AI Legislative Update

Congressional legislation to regulate artificial intelligence (“AI”) and AI companies is in the early formative stages. Just about the only thing that is certain at this point is that federal regulation in the United States is coming.

Congressional legislation to regulate artificial intelligence (“AI”) and AI companies is in the early formative stages. Just about the only thing that is certain at this point is that federal regulation in the United States is coming.

In August, 2023, Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) and Josh Hawley (R-MO) introduced a Bipartisan Framework for U.S. AI Act. The Framework sets out five bullet points identifying Congressional legislative objectives:

  • Establish a federal regulatory regime implemented through licensing AI companies, to include requirements that AI companies provide information about their AI models and maintain “risk management, pre-deployment testing, data governance, and adverse incident reporting programs.”
  • Ensure accountability for harms through both administrative enforcement and private rights of action, where “harms” include private or civil right violations. The Framework proposes making Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act inapplicable to these kinds of actions. (Second 230 is the provision that generally grants immunity to Facebook, Google and other online service providers for user-provided content.) The Framework identifies the harms about which it is most concerned as “explicit deepfake imagery of real people, production of child sexual abuse material from generative A.I. and election interference.” Noticeably absent is any mention of harms caused by copyright infringement.
  • Restrict the sharing of AI technology with Russia, China or other “adversary nations.”
  • Promote transparency: The Framework would require AI companies to disclose information about the limitations, accuracy and safety of their AI models to users; would give consumers a right to notice when they are interacting with an AI system; would require providers to watermark or otherwise disclose AI-generated deepfakes; and would establish a public database of AI-related “adverse incidents” and harm-causing failures.
  • Protect consumers and kids. “Consumer should have control over how their personal data is used in A.I. systems and strict limits should be imposed on generative A.I. involving kids.”

The Framework does not address copyright infringement, whether of the input or the output variety.

The Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law held a hearing on September 12, 2023. Witnesses called to testify generally approved of the Framework as a starting point.

The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety and Data Security also held a hearing on September 12, called The Need for Transparency in Artificial Intelligence. One of the witnesses, Dr. Ramayya Krishnan, Carnegie Mellon University, did raise a concern about the use of copyrighted material by AI systems and the economic harm it causes for creators.

On September 13, 2023, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) held an “AI Roundtable.” Invited attendees present at the closed-door session included Bill Gates (Microsoft), Elon Musk (xAI, Neuralink, etc.) Sundar Pichai (Google), Charlie Rivkin (MPA), and Mark Zuckerberg (Meta). Gates, whose Microsoft company, like those headed by some of the other invitees, has been investing heavily in generative-AI development, touted the claim that AI could target world hunger.

Meanwhile, Dana Rao, Adobe’s Chief Trust Officer, penned a proposal that Congress establish a federal anti-impersonation right to address the economic harms generative-AI causes when it impersonates the style or likeness of an author or artist. The proposed law would be called the Federal Anti-Impersonation Right Act, or “FAIR Act,” for short. The proposal would provide for the recovery of statutory damages by artists who are unable to prove actual economic damages.

Generative AI: Perfect Tool for the Age of Deception

For many reasons, the new millennium might well be described as the Age of Deception. Cokato Copyright Attorney Tom James explains why generative-AI is a perfect fit for it.

Illustrating generative AI
Image by Gerd Altmann on Pixabay.

What is generative AI?

“AI,” of course, stands for artificial intelligence. Generative AI is a variety of it that can produce content such as text and images, seemingly of its own creation. I say “seemingly” because in reality these kinds of AI tools are not really independently creating these images and lines of text. Rather, they are “trained” to emulate existing works created by humans. Essentially, they are derivative work generation machines that enable the creation of derivative works based on potentially millions of human-created works.

AI has been around for decades. It wasn’t until 2014, however, that the technology began to be refined to the point that it could generate text, images, video and audio so similar to real people and their creations that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the average person to tell the difference.

Rapid advances in the technology in the past few years have yielded generative-AI tools that can write entire stories and articles, seemingly paint artistic images, and even generate what appear to be photographic images of people.

