Tag: contributory-liability

Contributory liability for torts, copyright infringement or trademark infringement

Longstanding and Emerging Legal Issues in Trademark Law

Trademark law protects brand identifiers like names, logos, words, slogans, and other things, ensuring consumers aren’t deceived about the source of a product or service. It also protects businesses from unfair competition. Core concepts include use in commerce, distinctiveness and the likelihood of confusion, which dictate whether a mark can be registered and enforced.

Jack Daniels and Bad Spaniels

Whether you’re a startup founder, an artist, or just astudent of the law, understanding trademark law is essential. Here is a breakdown of the fundamentals, followed by some of the biggest trending issues in the trademark world today.

The Fundamentals of Trademark Law

A trademark is any word, name, drawing, graphic, or device used to identify the source of goods or services and distinguish them from others. The four essential requirements for a valid trademark are:

Distinctiveness

A trademark must operate not only to identify the source of a product or service but also to distinguish it from others.

It is evaluated along a spectrum:

  • Fanciful marks: These are completely made-up, invented words, graphics, etc. that have nothing whatsoever to do with the nature or quality of the products or services with which they are associated. These are inherently distinctive, meaning it is not necessary to prove that consumers have come to associate the mark with the source. XEROX and EXXON are examples.
  • Arbitrary marks: These are real words, images of real things, etc., but they bear no relationship to the product or service with which they are associated. APPLE computers is an example. These, too, are inherently distinctive.
  • Suggestive marks: Suggestive marks are marks that hint at the nature or a quality of the product or service, but do not directly describe it. They require some imaginative thought on the part of the consumer to “connect the dots.” JAGUAR for cars and COPPERTONE for suntan lotion are examples. A suggestive mark is inherently distinctive.
  • Descriptive marks. These describe a quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the product or service. Unlike suggestive marks, they don’t merely hint at it; they come right out and directly describe the product or service, or a characteristic or ingredient of it. HOLIDAY INN and INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES are examples. Descriptive marks cannot be claimed as trademarks unless they have acquired “secondary meaning.” The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that consumers have come to identify the brand with the claimant’s product or service, and not with other sources of it.
  • Generic marks: These are names for a category of product or service. MILK, as a mark for milk would be an example. No trademark rights can be claimed in generic marks.

Likelihood of Confusion

The primary legal standard for both registering a mark and suing for infringement is “likelihood of confusion”. This means determining if an ordinary consumer would mistakenly believe that your product or service and someone else’s come from the same source, or are affiliated.

Courts apply a multi-factor test (primarily the DuPont factors) to assess likelihood of confusion. The most critical ones are:

  • Similarity of the marks: Do they look, sound, or convey a similar commercial impression?
  • Relatedness of the goods/services

Courts consider other factors, too.

Two marks may be confusingly similar even if they are not identical. The key is whether consumers would be likely to confuse the source of one with the source of the other.

Use in Commerce

A mark must be used in commerce as a source identifier. Otherwise, a trademark does not come into being. To register a trademark federally with the USPTO, the use must be in interstate or foreign commerce. Purely intrastate commerce will not suffice for federal registration.

Registration

In the United States, trademarks come into existence through use in commerce as a trademark. When all the elements of a valid trademark exist (distinctiveness, etc.) a “common law” trademark exists. The scope of protection a common law trademark affords, however, is limited to the geographic area of trade. To get nationwide protection and the right to use the coveted ® symbol, you must register your mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

My experience has been that the major stumbling blocks for people who apply to register their trademark with the USPTO are (1) lack of distinctiveness, usually due to selecting a descriptive mark without acquired meaning; (2) likelihood of confusion with another person’s or company’s trademark; and (3) improperly completing the application for registration.

Topical Issues in Trademark Law

Fraudulent filings

The USPTO has implemented rigorous enforcement frameworks to crack down on fraudulent filings. Historically, many trademark owners were in the habit of registering their marks in more than one category of goods or services, either to “keep options open” for possible company expansion into a new product line, or to prevent competitors from doing so. The USPTO is making more vigorous efforts to crack down on registrants who fraudulently claim use in connection with goods or services with which they are not actually using the mark.

Due to a massive influx of suspicious, fraudulent, or automated filing mills, the office has cracked down by requiring stricter identity verification and heavily scrutinizing specimens of use. If a brand is caught digitally altering logos or faking mock-ups of their goods in commerce, their registration is being swiftly canceled. Examiners are inspecting specimens of use more closely now, trying to ferret out digitally created mock-ups of trademarks being used in commerce. A false or fraudulent specimen of use is grounds for cancellation of registration.

The Trademark Modernization Act has given the USPTO new and enhanced powers to cancel unused and fraudulent registrations.

AI-Generated Counterfeits

Generative-AI is being used to create knock-offs of digital products. This is creating challenges for owners of trademarks in digital products and services.

Intermediary Platform Liability

Can an online marketplace platform or intermediary website or online service provider be held contributorily liable for facilitating or otherwise contributing to counterfeit and trademark-infringing goods being sold on their platforms?

Phrases Without Trademark Functionality

People are increasingly trying to claim trademark ownership over common words and phrases, such as, “Hello. How are you?” The USPTO and courts are rebuffing a lot of these efforts. It is still possible for a phrase to become a trademark, but proof of acquired secondary meaning as a source identifier is needed. Otherwise, an applicant is likely to experience a “failure to function as a trademark” denial.

Read more about non-AI-related legal issues.

Need help with a trademark registration? Contact attorney Thomas James.

AI Lawsuits Roundup

A status update on 24 pending lawsuits against AI companies – what they’re about and what is happening in court – prepared by Minnesota copyright attorney Thomas James.

