreme Court has held that even if Congress has not expressly preempted state laws – or if express preemption is not determinative because the “loophole” might apply – state laws relating to a particular subject matter may be implicitly preempted in some cases. Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 398–400 (2012).

There are two kinds of implied preemption: conflict preemption and field preemption. Field preemption occurs when Congress has “legislated so comprehensively” in a field that it has “left no room for supplementary state legislation.” R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham Cty., 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986). Conflict preemption occurs when a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000); see also ASCAP v. Pataki, 930 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

Like an express preemption with a loophole, implied preemption does not apply if the state-created right protects a substantial “interest[ ] outside the sphere of congressional concern in the [copyright] laws.’” In re Jackson, 972 F.3d 25, 34–37 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal punctuation and citation omitted). On the other hand, if the state law is “little more than camouflage for an attempt to exercise control over the exploitation of a copyright,” then it is preempted. Id. at 38.

The Copyright Act “creates a balance between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need for access to creative works.” Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990); see also College Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554, 564 5 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (evaluation of “the balance struck by Congress between copyright owners found in § 106 of the Copyright Act and the exceptions to those exclusive rights found in §§ 107–118 of the same Act” leads to a finding that the state law is preempted). Congress has struck that balance by giving the author a right “arbitrarily to refuse to license one who seeks to exploit the work.” Stewart, 495 U.S. at 229. See also Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 270 F.2d 146, 154 (3d Cir. 1959) (the right to exclude others is a corollary to the licensing right).

Courts have been fairly consistent in finding that copyright law preempts state laws “that direct a copyright holder to distribute and license against its will or interests.” See, e.g., Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 386 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000). An argument might be made that states have the power to regulate the terms of a license. That, however, is significantly different from requiring a rights holder to grant licenses. At least one court has held that state laws that “appropriate[] a product protected by the copyright law for commercial exploitation against the copyright owner’s wishes” are preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377, 386 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000). A fortiori, a state law that appropriates a content creator’s exclusive right to decide whether and how to allow others to exercise one of his or her exclusive federally protected rights should be held to be preempted.

Moreover, the Copyright Act already covers the kinds of special concessions that copyright owners need to make to public libraries. Publishers should not be subjected to a complex array of state and federal laws making inroads into their federally protected rights, particularly where those inroads could vary significantly from state to state.

The “public interest”

Those who advocate for legislation of this kind typically assert the public interest in having access to literary works. The public certainly does have an interest in having access to literary works. The public also has an interest in having access to food. Does that mean government should force grocers to give a share of their inventory away to the public? That is essentially what these bills do to publishers, albeit indirectly.

One reason people will buy their own copy of a printed book instead of simply reading a library copy is that they do not want to have to get up out of their chairs and make a trip to a library. Digital copies are much easier to access, however. It generally may be done without ever having to get up out of one’s chair. An author may spend hundreds, or even thousands, of hours of his or her time researching, writing, compiling, proofing and editing a book. The least a reader – or a government acting on behalf of reader – can do is pay a couple of bucks for that, rather than using the strong arm of the law to force works to be made freely available online to anyone who applies for a library card – which often is also free, as well.

Absence of need

In any event, most publishers already make their digital catalogs available to public libraries. Something like half a billion digital check-outs from public libraries already occur every year. So why are some states trying to mandate this kind of licensing instead of simply allowing publishers and distributors to continue offering and negotiating licenses as they have been?

That question is open to speculation. One possibility is the “reasonable rate” requirement these bills would mandate publishers to offer to libraries. Who determines what a reasonable rate is? Well, it could be left to state courts to try to figure out. More likely, though, states would delegate authority to an agency of the state to determine rates. States with legislators and regulators who have a greater interest in being liked by their voting constituents than by a handful of published authors can reasonably be expected to set rates for those authors’ works below what they may have earned in a free market.

Concluding thought

The risk to publishers – and more importantly, to authors – should be obvious. Allowing states to require authors and publishers to sell their works at rates dictated by each state, most probably below market, would undermine the ultimate purpose of the Copyright Clause (U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8), which is “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”

I fear that the continuing outbreaks of state bills like these – which seem extremely likely to be declared unconstitutional – might someday impel Congress to enact a compulsory digital licensing system for e-books on a federal level. If that happens, it will be vitally important for authors, publishers, authors’ organizations and agents to actively monitor and participate in the process.

Contact attorney Tom James

Need help with copyright registration or a copyright matter? Contact attorney Tom James.