AI “hallucinations” (aka lies)

In the AI field, a “hallucination” occurs when an AI tool (such as ChatGPT) generates a confident response that is not justified by the data on which it has been trained.

For example, I queried ChatGPT about whether a company owned equally by a husband and wife could qualify for the preferences the federal government sets aside for women-owned businesses. The chatbot responded with something along the lines of “Certainly” or “Absolutely,” explaining that the U.S. government is required to provide equal opportunities to all people without discriminating on the basis of sex, or something along those lines. When I cited the provision of federal law that contradicts what the chatbot had just asserted, it replied with an apology and something to the effect of “My bad.”

I also asked ChatGPT if any U.S. law imposes unequal obligations on male citizens. The chatbot cheerily reported back to me that no, no such laws exist. I then cited the provision of the United States Code that imposes an obligation to register for Selective Service only upon male citizens. The bot responded that while that is true, it is unimportant and irrelevant because there has not been a draft in a long time and there is not likely to be one anytime soon. I explained to the bot that this response was irrelevant. Young men can be, and are, denied the right to government employment and other civic rights and benefits if they fail to register, regardless of whether a draft is in place or not, and regardless of whether they are prosecuted criminally or not. At this point, ChatGPT announced that it would not be able to continue this conversation with me. In addition, it made up some excuse. I don’t remember what it was, but it was something like too many users were currently logged on.

These are all examples of AI hallucinations. If a human being were to say them, we would call them “lies.”

Generating lie after lie

AI tools regularly concoct lies. For example, when asked to generate a financial statement for a company, a popular AI tool falsely stated that the company’s revenue was some number it apparently had simply made up. According to Slate, in their article, “The Alarming Deceptions at the Heart of an Astounding New Chatbot,” users of large language models like ChatGPT have been complaining that these tools randomly insert falsehoods into the text they generate. Experts now consider frequent “hallucination” (aka lying) to be a major problem in chatbots.

ChatGPT has also generated fake case precedents, replete with plausible-sounding citations. This phenomenon made the news when Stephen Schwartz submitted six fake ChatGPT-generated case precedents in his brief to the federal district court for the Southern District of New York in Mata v. Avianca. Schwartz reported that ChatGPT continued to insist the fake cases were authentic even after their nonexistence was discovered. The judge proceeded to ban the submission of AI-generated filings that have not been reviewed by a human, saying that generative-AI tools

are prone to hallucinations and bias…. [T]hey make stuff up – even quotes and citations. Another issue is reliability or bias. While attorneys swear an oath to set aside their personal prejudices,… generative artificial intelligence is the product of programming devised by humans who did not have to swear such an oath. As such, these systems hold no allegiance to…the truth.

Judge Brantley Starr, Mandatory Certification Regarding Generative Artificial Intelligence.

Facilitating defamation

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act generally shields Facebook, Google and other online services from liability for providing a platform for users to publish false and defamatory information about other people. That has been a real boon for people who like to destroy other people’s reputations by means of spreading lies and misinformation about them online. It can be difficult and expensive to sue an individual for defamation, particularly when the individual has taken steps to conceal and/or lie about his or her identity. Generative AI tools make the job of defaming people even simpler and easier.

More concerning than the malicious defamatory liars, however, are the many people who earnestly rely on AI as a research tool. In July, 2023, Mark Walters filed a lawsuit against OpenAI, claiming its ChatGPT tool provided false and defamatory misinformation about him to journalist Fred Riehl. I wrote about this lawsuit in a previous blog post. Shortly after this lawsuit was filed, a defamation lawsuit was filed against Microsoft, alleging that its AI tool, too, had generated defamatory lies about an individual. Generative-AI tools can generate false and defamation statements about individuals even if no one has any intention of defaming anyone or ruining another person’s reputation.