Advancements in artificial intelligence technology, including generative-AI, have introduced a wide range of new or exacerbated legal problems. Collectively, I call these AI legal issues. Although not all of them are unique to scenarios involving AI, they are certainly testing and stretching the capacity of legal institutions. Here is a very brief summary of how these issues are playing out in the courts, as of February 28, 2024. 

Copyright

Thomson Reuters v. Ross, (D. Del. 2020)

Filed May 6, 2020. Thomson Reuters, owner of Westlaw, claims that Ross Intelligence infringed copyrights in Westlaw headnotes by training AI on copies of them. The judge has granted, in part, and denied, in part, motions for summary judgment. The questions of fair use and whether the headnotes are sufficiently original to merit copyright protection remain to be decided.

Update: The court initially ruled that Westlaw’s headnotes are not sufficiently creative and original to merit copyright protection, but has now reversed itself, ruling that over 2,243 of them are. There has now been a fair use decision in Thomson Reuters v. Ross. 

Thaler v. Perlmutter (D.D.C. 2022).

Complaint filed June 2, 2022. Thaler created an AI system called the Creativity Machine. He applied to register copyrights in the output he generated with it. The Copyright Office refused registration on the ground that AI output does not meet the “human authorship” requirement. (I explained that requirement in a previous blog post that explored the difference between human and AI creation of a work. He then sought judicial review. The district court granted summary judgment for the Copyright Office. In October, 2023, Thaler filed an appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (Case no. 23-5233).

Doe v. GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI (N.D. Cal. 2022)

Complaint filed November 3, 2022. Software developers claim the defendants trained Codex and Copilot on code derived from theirs, which they published on GitHub. Some claims have been dismissed, but claims that GitHub and OpenAI violated the DMCA and breached open source licenses remain. Discovery is ongoing.

Andersen v. Stability AI (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed January 13, 1023. Visual artists sued Midjourney, Stability AI and DeviantArt for copyright infringement for allegedly training their generative-AI models on images scraped from the Internet without copyright holders’ permission. Other claims included DMCA violations, publicity rights violations, unfair competition, breach of contract, and a claim that output images are infringing derivative works. On October 30, 2023, the court largely granted motions to dismiss, but granted leave to amend the complaint. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 29, 2023. Defendants have filed motions to dismiss the amended complaint. Hearing on the motion is set for May 8, 2024.

Getty Images v. StabilityAI (U.K. 2023)

Complaint filed January, 2023. Getty Images claims StabilityAI scraped images without its consent. Getty’s complaint has survived a motion to dismiss and the case appears to be heading to trial.

In re OpenAI ChatGPT Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed June 28, 3023. Originally captioned Tremblay v. OpenAI. Book authors sued OpenAI for direct and vicarious copyright infringement, DMCA violations, unfair competition and negligence. Both input (training) and output (derivative works) claims are alleged, as well as state law claims of unfair competition, etc. Most state law and DMCA claims have been dismissed, but claims based on unauthorized copying during the AI training process remain. An amended complaint is likely to come in March. The court has directed the amended complaint to consolidate Tremblay v. OpenAI, Chabon v. OpenAI, and Silverman v. OpenAI.  

Kadrey v. Meta (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed July 7, 2023. Sarah Silverman and other authors allege Meta infringed copyrights in their works by making copies of them while training Meta’s AI model; that the AI model is itself an infringing derivative work; and that outputs are infringing copies of their works. Plaintiffs also allege DMCA violations, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and negligence. The court granted Meta’s motion to dismiss all claims except the claim that unauthorized copies were made during the AI training process. An amended complaint and answer have been filed.

In 2025, Judge Chhabria ruled in Meta’s favor on fair use with respect to AI training; reserved the motion for summary judgment on the DMCA claims for decision in a separate order, and held that the claim of infringing distribution via leeching or seeding “will remain a live issue in the case.”

J.L. v. Google (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed July 11, 2023. An author filed a complaint against Google alleging misuse of content posted on social media and Google platforms to train Google’s AI Bard. (Gemini is the successor to Google’s Bard.) Claims include copyright infringement, DMCA violations, and others. J.L. filed an amended complaint and Google has filed a motion to dismiss it. A hearing is scheduled for May 16, 2024.

Chabon v. OpenAI (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed September 9, 2023. Authors allege that OpenAI infringed copyrights while training ChatGPT, and that ChatGPT is itself an unauthorized derivative work. They also assert claims of DMCA violations, unfair competition, negligence and unjust enrichment. The case has been consolidated with Tremblay v. OpenAI, and the cases are now captioned In re OpenAI ChatGPT Litigation.

Chabon v. Meta Platforms (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed September 12, 2023. Authors assert copyright infringement claims against Meta, alleging that Meta trained its AI using their works and that the AI model itself is an unauthorized derivative work. The authors also assert claims for DMCA violations, unfair competition, negligence, and unjust enrichment. In November, 2023, the court issued an Order dismissing all claims except the claim of unauthorized copying in the course of training the AI. The court described the claim that an AI model trained on a work is a derivative of that work as “nonsensical.”

Authors Guild v. OpenAI, Microsoft, et al. (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

Complaint filed September 19, 1023. Book and fiction writers filed a complaint for copyright infringement in connection with defendants’ training AI on copies of their works without permission. A motion to dismiss has been filed.

Huckabee v. Bloomberg, Meta Platforms, Microsoft, and EleutherAI Institute (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

Complaint filed October 17, 2023. Political figure Mike Huckabee and others allege that the defendants trained AI tools on their works without permission when they used Books3, a text dataset compiled by developers; that their tools are themselves unauthorized derivative works; and that every output of their tools is an infringing derivative work.  Claims against EleutherAI have been voluntarily dismissed. Claims against Meta and Microsoft have been transferred to the Northern District of California. Bloomberg is expected to file a motion to dismiss soon.

