Tag: unfair-competition

Unfair competition

Voice Cloning

Copyright cannot be claimed in a voice. Copyright law protects only expression, not a person’s corporeal attributes.

Painting of Nipper by Francis Barraud (1898-99); subsequently used as a trademark with “His Master’s Voice.”

Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc.

On July 10, 2025, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York issued an Order granting in part and denying in part a motion to dismiss a putative class action lawsuit that Paul Lehrman and Linnea Sage commenced against Lovo, Inc. The lawsuit, Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc., alleges that Lovo used artificial intelligence to make and sell unauthorized “clones” of their voices.

Specifically, the complaint in Lehman v. Lovo, Inc. alleges that the plaintiffs are voice-over actors. For a fee, they read and record scripts for their clients. Lovo allegedly sells a text-to-speech subscription service that allows clients to generate voice-over narrations. The service is described as one that uses “AI-driven software known as ‘Generator’ or ‘Genny,'” which was “created using ‘1000s of voices.'” Genny allegedly creates voice clones, i.e., copies of real people’s voices. Lovo allegedly granted its customers “commercial rights for all content generated,” including “any monetized, business-related uses such as videos, audio books, advertising promotion, web page vlogging, or product integration.” (Lovo terms of service.) The complaint alleges that Lovo hired the plaintiffs to provide voice recordings for “research purposes only,” but that Lovo proceeded to exploit them commercially by licensing their use to Lovo subscribers.

This lawsuit ensued.

The complaint sets out claims for:

  • Copyright infringement
  • Trademark infringement
  • Breach of contract
  • Fraud
  • Conversion
  • Unjust enrichment
  • Unfair competition
  • New York civil rights laws
  • New York consumer protection laws.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The copyright claims

Sage alleged that Lovo infringed the copyright in one of her voice recordings by reproducing it in presentations and YouTube videos. The court allowed this claim to proceed.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Lovo’s unauthorized use of their voice recordings in training its generative-AI product infringed their copyrights in the sound recordings. The court ruled that the complaint did not contain enough factual detail about how the training process infringed one of the exclusive rights of copyright ownership. Therefore, it dismissed this claim with leave to amend.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims of output infringement, i.e., claims that the “cloned” voices the AI tool generated infringed copyrights in the original sound recordings.

Copyright protection in a sound recording extends only to the actual recording itself. Fixation of sounds that imitate or simulate the ones captured in the original recording does not infringe the copyright in the sound recording.

This issue often comes up in connection with copyrights in music recordings. If Chuck Berry writes a song called “Johnny B. Goode” and records himself performing it, he will own two copyrights – one in the musical composition and one in the sound recording. If a second person then records himself performing the same song, and he doesn’t have a license (compulsory or otherwise) to do so, that person would be infringing the copyright in the music but not the copyright in the sound recording. This is true even if he is very good at imitating Berry’s voice and guitar work. For a claim of sound recording infringement to succeed, it must be shown that the actual recording itself was copied.

Plaintiffs did not allege that Lovo used Genny to output AI-generated reproductions of their original recordings. Rather, they alleged that Genny is able to create new recordings that mimic attributes of their voices.

The court added that the sound of a voice is not copyrightable expression, and even if it were, the plaintiffs had registered claims of copyright in their recordings, not in their voices.

The trademark claims

In addition to infringement, the Lanham Act creates two other potential bases of trademark liability: (1) false association; and (2) false advertising. 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B). Plaintiffs asserted both kinds of claims. The judge dismissed these claims.

False association

The Second Circuit court of appeals recently held, in Electra v. 59 Murray Enter., Inc. and Souza v. Exotic Island Enters., Inc., that using a person’s likeness to create an endorsement without the person’s permission can constitute a “false association” violation. In other words, a federally-protected, trademark-like interest in one’s image, likeness, personality and identity exists. (See, e.g., Jackson v. Odenat.)

Although acknowledging that this right extends to one’s voice, the judge ruled that the voices in this case did not function as trademarks. They did not identify the source of a product or service. Rather, they were themselves the product or service. For this reason, the judge ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their voices, as such, are protectable trademarks under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.

False Advertising

Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1)(B)) prohibits misrepresentations about “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities.” The plaintiffs claimed that Lovo marketed their voices under different names (“Kyle Snow” and “Sally Coleman.”) The court determined that this was not fraudulent, however, because Lovo marketed them as what they were, namely, synthetic clones of the actors’ voices, not as their actual voices.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Lovo’s marketing materials falsely stated that the cloned voices “came with all commercial rights.” They asserted that they had not granted those rights to Lovo. The court ruled, however, that even if Lovo was guilty of misrepresentation, it was not the kind of misrepresentation that comes within Section 43(a)(1)(B), as it did not concern the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of the voices.

State law claims

Although the court dismissed the copyright and trademark claims, it allowed some state law claims to proceed. Specifically, the court denied the motion to dismiss claims for breach of contract, violations of sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, and violations of New York consumer protection law.

Both the common law and the New York Civil Rights Law prohibit the commercial use of a living person’s name, likeness or voice without consent. Known as “misappropriation of personality” or violation of publicity rights, this is emerging as one of the leading issues in AI law.