Facilitating false light invasion of privacy

Generative AI is also highly effective in portraying people in a false light. In one recently filed lawsuit, Jack Flora and others allege, among other things, that Prisma Labs’ Lensa app generates sexualized images from images of fully-clothed people, and that the company failed to notify users about the biometric data it collects and how it will be stored and/or destroyed. Flora et al. v. Prisma Labs, Inc., No. 23-cv-00680 (N.D. Calif. February 15, 2023).

Pot, meet kettle; kettle, pot

“False news is harmful to our community, it makes the world less informed, and it erodes trust. . . . At Meta, we’re working to fight the spread of false news.” Meta (nee Facebook) published that statement back in 2017.  Since then, it has engaged in what is arguably the most ambitious campaign in history to monitor and regulate the content of conversations among humans. Yet, it has also joined other mega-organizations Google and Microsoft in investing multiple billions of dollars in what is the greatest boon to fake news in recorded history: generative-AI.

Toward a braver new world

It would be difficult to imagine a more efficient method of facilitating widespread lying and deception (not to mention false and hateful rhetoric) – and therefore propaganda – than generative-AI. Yet, these mega-organizations continue to sink more and more money into further development and deployment of these lie-generators.

I dread what the future holds in store for our children and theirs.

Another AI lawsuit against Microsoft and OpenAI

Last June, Microsoft, OpenAI and others were hit with a class action lawsuit involving their AI data-scraping technologies. On Tuesday (September 5, 2023) another class action lawsuit was filed against them. The gravamen of both of these complaints is that these companies allegedly trained their AI technologies using personal information from millions of users, in violation of federal and state privacy statutes and other laws.

Among the laws alleged to have been violated are the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the California Invasion of Privacy Act, California’s unfair competition law, Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The lawsuits also allege a variety of common law claims, including negligence, invasion of privacy, conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of the duty to warn, and such.

This is just the most recent lawsuit in a growing body of claims against big AI. Many involve allegations of copyright infringement, but privacy is a growing concern. This particular suit is asking for an award of monetary damages and an order that would require the companies to implement safeguards for the protection of private data.

Microsoft reportedly has invested billions of dollars in OpenAI and its app, ChatGPT.

The case is A.T. v. OpenAI LP, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, No. 3:23-cv-04557 (September 5, 2023).

Is Microsoft “too big to fail” in court? We shall see.

A Recent Exit from Paradise

Over a year ago, Steven Thaler filed an application with the United States Copyright Office to register a copyright in an AI-generated image called “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.” In the application, he listed a machine as the “author” and himself as the copyright owner. The Copyright Office refused registration  on the grounds that the work lacked human authorship. Thaler then filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking to overturn that determination. On August 18, 2023 the court upheld the Copyright Office’s refusal of registration. The case is Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. CV 22-1564 (BAH), 2023 WL 5333236 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023).

Read more about the history of this case in my previous blog post, “A Recent Entrance to Complexity.”

The Big Bright Green Creativity Machine

In his application for registration, Thaler had listed his computer, referred to as “Creativity Machine,” as the “author” of the work, and himself as a claimant. The Copyright Office denied registration on the basis that copyright only protects human authorship.

Taking the Copyright Office to court

Unsuccessful in securing a reversal through administrative appeals, Thaler filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming the Office’s denial of registration was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law….”

The court ultimately sided with the Copyright Office. In its decision, it provided a cogent explanation of the rationale for the human authorship requirement:

The act of human creation—and how to best encourage human individuals to engage in that creation, and thereby promote science and the useful arts—was thus central to American copyright from its very inception. Non-human actors need no incentivization with the promise of exclusive rights under United States law, and copyright was therefore not designed to reach them.

Id.

A Complex Issue

As I discussed in a previous blog post, the issue is not as simple as it might seem. There are different levels of human involvement in the use of an AI content generating mechanism. At one extreme, there are programs like “Paint,” in which users provide a great deal of input. These kinds of programs may be analogized to paintbrushes, pens and other tools that artists traditionally have used to express their ideas on paper or canvas. Word processing programs are also in this category. It is easy to conclude that the users of these kinds of programs are the authors of works that may be sufficiently creative and original to receive copyright protection.