Huckabee v. Meta Platforms and Microsoft (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed October 17, 2023. Political figure Mike Huckabee and others allege that the defendants trained AI tools on their works without permission when they used Books3, a text dataset compiled by developers; that their tools are themselves unauthorized derivative works; and that every output of their tools is an infringing derivative work. Plaintiffs have filed an amended complaint. Plaintiffs have stipulated to dismissal of claims against Microsoft without prejudice.

Concord Music Group v. Anthropic (M.D. Tenn. 2023)

Complaint filed October 18, 2023. Music publishers claim that Anthropic infringed publisher-owned copyrights in song lyrics when they allegedly were copied as part of an AI training process (Claude) and when lyrics were reproduced and distributed in response to prompts. They have also made claims of contributory and vicarious infringement. Motions to dismiss and for a preliminary injunction are pending.

Alter v. OpenAI and Microsoft (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

Complaint filed November 21, 2023. Nonfiction author alleges claims of copyright infringement and contributory copyright infringement against OpenAI and Microsoft, alleging that reproducing copies of their works in datasets used to train AI infringed copyrights. The court has ordered consolidation of Author’s Guild (23-cv-8292) and Alter (23-cv-10211). On February 12,2024, plaintiffs in other cases filed a motion to intervene and dismiss.

New York Times v. Microsoft and OpenAI (S.D.N.Y. 2023)

Complaint filed December 27, 2023. The New York Times alleges that their news stories were used to train AI without a license or permission, in violation of their exclusive rights of reproduction and public display, as copyright owners. The complaint also alleges vicarious and contributory copyright infringement, DMCA violations, unfair competition, and trademark dilution. The Times seeks damages, an injunction against further infringing conduct, and a Section 503(b) order for the destruction of “all GPT or other LLM models and training sets that incorporate Times Works.” On February 23, 2024, plaintiffs in other cases filed a motion to intervene and dismiss this case.  

Basbanes and Ngagoyeanes v. Microsoft and OpenAI (S.D.N.Y. 2024)

Complaint filed January 5, 2024. Nonfiction authors assert copyright claims against Microsoft and OpenAI. On February 6, 2024, the court consolidated this case with Authors Guild (23-cv-08292) and Alter v. Open AI (23-cv-10211), for pretrial purposes.  

Trademark

Getty Images v. Stability AI (D. Del.)

Complaint filed against Stability AI by Getty Images on February 3, 2023. Getty Images alleges claims of copyright infringement, DMCA violation and trademark violations against Stability AI. The judge has dismissed without prejudice a motion to dismiss or transfer on jurisdictional grounds. The motion may be re-filed after the conclusion of jurisdictional discovery, which is ongoing.

Privacy and Publicity Rights

Flora v. Prisma Labs (N.D. Cal.)

Complaint filed February 15, 2023. Plaintiffs allege violations of the Illinois Biometric Privacy Act in connection with Prisma Labs’ collection and retention of users’ selfies in AI training. The court has granted Prisma’s motion to compel arbitration.

Kyland Young v. NeoCortext (C.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed April 3, 2023. This complaint alleges that AI tool Reface used a person’s image without consent, in violation of the person’s publicity rights under California law. The court has denied a motion to dismiss, ruling that publicity rights claims are not preempted by federal copyright law. The case has been stayed pending appeal.

P.M. v. OpenAI (N.D. Cal. 2023).

Complaint filed June 28, 2023. Users claim OpenAI violated the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act and California wiretapping laws by collecting their data when they input content into ChatGPT. They also claim violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on September 15, 2023. See now A.T. v. OpenAI (N.D. Cal. 2023) (below).

A.T. v. OpenAI (N.D. Cal. 2023)

Complaint filed September 5, 2023. ChatGPT users claim the company violated the federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and California Penal Code section 631 (wiretapping). The gravamen of the complaint is that ChatGPT allegedly accessed users’ platform access and intercepted their private information without their knowledge or consent. Motions to dismiss and to compel arbitration are pending.

Defamation

Walters v. OpenAI (Gwinnett County Super. Ct. 2023), and Walters v. OpenAI (N.D. Ga. 2023)

Gwinnett County complaint filed June 5, 2023.

Federal district court complaint filed July 14, 2023.

Radio talk show host sued OpenAI for defamation. A reporter had used ChatGPT to get information about him. ChatGPT wrongly described him as a person who had been accused of fraud. In October, 2023, the federal court remanded the case to the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia.  On January 11, 2024, the Gwinnett County Superior Court denied OpenAI’s motion to dismiss.

Battle v. Microsoft (D. Md. 2023)

Complaint filed July 7, 2023. Pro se defamation complaint against Microsoft alleging that Bing falsely described him as a member of the “Portland Seven,” a group of Americans who tried to join the Taliban after 9/11.

 

Caveat

This list is not exhaustive. There may be other cases involving AI that are not included here. For a discussion of bias issues in Google’s Gemini, have a look at Scraping Bias on Medium.com.

The Top 3 Generative-AI Copyright Issues

What are your favorite generative-AI copyright issues? In this capsule summary, Cokato attorney Tom James shares what his three favorites are.

Black hole consuming a star. Photo credit: NASA.

Having outlined the top AI legal issues, the time has come now to pick favorites. In this capsule summary, Cokato attorney Tom James shares what his three favorite generative-AI copyright issues are.

Generative artificial intelligence refers collectively to technology that is capable of generating new text, images, audio/visual and possibly other content in response to a user’s prompts. They are trained by feeding them mass quantities of ABC (already-been-created) works. Some of America’s biggest mega-corporations have invested billions of dollars into this technology. They are now facing a barrage of lawsuits, most of them asserting claims of copyright infringement.