The court also allowed state law claims of false advertising and deceptive trade practices to proceed. The New York laws are not subject to the “nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” limitation set out in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

Conclusion

I expect this case will come to be cited for the rule that copyright cannot be claimed in a voice. Copyright law protects only expression, not a person’s corporeal attributes. The lack of copyright protection for a person’s voice, however, does not mean that voice cloning is “legal.” Depending on the particular facts and circumstances, it may violate one or more other laws.

It also should be noted that after the Joe Biden voice-cloning incident of 2024, states have been enacting statutes regulating the creation and distribution of voice clones. Even where a specific statute is not applicable, though, a broader statute (such as the FTC Act or a similar state law) might cover the situation.

Images and references in this blog post are for illustrative purposes only. No endorsement, sponsorship or affiliation with any person, organization, company, brand, product or service is intended, implied, or exists.

Official portrait of Vice President Joe Biden in his West Wing Office at the White House, Jan. 10, 2013. (Official White House Photo by David Lienemann)

 

Generative-AI as Unfair Trade Practice

While Congress and the courts grapple with generative-AI copyright issues, the FTC weighs in on the risks of unfair competition, monopolization, and consumer deception.

FTC Press Release exceprt

While Congress and the courts are grappling with the copyright issues that AI has generated, the federal government’s primary consumer watchdog has made a rare entry into the the realm of copyright law. The Federal Trade Commission has filed an FTC Comment with the U.S. Copyright Office suggesting that generative-AI could be (or be used as) an unfair or deceptive trade practice. The Comment was filed in response to the Copyright Office’s request for comments as it prepares to begin rule-making on the subject of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly, generative-AI.

Monopolization

The FTC is responsible for enforcing the FTC Act, which broadly prohibits “unfair or deceptive” practices. The Act protects consumers from deceptive and unscrupulous business practices. It is also intended to promote fair and healthy competition in U.S. markets. The Supreme Court has held that all violations of the Sherman Act also violate the FTC Act.

So how does generative-AI raise monopolization concerns? The Comment suggests that incumbents in the generative-AI industry could engage in anti-competitive behavior to ensure continuing and exclusive control over the use of the technology.  See Generative-AI Raises Competition Concerns. 

The agency cited the usual suspects: bundling, tying, exclusive or discriminatory dealing, mergers, acquisitions. Those kinds of concerns, of course, are common in any business sector. They are not unique to generative-AI. The FTC also described some things that are matters of special concern in the AI space, though.

Network effects

Because positive feedback loops improve the performance of generative-AI, it gets better as more people use it. This results in concentrated market power in incumbent generative-AI companies with diminishing possibilities for new entrants to the market. According to the FTC, “network effects can supercharge a company’s ability and incentive to engage in unfair methods of competition.”

Platform effects

As AI users come to be dependent on a particular incumbent generative-AI platform, the company that owns the platform could take steps to lock their customers into using their platform exclusively.

Copyrights and AI competition

The FTC Comment indicates that the agency is not only weighing the possibility that AI unfairly harms creators’ ability to compete. (The use of pirated or the misuse of copyrighted materials can be an unfair method of competition under Section 5 of the FTC Act.) It is also considering that generative-AI may deceive, or be used to deceive, consumers. Specifically, the FTC expressed a concern that “consumers may be deceived when authorship does not align with consumer expectations, such as when a consumer thinks a work has been created by a particular musician or other artist, but it has been generated by someone else using an AI tool.” (FTC Comment, page 5.) Once again, generative-AI is a tool that is a perfect fit for the age of deception. 

In one of my favorite passages in the Comment, the FTC suggests that training AI on protected expression without consent, or selling output generated “in the style of” a particular writer or artist, may be an unfair method of competition, “especially when the copyright violation deceives consumers, exploits a creator’s reputation or diminishes the value of her existing or future works….” (FTC Comment, pages 5 – 6).

Fair Use

The significance of the FTC’s injection of itself into the generative-AI copyright fray cannot be overstated. It is extremely likely that during their legislative and rule-making deliberations, both Congress and the Copyright Office are going to be focusing the lion’s share of their attention on the fair use doctrine. They are most likely going to try to allow generative-AI outfits to continue to infringe copyrights (It is already a multi-billion-dollar industry, after all, and with obvious potential political value), while at the same time imposing at least some kinds of limitations to preserve a few shards of the copyright system. Maybe they will devise a system of statutory licensing like they did when online streaming — and the widespread copyright infringement it facilitated– became a thing.

Whatever happens, the overarching question for Congress is going to be, “What kinds of copyright infringement should be considered “fair” use.

Copyright fair use normally is assessed using a four-prong test set out in the Copyright Act. Considerations about unfair competition arguably are subsumed within the fourth factor in that analysis – the effect the infringing use has on the market for the original work.

The other objective of the FTC Act – protecting consumers from deception — does not neatly fit into one of the four statutory factors for copyright fair use. I believe a good argument can be made that it should come within the coverage of the first prong of the four-factor test: the purpose and character of the use. The task for Congress and the Copyright Office, then, should be to determine which particular purposes and kinds of uses of generative-AI should be thought of as fair. There is no reason the Copyright Office should avoid considering Congress’s objectives, expressed in the FTC Act and other laws, when making that determination.