At the other end of the spectrum are AI services like DALL-E and ChatGPT. These tools are capable of generating content with very little user input. If the only human input is a user’s directive to “Draw a picture,” then it would be difficult to claim that the author contributed any creative expression. That is to say, it would be difficult to claim that the user authored anything.

The difficult question – and one that is almost certain to be the subject of ongoing litigation and probably new Copyright Office regulations – is exactly how much, and what kind of, human input is necessary before a human can claim authorship.  Equally as perplexing is how much, if at all, the Copyright Office should involve itself in ascertaining and evaluating the details of the process by which a work was created. And, of course, what consequences should flow from an applicant’s failure to disclose complete details about the nature and extent of machine involvement in the creative process.

Conclusion

The court in this case did not dive into these issues. The only thing we can safely take away from this decision is the broad proposition that a work is not protected by copyright to the extent it is generated by a machine.

A copyright win in the Internet Archive lawsuit

Book publishers have won their lawsuit against the Internet Archive. What does it mean for copyright owners? Cokato Copyright Attorney Tom James explains.

New York Public Library public domain image; this is NOT the library that is involved in this lawsuit.

In a previous blog post, I wrote about a lawsuit that book publishers Hachette Book Group et al. have filed against Internet Archive (“IA”) et al. The lawsuit alleges that IA scans copyright-protected printed books into a digital format, uploads them to its servers, and distributes these digital copies to members of the public via a website – all without a license and without paying the authors and publishers. The lawsuit asserts claims of copyright infringement.

A permanent injunction

Judge John Koeltl has now approved a consent judgment providing for a permanent injunction that prohibits Internet Archive from scanning and distributing copyrighted books. It applies only to books that copyright owners have already published and made available in e-book format. As Judge Koeltl put it: “The Court has narrowly tailored the injunctive relief in this case to cover only copyrighted works, like the Works in Suit, that are available from the Publishers in electronic form.”

IA reportedly plans to appeal.

A new lawsuit

This month, Sony Music Entertainment et al. filed a similar copyright infringement lawsuit against IA. This complaint alleges that IA digitized and distributed digital copies of 78 rpm records by Frank Sinatra, Billie Holiday, and other recording artists in violation of the rights of copyright owners.

Sham Books: The latest generative-AI scam

Copyright issues raised by generative-AI (artificial intelligence) have been receiving extensive coverage and discussion lately. Generative-AI has given rise to another kind of problem, too, though. People are generating books “in the style of” books by well-known authors and marketing them to the public as if they were written by those authors when in fact they were not.

Fake books

Jane Friedman was one of the first to report the problem of AI-generated fake books.

The way it works is this: A person asks a generative-AI tool to write a book in the style of a particular named author. Usually it is a well-known author and/or one whose books sell well. The person then creates a listing on Amazon or another online marketplace for the book, misrepresenting it to be the work of the named author rather than AI-generated. Proceeds from sales of these unauthorized knock-offs are then shared between the marketplace provider (Amazon, eBay, etc.) and the fraudster.

Removal difficulties

It can be difficult for an author to get these knock-offs removed. Of course, if you are able to prove that one of these sham books infringes the copyright in one of your works, that should provide a basis for removal. In many cases, however, it can be difficult to prove that an AI-generated book actually copied from any particular book. A book “in the style of” so-and-so might have a completely different setting, plot, characters and so on. Generative-AI tools can generate a book on a theme that a named author commonly writes about, but copyright cannot be claimed in themes.

Trademark law is not necessarily of much help, either. Publishing under a name under which someone else is already publishing is not illegal. In fact, it is quite common. For example, five different people named Scott Adams publish under that name.

The sham books not being pirated or counterfeit copies of any existing work, and an author not having secured a trademark registration in his or her name (not always possible), can be obstacles to getting a title removed on the basis of copyright or trademark infringement.

The Lanham Act

The Lanham Act, sometimes called the Trademark Act, is a federal law that prohibits a wider range of activity than merely trademark infringement. It prohibits false and misleading designations of origin (false advertising), as well, including attempts to pass off a product as somebody else’s. No trademark registration is necessary for these kinds of Lanham Act claims.