Issue #1: Does AI Output Infringe Copyrights?

Copyrights give their owners an exclusive right to reproduce their copyright-protected works and to create derivative works based on them. If a generative-AI user prompts the service to reproduce the text of a pre-existing work, and it proceeds to do so, this could implicate the exclusive right of reproduction. If a generative-AI user prompts it to create a work in the style of another work and/or author, this could implicate the exclusive right to create derivative works.

To establish infringement, it will be necessary to prove copying. Two identical but independently created works may each be protected by copyright. Put another way, a person is not guilty of infringement merely by creating a work that is identical or similar to another if he/she/it came up with it completely on his/her/its own.

Despite “training” their proteges on existing works, generative-AI outfits deny that their tools actually copy any of them. They say that any similarity to any existing works, living or dead, is purely coincidental. Thus, OpenAI has stated that copyright infringement “is an unlikely accidental outcome.”

The “accidental outcome” defense seems to me like a hard one to swallow in those cases where a prompt involves creating a story involving a specified fictional character that enjoys copyright protection. If the character is distinctive enough — and a piece of work in and of itself, so to speak — to enjoy copyright protection (such as, say, Mr. Spock from the Star Trek series), then any generated output would seem to be an unauthorized derivative work, at least if the AI tool is any good.

If AI output infringes a copyright in an existing work, who would be liable for it? Potentially, the person who entered the prompt might be held liable for direct infringement. The AI tool provider might arguably be liable for contributory infringement.

Issue #2: Does AI Training Infringe Copyrights?

AI systems are “trained” to create works by exposing a computer program system to large numbers of existing works downloaded from the Internet.

When content is downloaded from the Internet, a copy of it is made. This process will “involve the reproduction of entire works or substantial portions thereof.” OpenAI, for example, acknowledges that its programs are trained on “large, publicly available datasets that include copyrighted works” and that this process “involves first making copies of the data to be analyzed….” Making these copies without permission may infringe the copyright holders’ exclusive right to make reproductions of their works.

Generative-AI outfits tend to argue that the training process is fair use.

Fair use claims require consideration of four statutory factors:

  • the purpose and character of the use;
  • the nature of the work copied;
  • the amount and substantiality of the portion copied; and
  • the effect on the market for the work.

OpenAI relies on the precedent set in Authors Guild v. Google for its invocation of “fair use.” That case involved Google’s copying of the entire text of books to construct its popular searchable database.

A number of lawsuits currently pending in the courts are raising the question whether and how, the AI training process is “fair use.” For more information, have a look at Does AI Infringe Copyright? 

Issue #3: Are AI-Generated Works Protected by Copyright?

The Copyright Act affords copyright protection to “original works of authorship.” The U.S. Copyright Office recognizes copyright only in works “created by a human being.” Courts, too, have declined to extend copyright protection to nonhuman authors. (Remember the monkey selfie case?) A recent copyright registration applicant has filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Copyright Office alleging that the Office wrongfully denied registration of an AI-generated work. A federal court has now rejected his argument that human authorship is not required for copyright ownership.

In March 2023, the Copyright Office released guidance stating that when AI “determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship.” Moreover, an argument might be made that a general prompt, such as “create a story about a dog in the style of Jack London,” is an idea, not expression. It is well settled that only expression gets copyright protection; ideas do not.

In September 2023, the Copyright Office Review Board affirmed the Office’s refusal to register a copyright in a work that was generated by Midjourney and then modified by the applicant, on the basis that the applicant did not disclaim the AI-generated material.

The Office also has the power to cancel improvidently granted registrations. (Words to the wise: Disclose and disclaim.)

These are my favorite generative-AI legal issues. What are yours?

Does AI Infringe Copyright?

A previous blog post addressed the question whether AI-generated creations are protected by copyright. This could be called the “output question” in the artificial intelligence area of copyright law. Another question is whether using copyright-protected works as input for AI generative processes infringes the copyrights in those works. This could be called the “input question.” Both kinds of questions are now before the courts. Minnesota attorney Tom James describes a framework for analyzing the input question.

The Input Question in AI Copyright Law

by Thomas James, Minnesota attorney

In a previous blog post, I described the top three generative-AI issues in copyright law. The question whether AI-generated creations are protected by copyright is what I call the “output question.” . Another question is whether using copyright-protected works as input for AI generative processes infringes the copyrights in those works. This could be called the “input question.” Both kinds of questions are now before the courts. In this blog post, I describe a framework for analyzing the input question.

The Cases

The Getty Images lawsuit

Getty Images is a stock photograph company. It licenses the right to use the images in its collection to those who wish to use them on their websites or for other purposes. Stability AI is the creator of Stable Diffusion, which is described as a “text-to-image diffusion model capable of generating photo-realistic images given any text input.” In January, 2023, Getty Images initiated legal proceedings in the United Kingdom against Stability AI. Getty Images is claiming that Stability AI violated copyrights by using their images and metadata to train AI software without a license.

The independent artists lawsuit

Another lawsuit raising the question whether AI-generated output infringes copyright has been filed in the United States. In Andersen v. Stability AI, a group of visual artists are seeking class action status for claims against Stability AI, Midjourney Inc. and DeviantArt Inc. The artists claim that the companies use their images to train computers “to produce seemingly new images through a mathematical software process.” They describe AI-generated artwork as “collages” made in violation of copyright owners’ exclusive right to create derivative works.