 

 

 

Case Update: Andersen v. Stability AI

unlicensed use of copyright-protected artistic works in generative-AI systems.

Andersen v. Stability AI is one of the top 12 generative-AI lawsuits. To recap, artists Sarah Andersen, Kelly McKernan, and Karla Ortiz filed a class action lawsuit against Stability AI, DeviantArt, and MidJourney in federal district court alleging causes of action for copyright infringement, removal or alteration of copyright management information, and violation of publicity rights. (Andersen, et al. v. Stability AI Ltd. et al., No. 23-cv-00201-WHO (N.D. Calif. 2023).) The claims relate to the defendants’ alleged unlicensed use of their copyright-protected artistic works in generative-AI systems.

On October 30, 2023, Judge Orrick dismissed all claims except for Andersen’s direct infringement claim against Stability. Most of the dismissals, however, were granted with leave to amend.

The Claims

McKernan’s and Ortiz’s copyright infringement claims

The judge dismissed McKernan’s and Ortiz’s copyright infringement claims because they did not register the copyrights in their works with the U.S. Copyright Office.

I criticized the U.S. requirement of registration as a prerequisite to the enforcement of a domestic copyright in a U.S. court in a 2019 Illinois Law Review article (Copyright Enforcement: Time to Abolish the Pre-Litigation Registration Requirement.) This is a uniquely American requirement. Moreover, the requirement does not apply to foreign works. This has resulted in the anomaly that foreign authors have an easier time enforcing the copyrights in their works in the United States than U.S. authors do. Nevertheless, until Congress acts to change this, it is still necessary for U.S. authors to register their copyrights with the U.S. Copyright Office before they can enforce their copyrights in U.S. courts.  

Since there was no claim that McKernan or Ortiz had registered their copyrights, the judge had no real choice under current U.S. copyright law but to dismiss their claims.

Andersen’s copyright infringement claim against Stability

The Andersen complaint alleges that she “owns a copyright interest in over two hundred Works included in the Training Data” and that Stability used some of them as training data. Defendants moved to dismiss this claim because it failed to specifically identify which of those works had been registered. The judge, however, determined that her attestation that some of her registered works had been used as training images sufficed, for pleading purposes.  A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint to state a claim; it does not test the truth or falsity of the assertions made in a pleading. Stability can attempt to disprove the assertion later in the proceeding. Accordingly, Judge Orrick denied Stability’s motion to dismiss Andersen’s direct copyright infringement claim.

Andersen’s copyright infringement claims against DeviantArt and MidJourney

The complaint alleges that Stability created and released a software program called Stable Diffusion and that it downloaded copies of billions of copyrighted images (known as “training images”), without permission, to create it. Stability allegedly used the services of LAION (LargeScale Artificial Intelligence Open Network) to scrape the images from the Internet. Further, the complaint alleges, Stable Diffusion is a “software library” providing image-generating service to the other defendants named in the complaint. DeviantArt offers an online platform where artists can upload their works. In 2022, it released a product called “DreamUp” that relies on Stable Diffusion to produce images. The complaint alleges that artwork the plaintiffs uploaded to the DeviantArt site was scraped into the LAION database and then used to train Stable Diffusion. MidJourney is also alleged to have used the Stable Diffusion library.

Judge Orrick granted the motion to dismiss the claims of direct infringement against DeviantArt and MidJourney, with leave to amend the complaint to clarify the theory of liability.

DMCA claims

The complaint makes allegations about unlawful removal of copyright management information in violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Judge Orrick found the complaint deficient in this respect, but granted leave to amend to clarify which defendant(s) are alleged to have done this, when it allegedly occurred, and what specific copyright management information was allegedly removed.

Publicity rights claims

 Plaintiffs allege that the defendants used their names in their products by allowing users to request the generation of artwork “in the style of” their names. Judge Orrick determined the complaint did not plead sufficient factual allegations to state a claim. Accordingly, he dismissed the claim, with leave to amend. In a footnote, the court deferred to a later time the question whether the Copyright Act preempts the publicity claims.

In addition, DeviantArt filed a motion to strike under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute. The court deferred decision on that motion until after the Plaintiffs have had time to file an amended complaint.

Unfair competition claims

The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims of unfair competition, with leave to amend.

Breach of contract claim against DeviantArt

Plaintiffs allege that DeviantArt violated its own Terms of Service in connection with their DreamUp product and alleged scraping of works users upload to the site. This claim, too, was dismissed with leave to amend.

Conclusion

Media reports have tended to overstate the significance of Judge Orrick’s October 30, 2023 Order. Reports of the death of the lawsuit are greatly exaggerated. It would have been nice if greater attention had been paid to the registration requirement during the drafting of the complaint, but the lawsuit nevertheless is still very much alive. We won’t really know whether it will remain that way unless and until the plaintiffs amend the complaint – which they are almost certainly going to do.

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