These provisions offer a small glimmer of hope. Unfortunately, these kinds of claims are not as easy for marketplace providers like Amazon to sort out, as compared with a claim that someone is using a trademark that is confusingly similar to one that has been registered.

Other legal remedies

The Copyright Act and Lanham Act are not the only possible sources of legal recourse. Book authorship fraud is likely unlawful under state unfair competition and deceptive trade practices laws. In many jurisdictions, a claim for damages for misappropriation of name or likeness, or of exclusive publicity rights, may be viable.

As a practical matter, though, these rights may be difficult to enforce. Marketplace providers are equipped to handle claims where someone is able to produce a trademark or copyright registration certificate to support their claims, but they are not courts. They are not equipped to decide the kinds of fact issues that typically need to be decided in order to resolve competing claims to rights in a work, or likelihood of confusion and so on.

This seems to me to be yet another aspect of generative-AI that is ripe for legislation.


Photograph by Martin Vorel, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0, via Wikimedia Commons. The image has not been modified. No suggestion is made that the licensor endorses this author or this use.

Generative-AI: The Top 12 Lawsuits

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is generating more than content; it is generating lawsuits. Here is a brief chronology of what I believe are the most significant lawsuits that have been filed so far.

Artificial intelligence (“AI”) is generating more than content; it is generating lawsuits. Here is a brief chronology of what I believe are the most significant lawsuits that have been filed so far.

Most of these allege copyright infringement, but some make additional or other kinds of claims, such as trademark, privacy or publicity right violations, defamation, unfair competition, and breach of contract, among others. So far, the suits primarily target the developers and purveyors of generative AI chatbots and similar technology. They focus more on what I call “input” than on “output” copyright infringement. That is to say, they allege that copyright infringement is involved in the way particular AI tools are trained.

Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH et al. v. ROSS Intelligence (May, 2020)

Thomson Reuters Enterprise Centre GmbH et al. v. ROSS Intelligence Inc., No. 20-cv-613 (D. Del. 2020)

Thomson Reuters alleges that ROSS Intelligence copied its Westlaw database without permission and used it to train a competing AI-driven legal research platform. In defense, ROSS has asserted that it only copied ideas and facts from the Westlaw database of legal research materials. (Facts and ideas are not protected by copyright.) ROSS also argues that its use of content in the Westlaw database is fair use.

One difference between this case and subsequent generative-AI copyright infringement cases is that the defendant in this case is alleged to have induced a third party with a Westlaw license to obtain allegedly proprietary content for the defendant after the defendant had been denied a license of its own. Other cases involve generative AI technologies that operate by scraping publicly available content.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. While those motions were pending, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 1258 (2023). The parties have now filed supplemental briefs asserting competing arguments about whether and how the Court’s treatment of transformative use in that case should be interpreted and applied in this case. A decision on the motions is expected soon.

Doe 1 et al. v. GitHub et al. (November, 2022)

Doe 1 et al. v. GitHub, Inc. et al., No. 22-cv-06823 (N.D. Calif. November 3, 2022)

This is a class action lawsuit against GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI that was filed in November, 2022. It involves GitHub’s CoPilot, an AI-powered tool that suggests lines of programming code based on what a programmer has written. The complaint alleges that Copilot copies code from publicly available software repositories without complying with the terms of applicable open-source licenses. The complaint also alleges removal of copyright management information in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202, unfair competition, and other tort claims.

Andersen et al. v. Stability AI et al. (January 13, 2023)

Andersen et al. v. Stability AI et al., No. 23-cv-00201 (N.D. Calif. Jan. 13, 2023)

Artists Sarah Andersen, Kelly McKernan, and Karla Ortiz filed this class action lawsuit against generative-AI companies Stability AI, Midjourney, and DeviantArt on January 13, 2023. The lawsuit alleges that the defendants infringed their copyrights by using their artwork without permission to train AI-powered image generators to create allegedly infringing derivative works.  The lawsuit also alleges violations of 17 U.S.C. § 1202 and publicity rights, breach of contract, and unfair competition.