The GitHut Copilot lawsuit

In November, 2022, a class action lawsuit was filed in a U.S. federal court against GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI. The lawsuit claims the GitHut Copilot and OpenAI Codex coding assistant services use existing code to generate new code. By training their AI systems on open source programs, the plaintiffs claim, the defendants have allegedly infringed the rights of developers who have posted code under open-source licenses that require attribution.

How AI Works

AI, of course, stands for artificial intelligence. Almost all AI techniques involve machine learning. Machine learning, in turn, involves using a computer algorithm to make a machine improve its performance over time, without having to pre-program it with specific instructions. Data is input to enable the machine to do this. For example, to teach a machine to create a work in the style of Vincent van Gogh, many instances of van Gogh’s works would be input. The AI program contains numerous nodes that focus on different aspects of an image. Working together, these nodes will then piece together common elements of a van Gogh painting from the images the machine has been given to analyze. After going through many images of van Gogh paintings, the machine “learns” the features of a typical Van Gogh painting. The machine can then generate a new image containing these features.

In the same way, a machine can be programmed to analyze many instances of code and generate new code.

The input question comes down to this: Does creating or using a program that causes a machine to receive information about the characteristics of a creative work or group of works for the purpose of creating a new work that has the same or similar characteristics infringe the copyright in the creative work(s) that the machine uses in this way?

The Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners

In the United States, the owner of a copyright in a work has the exclusive rights to:

  • reproduce (make copies of) it;
  • distribute copies of it;
  • publicly perform it;
  • publicly display it; and
  • make derivative works based on it.

(17 U.S.C. § 106). A copyright is infringed when a person exercises any of these exclusive rights without the copyright owner’s permission.

Copyright protection extends only to expression, however. Copyright does not protect ideas, facts, processes, methods, systems or principles.

Direct Infringement

Infringement can be either direct or indirect. Direct infringement occurs when somebody directly violates one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. Examples would be a musician who performs a copyright-protected song in public without permission, or a cartoonist who creates a comic based on the Batman and Robin characters and stories without permission.

The kind of tool an infringer uses is not of any great moment. A writer who uses word-processing software to write a story that is simply a copy of someone else’s copyright-protected story is no less guilty of infringement merely because the actual typewritten letters were generated using a computer program that directs a machine to reproduce and display typographical characters in the sequence a user selects.

Contributory and Vicarious Infringement

Infringement liability may also arise indirectly. If one person knowingly induces another person to infringe or contributes to the other person’s infringement in some other way, then each of them may be liable for copyright infringement. The person who actually committed the infringing act could be liable for direct infringement. The person who knowingly encouraged, solicited, induced or facilitated the other person’s infringing act(s) could be liable for contributory infringement.

Vicarious infringement occurs when the law holds one person responsible for the conduct of another because of the nature of the legal relationship between them. The employment relationship is the most common example. An employer generally is held responsible for an employee’s conduct,  provided the employee’s acts were performed within the course and scope of the employment. Copyright infringement is not an exception to that rule.

Programmer vs. User

Direct infringement liability

Under U.S. law, machines are treated as extensions of the people who set them in motion. A camera, for example, is an extension of the photographer. Any images a person causes a camera to generate by pushing a button on it is considered the creation of the person who pushed the button, not of the person(s) who manufactured the camera, much less of the camera itself. By the same token, a person who uses the controls on a machine to direct it to copy elements of other people’s works should be considered the creator of the new work so created. If using the program entails instructing the  machine to create an unauthorized derivative work of copyright-protected images, then it would be the user, not the machine or the software writer, who would be at risk of liability for direct copyright infringement.

Contributory infringement liability

Knowingly providing a device or mechanism to people who use it to infringe copyrights creates a risk of liability for contributory copyright infringement. Under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, however, merely distributing a mechanism that people can use to infringe copyrights is not enough for contributory infringement liability to attach, if the mechanism has substantial uses for which copyright infringement liability does not attach. Arguably, AI has many such uses. For example, it might be used to generate new works from public domain works. Or it might be used to create parodies. (Creating a parody is fair use; it should not result in infringement liability.)

The situation is different if a company goes further and induces, solicits or encourages people to use its mechanism to infringe copyrights. Then it may be at risk of contributory liability. As the United States Supreme Court has said, “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). (Remember Napster?)

Fair Use

If AI-generated output is found to either directly or indirectly infringe copyright(s), the infringer nevertheless might not be held liable, if the infringement amounts to fair use of the copyrighted work(s) that were used as the input for the AI-generated work(s).

Ever since some rap artists began using snippets of copyright-protected music and sound recordings without permission, courts have embarked on a treacherous expedition to articulate a meaningful dividing line between unauthorized derivative works, on one hand, and unauthorized transformative works, on the other. Although the Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive right to create works based on their copyrighted works (called derivative works), courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work may be fair use if it is “transformative.: This has caused a great deal of uncertainty in the law, particularly since the U.S. Copyright Act expressly defines a derivative work as one that transforms another work. (See 17 U.S.C. § 101: “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” (emphasis added).)

When interpreting and applying the transformative use branch of Fair Use doctrine, courts have issued conflicting and contradictory decisions. As I wrote in another blog post, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear and decide Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith. It is anticipated that the Court will use this case to attempt to clear up all the confusion around the doctrine. It is also possible the Court might take even more drastic action concerning the whole “transformative use” branch of Fair Use.

Some speculate that the questions the Justices asked during oral arguments in Warhol signal a desire to retreat from the expansion of fair use that the “transformativeness” idea spawned. On the other hand, some of the Court’s recent decisions, such as Google v. Oracle, suggest the Court is not particularly worried about large-scale copyright infringing activity, insofar as Fair Use doctrine is concerned.