Dune It Wrong

The crypto group Spice DAO shelled out €2.66 million – about $3 million – for a rare book. The group announced that it had plans to digitize the book and distribute it to the public, produce an animated series based on the book for a streaming service, “support derivative projects,” and burn the book as an “incredible marketing stunt.” What could possibly go wrong?

by Thomas James Minnesota attorney

Dune is a widely-acclaimed 1965 science fiction novel by Frank Herbert. It is set in the future, at a time when feudalism exists on an interstellar scale. A wildly popular novel, Herbert wrote five sequels to it.

In 1974, director Alexander Jodorowsky resolved to adapt the book to film. The plan, however, ultimately was scrapped for lack of funds. It is not hard to see why. Jodorowsky envisioned an hours-long film with a score by Pink Floyd and appearances by such luminaries as Orson Welles and Mick Jagger. Weird artist Salvador Dali signed on to play a part, reportedly asking to be paid $100,000 per minute of screen time.

Before the project was scrapped, however, Jodorowsky compiled a book of concept art to present to studio executives. It included a storyboard sketched by the famous French cartoonist Moebius, along with set and character designs. Only a limited number of copies of it were made, and it is believed that only ten copies still exist today.

In November, one of these copies went up for auction at Christie’s. Appraisers expected it to sell for around $40,000. In the past, a copy of the book sold for $28,000 at auction. The crypto group Spice DAO, however, shelled out €2.66 million – about $3 million – for it. The group announced that it had plans to digitize the book and distribute it to the public, produce an animated series based on the book for a streaming service, “support derivative projects,” and burn the book as an “incredible marketing stunt.”

What could possibly go wrong?

It was a grand plan, except for one thing: Buying a copy of a book does not transfer the copyright along with it.

In general, you are free to do anything with the physical copy of a work you purchase – read it, decorate your restaurant or coffee shop with it, shred it, let your children color it. You are not free, however, to do anything you want with the intangible property embodied in it. When you buy a book, you do not acquire a right to make copies and distribute them to the public. You also do not acquire the right to make derivative works (new works based on the original work) or the right to “support derivative projects.” For these things, you would need to acquire either a license or outright ownership of the copyright from the copyright owner. If you don’t, then you may be liable for copyright infringement.

What about burning the book?

As I said, buying a copy of a book generally gives you the right to do whatever you want with the physical copy (as distinguished from the intangible property embodied in it.) I imagine many college students and zealous guardians of public morals will be delighted with this news, if they do not already know it.

There is an important exception to this rule, however. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (“VARA”), is a U.S. law that gives the author of a work of the visual arts the rights to (a) claim authorship of the work; and (b) prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create. In addition, the author of a work of the visual arts has the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work. Further, the author has a right to “prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.” Id.

VARA is clear that these rights are personal to the author. Even if you acquire both a physical copy and ownership of the copyright, you do not acquire the right to destroy a work of visual art, if it is protected by VARA.

For purposes of VARA, a protected “work of visual art” is a drawing, painting, print or sculpture existing either in a single copy or in a limited edition of 200 or fewer copies that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.

If the copy at issue here falls into this category – if it is was signed and consecutively numbered by the author – then burning the book would be unlawful.

Conclusion

Consulting with an attorney before making a significant purchase of intellectual property – or what you think is intellectual property – can be worthwhile at times.

Contact Thomas James, Minnesota attorney

Need help with a copyright matter? Contact Cokato, Minnesota attorney Thomas James at the Law Office of Tom James.

The Trademark Modernization Act

Not many people are aware that tucked into the 5,593-page Act are two major pieces of intellectual property legislation: the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act and the Trademark Modernization Act. Since the TM Act just went into effect, it seems appropriate to address it first.

By Tom James, Minnesota attorney

The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 was signed into law on December 27, 2020. Most people have heard of the provisions relating to COVID-19, such as rental and other kinds of financial assistance, and Title XIV of Division FF of Section 2 (COVID-19 Consumer Protection Act). Most people are probably also aware that it contains the usual annual appropriations for things like the promotion of women’s interests. Not as many people are aware, however, that tucked into the 5,593-page Act are two major pieces of intellectual property legislation: the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act (“the CASE Act of 2020”) and the Trademark Modernization Act (“the TM Act of 2020.”) I will be talking about the CASE Act in later articles. Since the TM Act just went into effect, it seems appropriate to address it first.