Getty Images v. Stability AI (February 3, 2023)

Getty Images v. Stability AI, No. 23-cv-00135-UNA (D. Del. February 23, 2023)

Getty Images has filed two lawsuits against Stability AI, one in the United Kingdom and one in the United States, each alleging both input and output copyright infringement. Getty Images owns the rights to millions of images. It is in the business of licensing rights to use copies of the images to others. The lawsuit also accuses Stability AI of falsifying, removing or altering copyright management information, trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair competition, and deceptive trade practices.

Stability AI has moved to dismiss the complaint filed in the U.S. for lack of jurisdiction.

Flora et al. v. Prisma Labs (February 15, 2023)

Flora et al. v. Prisma Labs, Inc., No. 23-cv-00680 (N.D. Calif. February 15, 2023)

Jack Flora and others filed a class action lawsuit against Prisma Labs for invasion of privacy. The complaint alleges, among other things, that the defendant’s Lensa app generates sexualized images from images of fully-clothed people, and that the company failed to notify users about the biometric data it collects and how it will be stored and/or destroyed, in violation of Illinois’s data privacy laws.

Young v. NeoCortext (April 3, 2023)

Young v. NeoCortext, Inc., 2023-cv-02496 (C.D. Calif. April 3, 2023)

This is a publicity rights case. NeoCortext’s Reface app allows users to paste images of their own faces over those of celebrities in photographs and videos. Kyland Young, a former cast member of the Big Brother reality television show, has sued NeoCortext for allegedly violating his publicity rights. The complaint alleges that NeoCortext has “commercially exploit[ed] his and thousands of other actors, musicians, athletes, celebrities, and other well-known individuals’ names, voices, photographs, or likenesses to sell paid subscriptions to its smartphone application, Refacewithout their permission.”

NeoCortext has asserted a First Amendment defense, among others.

Walters v. Open AI (June 5, 2023)

Walters v. OpenAI, LLC, No. 2023-cv-03122 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2023) (Complaint originally filed in Gwinnett County, Georgia Superior Court on June 5, 2023; subsequently removed to federal court)

This is a defamation action against OpenAI, the company responsible for ChatGPT. The lawsuit was brought by Mark Walters. He alleges that ChatGPT provided false and defamatory misinformation about him to journalist Fred Riehl in connection with a federal civil rights lawsuit against Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson and members of his staff. ChatGPT allegedly stated that the lawsuit was one for fraud and embezzlement on the part of Mr. Walters. The complaint alleges that Mr. Walters was “neither a plaintiff nor a defendant in the lawsuit,” and “every statement of fact” pertaining to him in the summary of the federal lawsuit that ChatGPT prepared is false. A New York court recently addressed the questions of sanctions for attorneys who submit briefs containing citations to non-existent “precedents” that were entirely made up by ChatGPT. This is the first case to address tort liability for ChatGPT’s notorious creation of “hallucinatory facts.”

In July, 2023, Jeffrey Battle filed a complaint against Microsoft in Maryland alleging that he, too, has been defamed as a result of AI-generated “hallucinatory facts.”

P.M. et al. v. OpenAI et al. (June 28, 2023)

P.M. et al. v. OpenAI LP et al., No. 2023-cv-03199 (N.D. Calif. June 28, 2023)

This lawsuit has been brought by underage individuals against OpenAI and Microsoft. The complaint alleges the defendants’ generative-AI products ChatGPT, Dall-E and Vall-E collect private and personally identifiable information from children without their knowledge or informed consent. The complaint sets out claims for alleged violations of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; California’s Invasion of Privacy Act and unfair competition law; Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act, Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act; New York General Business Law § 349 (deceptive trade practices); and negligence, invasion of privacy, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of duty to warn.