Conclusion

To date, it does not appear that there is any direct legal precedent in the United States for classifying the use of mass quantities of works as training tools for AI as “fair use.” It seems, however, that there soon will be precedent on that issue, one way or the other. Several lawsuits raising this generative-AI copyright issue are pending in the courts. In the meantime, AI generating system users should proceed with caution.

The Top Copyright Cases of 2022

Cokato Minnesota attorney Tom James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”) presents his annual list of the top copyright cases of the year.

My selections for the top copyright cases of the year.

“Dark Horse”

Marcus Gray had sued Katy Perry for copyright infringement, claiming that her “Dark Horse” song unlawfully copied portions of his song, “Joyful Noise.” The district court held that the disputed series of eight notes appearing in Gray’s song were not “particularly unique or rare,” and therefore were not protected against infringement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the series of eight notes was not sufficiently original and creative to receive copyright protection. Gray v. Hudson.

“Shape of You”

Across the pond, another music copyright infringement lawsuit was tossed. This one involved Ed Sheeran’s “Shape of You” and Sam Chokri’s “Oh Why.” In this case, the judge refused to infer from the similarities in the two songs that copyright infringement had occurred. The judge ruled that the portion of the song as to which copying had been claimed was “so short, simple, commonplace and obvious in the context of the rest of the song that it is not credible that Mr. Sheeran sought out inspiration from other songs to come up with it.” Sheeran v. Chokri.

Instagram images

Another case out of California, this one involves a lawsuit filed by photographers against Instagram, alleging secondary copyright infringement. The photographers claim that Instagram’s embedding tool facilitates copyright infringement by users of the website. The district court judge dismissed the lawsuit, saying he was bound by the so-called “server test” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals announced in Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The server test says, in effect, that a website does not unlawfully “display” a copyrighted image if the image is stored on the original site’s server and is merely embedded in a search result that appears on a user’s screen. The photographers have an appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, asking the Court to reconsider its decision in Perfect 10. Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The Court now has the option to either overrule Perfect 10 and allow the photographers’ lawsuit to proceed, or to re-affirm it, thereby creating a circuit split that could eventually lead to U.S. Supreme Court review. Hunley v. Instagram.

Tattoos

Is reproducing a copyrighted image in a tattoo fair use? That is a question at issue in a case pending in New York. Photographer Jeffrey Sedlik took a photograph of musician Miles Davis. Later, a tattoo artist allegedly traced a printout of it to create a stencil to transfer to human skin as a tattoo. Sedlik filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The judge analyzed the claims using the four “fair use” factors. Although the ultimate ruling was that fact issues remained to be decided by a jury, the court issued some important rulings in the course of making that ruling. In particular, the court ruled that affixing an image to skin is not necessarily a protected “transformative use” of an image. According to the court, it is for a jury to decide whether the image at issue in a particular case has been changed significantly enough to be considered “transformative.” It will be interesting to see how this case ultimately plays out, especially if it is still pending when the United States Supreme Court announces its decision in the Warhol case (See below). Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg.

Digital libraries

The book publishers’ lawsuit against Internet Archive, about which I wrote in a previous blog post, is still at the summary judgment stage. Its potential future implications are far-reaching. It is a copyright infringement lawsuit that book publishers filed in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. The gravamen of the complaint is that Internet Archive allegedly has scanned over a million books and has made them freely available to the public via an Internet website without securing a license or permission from the copyright rights-holders. The case will test the “controlled digital lending” theory of fair use that was propounded in a white paper published by David R. Hansen and Kyle K. Courtney. They argued that distributing digitized copies of books by libraries should be regarded as the functional equivalent of lending physical copies of books to library patrons. Parties and amici have filed briefs in support of motions for summary judgment. An order on the motions is expected soon. The case is Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive.

Copyright registration

In Fourth Estate Public Benefits Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2019), the United States Supreme Court interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) to mean that a copyright owner cannot file an infringement claim in federal court without first securing either a registration certificate or an official notice of denial of registration from the Copyright Office. In an Illinois Law Review article, I argued that this imposes an unduly onerous burden on copyright owners and that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to abolish the requirement. Unfortunately, Congress has not done that. As I said in a previous blog post, Congressional inaction to correct a harsh law with potentially unjust consequences often leads to exercises of the judicial power of statutory interpretation to ameliorate those consequences. Unicolors v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz.

Unicolors, owner of the copyrights in various fabric designs, sued H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), alleging copyright infringement. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Unicolor, but H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law. H&M argued that Unicolors had failed to satisfy the requirement of obtaining a registration certificate prior to commencing suit. Although Unicolors had obtained a registration, H&M argued that the registration was not a valid one. Specifically, H&M argued that Unicolors had improperly applied to register multiple works with a single application. According to 37 CFR § 202.3(b)(4) (2020), a single application cannot be used to register multiple works unless all of the works in the application were included in the same unit of publication. The 31 fabric designs, H&M contended, had not all been first published at the same time in a single unit; some had been made available separately exclusively to certain customers. Therefore, they could not properly be registered together as a unit of publication.

The district court denied the motion, holding that a registration may be valid even if contains inaccurate information, provided the registrant did not know the information was inaccurate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court held that characterizing the group of works as a “unit of publication” in the registration application was a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact. The Court applied the traditional rule of thumb that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, in essence ruling that although a mistake of fact in a registration application might not invalidate the registration for purposes of the pre-litigation registration requirement, a mistake of law in an application will.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. It reversed the Ninth Circuit Court’s reversal, thereby allowing the infringement verdict to stand notwithstanding the improper registration of the works together as a unit of publication rather than individually.

It is hazardous to read too much into the ruling in this case. Copyright claimants certainly should not interpret it to mean that they no longer need to bother with registering a copyright before trying to enforce it in court, or that they do not need to concern themselves with doing it properly. The pre-litigation registration requirement still stands (in the United States), and the Court has not held that it condones willful blindness of legal requirements. Copyright claimants ignore them at their peril.