Injunctions against infringement

In order to obtain an injunction, it is necessary to convince a court that you will suffer irreparable harm unless the court issues one. That can be difficult – and expensive – to do.

Historically, courts relieved some of the burden on trademark owners by applying a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of confusion. The United States Supreme Court, however, disrupted that practice in some circuits in 2006. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), the Court held that an injunction against patent infringement cannot be granted unless the plaintiff makes an evidentiary showing that irreparable harm will ensue unless an injunction is granted. A split in the circuits resulted with respect to the question whether the requirement also applies to injunctions against trademark infringement. Some courts continued to apply the presumption; others did not.

The TM Act resolves the split. Now, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) requires courts in all jurisdictions to apply a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm upon a finding of likelihood of confusion with a federally registered trademark, when an injunction is sought under the Lanham Act. In the case of a motion for a preliminary injunction or TRO, the presumption arises upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits of an infringement claim brought under the Lanham Act.

The rebuttable presumption applies not only to infringement claims, but also to claims for injunctive relief with respect to false advertising, unfair competition, trademark dilution, or cyberpiracy under Section 43 of the Lanham Act.

By codifying this rebuttable presumption in the Lanham Act, the TMA removes uncertainty in the law and makes it easier for trademark owners to establish entitlement to injunctive relief.

Throwing out unused trademarks

If you’ve ever conducted a trademark search at the USPTO website, you’ve probably noticed an overabundance of registrations. In many cases, a trademark is registered in more categories of products and services than is really needed. Trademarks are often registered for good or services that either never have been used, or are not current being used, in connection with the mark. The TM Act provides new ways of clearing some of them out.

Expungement

The TM Act makes non-use a grounds for cancellation of a trademark registration. Cancellation of a trademark upon proof of abandonment is not new. The ability to remove unused goods or services from the coverage of the registration is. Moreover, an expungement does not require proof that the registrant has stopped using the mark since it was registered. To the contrary, it allows claims that a trademark has never been used (or has never been used for specified goods or services) to be made.

It is now possible to initiate a proceeding (called an “expungement”) to cancel a registration or narrow the categories of goods and services on the grounds of non-use.

Anyone may file an expungement petition. It may be brought between three and ten years after the registration. Until December 27, 2023, petitions to expunge trademarks may be brought with respect to registrations that are more than three years old, even if they are more than 10 years old. Thereafter, a petition may be brought only if the registration is between three and 10 years old.

Reexamination

The TM Act also makes it possible to petition the Trademark Office to reexamine the registration of a trademark. Under the TM Act, it will now be possible to seek the cancellation of a trademark on the grounds of that it was not actually used in commerce prior to the registration date. There is a 5-year limitations period for filing such a petition, measured from the date of issuance of the registration.

Who may initiate a proceeding

Anyone may initiate a proceeding. In addition, the USPTO may commence one on its own initiative. The filing fee is $400 per class of goods or services.

Appeals

The director’s determination with respect to an expungement or reexamination petition may be appealed. A party seeking to challenge the determination must first seek review from the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (TTAB). Further review may then be sought from the Federal Circuit court of appeals.

Madrid Protocol registrations

A foreign or Madrid Protocol registration under Sections 44(e) or 66 cannot be cancelled on this new ground of non-use if the nonuse was due to special circumstances excusing the non-use.

Office Action response deadlines

Currently, trademark applicants have six months to respond to an Office Action. The TM Act authorizes the USPTO to specify a shorter time period.

The USPTO has announced that people (other than Madrid Section 66(a) applicants) will have three months, instead of six, to respond to office actions. For $125, you can request a 3-month extension. This shorter time period, however, will not be implemented until December 1, 2022.

Third-party evidence in examinations

Finally, the Act facilitates the submission and consideration of evidence submitted by third parties during the examination process. In the past, opponents of an application for registration typically initiated an opposition proceeding to contest a registration application. Under the new provisions, we are likely to see more attempts to forestall registration even before the application is published for opposition.

The Law Office of Tom James

Need help with a trademark matter? Whether it’s an application to register a trademark, an expungement or re-examination petition, an opposition proceeding, or an appeal, Cokato Minnesota attorney Thomas James at the Tom James Law Office can help you.

Take my course on Trademark Law

Enroll in attorney Tom James’s 90-minute on-demand course, “Trademark Law: Key Concepts” at Udemy to learn the basics of U.S. trademark law.

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