Tremblay v. OpenAI (June 28, 2023)

Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc., No. 23-cv-03223 (N.D. Calif. June 28, 2023)

Another copyright infringement lawsuit against OpenAI relating to its ChatGPT tool. In this one, authors allege that ChatGPT is trained on the text of books they and other proposed class members authored, and facilitates output copyright infringement. The complaint sets forth claims of copyright infringement, DMCA violations, and unfair competition.

Silverman et al. v. OpenAI (July 7, 2023)

Silverman et al. v. OpenAI, No. 23-cv-03416 (N.D. Calif. July 7, 2023)

Sarah Silverman (comedian/actress/writer) and others allege that OpenAI, by using copyright-protected works without permission to train ChatGPT, committed direct and vicarious copyright infringement, violated section 17 U.S.C. 1202(b), and their rights under unfair competition, negligence, and unjust enrichment law.

Kadrey et al. v. Meta Platforms (July 7, 2023)

Kadrey et al. v. Meta Platforms, No. 2023-cv-03417 (N.D. Calif. July 7, 2023)

The same kinds of allegations as are made in Silverman v. OpenAI, but this time against Meta Platforms, Inc.

J.L. et al. v. Alphabet (July 11, 2023)

J.L. et al. v. Alphabet, Inc. et al. (N.D. Calif. July 11, 2023)

This is a lawsuit against Google and its owner Alphabet, Inc. for allegedly scraping and harvesting private and personal user information, copyright-protected works, and emails, without notice or consent. The complaint alleges claims for invasion of privacy, unfair competition, negligence, copyright infringement, and other causes of action.

On the Regulatory Front

The U.S. Copyright Office is examining the problems associated with registering copyrights in works that rely, in whole or in part, on artificial intelligence. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has suggested that generative-AI implicates “competition concerns.”. Lawmakers in the United States and the European Union are considering legislation to regulate AI in various ways.

Let’s Stop Analogizing Human Creators to Machines

Of course, policy discussions usually begin with the existing framework, but in this instance, it can be a shaky starting place because generative AI presents some unique challenges—and not just for the practice of copyright law.

[Guest post by David Newhoff, author of The Illusion of More and Who Invented Oscar Wilde? The Photograph at the Center of Modern American Copyright.]

Just as it is folly to anthropomorphize computers and robots, it is also unhelpful to discuss the implications of generative AI in copyright law by analogizing machines to authors.[1] In 2019, I explored the idea that “machine learning” could be analogous to human reading if the human happens to have an eidetic memory. But this was a thought exercise, and in that post, I also imagined machine training that serves a computer science or research purpose—not necessarily generative AIs trained on protected works designed to produce works without authors.

In the present discussion, however, certain parties weighing in on AI and copyright seem to advocate policy that is premised on the language and principles of existing doctrine as applicable to the technological processes of both the input and output sides of the generative AI equation. Of course, policy discussions usually begin with the existing framework, but in this instance, it can be a shaky starting place because generative AI presents some unique challenges—and not just for the practice of copyright law.

We should be wary of analogizing machine functions to human activity for the simple reason that copyright law (indeed all law) has never been anything but anthropocentric. Although it is difficult to avoid speaking in terms of machines “learning” or “creating,” it is essential that we either constantly remind ourselves that these are weak, inaccurate metaphors, or that a new glossary is needed to describe what certain AIs may be doing in the world of creative production.

On the input (training) side of the equation, the moment someone says something like, “Humans learn to make art by looking at art, and generative AIs do the same thing,” the speaker should be directed to the break-out session on sci-fi and excused from any serious conversation about applicable copyright law. Likewise, on the output side, comparisons of AI to other technological developments—from the printing press to Photoshop—should be presumed irrelevant unless the AI at issue can plausibly be described as a tool of the author rather than the primary maker of a work of creative expression.

Copyright Office Guidance Highlights Some Key Difficulties

To emphasize the exceptional nature of this discussion, even experts are somewhat confused by both the doctrinal and administrative aspects in the new guidelines published by U.S. Copyright Office directing authors how to disclaim AI-generated material in a registration application. The confusion is hardly surprising because generative AI has prompted the Office to ask an unprecedented question—namely, How was this work made?