Andy Warhol, Prince Transformer

I wrote about the Warhol case in a previous blog post. Basically, it is a copyright infringement case alleging that Lynn Goldsmith took a photograph of Prince in her studio and that Andy Warhol later based a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations on it without a license or permission. The Andy Warhol Foundation sought a declaratory judgment that Warhol’s use of the photograph was “fair use.” Goldsmith counterclaimed for copyright infringement. The district court ruled in favor of Warhol and dismissed the photographer’s infringement claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court misapplied the four “fair use” factors and that the derivative works Warhol created do not qualify as fair use. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in October, 2022. A decision is expected next year.

Because this case gives the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to bring some clarity to the extremely murky “transformative use” area of copyright law, it is not only one of this year’s most important copyright cases, but it very likely will wind up being one of the most important copyright cases of all time. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith.

NFTs and Copyright

The rise in popularity of nonfungible tokens (NFTs) has generated considerable controversy and confusion about whether and how copyright law applies to them. In this article, Cokato, Minnesota attorney Thomas James discusses the interplay between NFTs and U.S. copyright law.

by Minnesota attorney Thomas James

The rise in popularity of nonfungible tokens (NFTs) has generated considerable controversy and confusion about whether and how copyright law applies to them. In this article, Cokato, Minnesota attorney Thomas James explains what they are and discusses the interplay between NFTs and U.S. copyright law.

 

Just for fun, call up an attorney and say, “Hey, I‘ve got a quick question for you. Can I make, sell and buy NFTs without getting into copyright trouble?” Depending on the attorney’s age, area of practice, and musical tastes, the answers you get may be anything from “What makes you think that selling shares of the Nichiyu Forklift Thailand company could raise copyright issues?” to “The answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind” – and many variants in between.

(More probably, someone other than the attorney would answer the phone and ask, “Would you like to set up an appointment?” That, however, would not help to make the point.)

Incidentally, don’t really make a telephone call like this “just for fun.” I was only joking I wouldn’t want you to incur unnecessary legal fees or be accused of making an unwanted or disturbing telephone call.

The point is that many members of the legal profession are scrambling just as much as everybody else is to understand NFTs and how copyright laws apply to them. The aim of this article is to reduce some of the confusion by shedding some light on what NFTs are and how copyright laws may apply to them.

What are NFTs?

NFT stands for “non-fungible token.”

Great. Now what the heck is that? Well, let’s break it down.

Fungible vs. Non-fungible

An item is said to be “fungible” if it is interchangeable with similar items. For example, if a retailer orders 100 pounds of red potatoes from a wholesaler, the contract is most likely one for the purchase of fungible goods. The retailer most likely has not specifically identified any particular potato that must be included in the batch, so long as they’re all of merchantable quality. By contrast, if an art collector enters into a contract to purchase an original painting by Peter Doig, it is almost certainly going to be a contract for a non-fungible product (the painting.) The buyer of a non-fungible item wants a specifically identified item.

Currency is a good illustration of the difference. When you cash a check at a bank, you don’t really care which particular bills and coins you are given in exchange for the check, so long as the amount you are given is equal to the amount specified on the check. The currency in this situation is fungible. By contrast, if you present a check for $4 million dollars to a rare coin vendor to purchase a 1913 Liberty V nickel, you would not consider it acceptable for the vendor to give you a standard-issue 2019 nickel in its place. The rare coin in this example is not fungible, i.e., it is non-fungible.

Tokens

A token is something that represents or stands for something else. New York City old-timers may recall subway tokens – small, coin-shaped objects representing the right of access to a subway train. Casino chips are tokens representing specified amounts of money.

A digital token is a programmable digital unit that is recorded on a digital ledger using blockchain technology. There are a lot of different kinds of digital tokens. They can represent physical goods or digital goods.

Bitcoins are examples of fungible digital tokens. Digital NFTs, on the other hand, most commonly represent art, a photograph, music, a video, a meme, or a digitized scan of some other kind. Cryptopunks, pixelated images of characters each one of which is unique and different from others, are some of the earliest NFTs, but many other examples abound.

Ethereum has developed standards for digital tokens. The ERC-721 standard governs digital NFTs. Under this standard, every NFT must have a tokenID. The tokenID is generated when the token is created. Every NFT also must have a contract address. This is a blockchain address that can be viewed using a blockchain scanner. The combination of tokenID and contract address is unique for each NFT.

Blockchains

Both fungible and nonfungible tokens are built and reside on blockchains. A blockchain is simply a database that stores information in digital format. Think of them as digital ledgers. They are called “block” chains because information is stored in groups (“blocks”). When a block reaches its storage capacity, it is closed and linked to the previously filled block. A new block will be formed for any new data that is added later. As this process repeats, a chain of records is created. Hence the “chain” in blockchain. Each block is time-stamped.

Blockchains are simply record-keeping mechanisms. They work well for many, but not all, kinds of digital files. They play a significant role in cryptocurrency systems, as they maintain a secure, decentralized record of transactions. They are not as efficient, however, for large digital files like artwork, videos, sound recordings, and so on. In these cases, a nonfungible token, not the actual file, can be made a part of the chain. This is why, in addition to a tokenID and contract address, an NFT will frequently contain the creator’s wallet address and a link to the work the token represents.

One of the most important things to remember about NFTs, for purposes of copyright law, is that although they might contain a creative work within them, more typically they link to a work in some way. They are pieces of code containing a link; they are not typically the works themselves.  

Transfers of NFTs vs. transfers of copyrights

NFTs representing artwork sometimes sell for millions of dollars. Perhaps this explains the popular misconception that the copyright in the work the NFT represents gets transferred along with the NFT. No, buying an NFT representing a work of art does not, by itself, give the buyer the rights of a copyright owner. You might think that you must be getting something more than a string of code when you buy an NFT, but no. In the United States anyway, an assignment of copyright must be express and made in a writing signed by the copyright owner (or the copyright owner’s authorized agent.)

Of course, if a written contract does expressly provide for the assignment of the copyright, then a transfer of a copyright may co-occur with the transfer of an NFT. In the absence of such a contractual provision, however, buying an NFT does not transfer the copyright in the artwork it represents. Instead, it operates in a way similar to the way buying a copy of a copyrighted book or a print of copyrighted artwork does.

The question whether the transfer of an NFT gives the transferee a copyright license is a little more complicated.

In the United States, an exclusive copyright license, like an outright transfer, must be in writing. A non-exclusive license, on the other hand, may be either express or implied. In addition, it is possible to code any type of agreement into a smart contract (an agreement that is written in code and stored on a blockchain.) If the existence of a valid copyright license can be proven, then the nature and extent of the NFT transferee’s rights may be governed by its terms.

A U.S. federal court had occasion to address the subject of implied copyright licenses in the case of Pelaez v. McGraw Hill, 399 F. Supp. 3d 120 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). There, the court ruled that the test for an implied license is whether the parties’ conduct, taken as a whole, demonstrates an intent to grant a license. The court pointed out that an implied license cannot be based on the unilateral expectations of one person. A party’s subjective belief that he or she has been granted a license is not enough. The totality of facts and circumstances must be such that a court could reasonably infer that both parties intended a license.

Copyright ownership arises at the time an original, creative, expressive work is fixed in a tangible medium. Registration is not required. Despite this feature of copyright law, some countries make registration of the copyright a prerequisite to enforcing it in court. The United States is such a country.

Some people believe that because blockchain operates as an unalterable record of ownership, it serves as a substitute for registration with the U.S. Copyright Office. This is not the case.

The U.S. Copyright Act requires the copyright in a domestic work to be registered with the Copyright Office before an infringement claim may be filed in court. 17 U.S.C. § 411. It does not make an exception for cases in which ownership is sought to be proven by a “poor man’s copyright” (i.e., submitting into evidence the postmark on an envelope in which you have mailed a copy of the work to yourself), much less for a digital NFT.

Of course, a registration certificate only creates a presumption of copyright ownership. The presumption is rebuttable. Could evidence such as the date on which an NFT representing the work was created and written into the blockchain be used to rebut that presumption? Possibly. Then again, how probative is that evidence? Anyone can make a false ownership claim and write it into the blockchain, just as anyone can mail an infringing copy of a work to themselves.

Unless Congress amends the Copyright Act to make blockchain a substitute for registration with the Copyright Office, it would be foolhardy to rely on blockchain as a registration alternative.

Infringement

Is minting an NFT associated with a copyrighted work, without permission, infringement? The answer to this question is not as simple as you might think.

The exclusive rights of a copyright owner include reproduction, distribution, public display, public performance, and the making of derivative works. An NFT containing only a tokenID, contract address and a link to a work is merely a string of code associated with a work; it is not the work itself. If an NFT only contains a link to the work, not the work itself, then it is difficult to see how minting an NFT would violate any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner.

Of course, if the NFT itself contains copyright-protected elements of the work (and this would have to be something more than the title, artist name and a link), then it might be a reproduction or a derivative of the work. In this situation, creating an NFT without the copyright owner’s permission could constitute infringement, since the copyright owner has the exclusive right to make copies and derivatives of the work.

If the link points to a copy or derivative work that the link creator created in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to make copies and derivative works, then the link creator could incur two kinds of infringement liability. Even if minting an NFT does not itself infringe a copyright, including in it a link to an infringing copy of a copyright-protected work could result in contributory liability for infringement if that person knows or should know that it will facilitate or encourage unauthorized copying (or other unauthorized use) of a copyrighted work. And of course, there would be direct liability for making the copy or the derivative work without the copyright owner’s permission.

The first sale doctrine

Under U.S. copyright law, the purchaser of a lawfully acquired copy of a copyrighted work may resell that copy without first getting the copyright owner’s permission, unless a contract governing the acquisition of the copy provides otherwise. This is why purchasing a paperback copy of The Andromeda Strain on Amazon.com and later reselling it at a garage sale will not subject you to liability for infringing the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute copies of the work.

Does the first sale doctrine also apply to NFTs?

The first sale doctrine generally does not apply to resales of digital goods. This is because a sale of a digital file normally will require making a copy of the file. That would violate the copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduce his or her work. See, e.g., Capitol Records LLC v. ReDigi Inc. (2d Cir. 2018) (refusing to apply the first sale doctrine to the resale of an MP3 file because the resale would require making an unauthorized reproduction of the original MP3 file).

NFTs, however, arguably are distinguishable from MP3 files. A purchaser of an NFT does not buy the digital file containing the copyright-protected work. An NFT buyer simply purchases a token. Reselling a token does not involve reproducing the work itself. cf. Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Redbox Automated Retail LLC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2018 (first sale doctrine inapplicable to digital download codes because they are options to create a physical copy, not actual sales of copies).

If the transferee of an NFT uses it to access the copyrighted work, and in the course of doing so, the work is reproduced or distributed, then it would seem that the transferee could, at that point, be liable for copyright infringement. There would also appear to be a potential risk of liability for contributory infringement on the part of the NFT seller, at least in some cases.

Of course, this should not be a problem if the copyright owner has authorized resales by NFT buyers.

Contact Minnesota attorney Thomas James

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