As noted in several posts, copyrightability has always been agnostic with regard to the creative process. Copyright rights attach to works that show a modicum of originality, and the Copyright Office does not generally ask what tools, methods, etc. the author used to make a work.[2] But this historic practice was then confronted by the now widely reported applications submitted by Stephen Thaler and Kris Kashtanova, both claiming copyright in visual works made with generative AI.

In both cases, the Copyright Office rejected registration applications for the visual works based on the longstanding, bright-line doctrine that copyright rights can only attach to works made by human beings. In Thaler’s case, the consideration is straightforward because the claimant affirmed that the image was produced entirely by a machine. Kashtanova, on the other hand, asserts more than de minimis authorship (i.e., using AI as a tool) to produce the visual works elements in a comic book.

Whether in response to Kashtanova—or certainly anticipating applications yet to come—the muddiness of the Office guidelines is an attempt to address the difficult question as to whether copyright attaches to a work that combines authorship and AI generation, and how to draw distinctions between the two. This is not only new territory for the Office as a doctrinal matter but is a potential mess as an administrative one.

The Copyright Office has never been tasked with separating the protectable expression attributable to a human from the unprotectable expression attributable to a machine. Even if it could be said that photography has always provoked this tension (a discussion on its own), the analysis has never been an issue for the Office when registering works, but only for the courts in resolving claims of infringement. In fact, Warhol v. Goldsmith, although a fair use case, is a prime example of how tricky it can be to separate the factual elements of a photograph from the expressive elements.

But now the Copyright Office is potentially tasked with a copyrightability question that, in practice, would ask both the author and the examiner to engage in a version of the idea/expression dichotomy analysis—first separating the machine generated material from the author’s material and then considering whether the author has a valid claim in the protectable expression.

This is not so easy to accomplish in a work that combines author and machine-made elements in a manner that may be subtly intertwined; it begs new questions about what the AI “contributed” to a given work; and the inquiry is further complicated by the variety of AI tools in the market or in development. Then, because neither the author/claimant nor the Office examiner is likely a copyright attorney (let alone a court), the inquiry is fraught with difficulty as an administrative process—and that’s if the author makes a good-faith effort to disclaim the AI-generated material in the first place.

Many independent authors are confused enough by the Limit of Claim in a registration application or the concept of “published” versus “unpublished.” Asking these same creators to delve into the metaphysics implied by the AI/Author distinction seems like a dubious enterprise, and one that is not likely to foster more faith in the copyright system than the average indie creator has right now.

Copyrightability Could Remain Blind But …

It is understandable that some creators (e.g., filmmakers using certain plug-ins) may be concerned that the Copyright Office has already taken too broad a view—connoting a per se rule that denies copyrightability for any work generated with any AI technology. This concern is a reminder that AI should not be discussed as a monolithic topic because not all AI enhanced products do the same thing. And again, this may imply a need for some new terms rather than the words we use to describe human activities.

In this light, one could follow a different line of reasoning and argue that the agnosticism of copyrightability vis-à-vis process has always implied a presumption of human authorship where other factors—from technological enhancements to dumb luck—invisibly contribute to the protectable expression. Relatedly, a photographer can add a filter or plug-in that changes the expressive qualities of her image, but doing so is considered part of the selection and arrangement aspect of her authorship and does not dilute the copyrightability of the image.

Some extraordinary visual work has already been produced by professional artists using AI to yield results that are too strikingly well-crafted to believe that the author has not exerted considerable influence over the final image. In this regard, then, perhaps the copyrightability question at the registration stage, no matter how sophisticated the “filter” becomes, should remain blind to process. The Copyright Office could continue to register works submitted by valid claimants without asking the novel How question.

But the more that works may be generated with little or no human spark, the more this agnostic, status-quo approach could unravel the foundation of copyright rights altogether. And it would not be the first time that major tech companies have sought to do exactly that. It is no surprise that an AI developer or a producer using AI would seek the financial benefits of copyright protection; but without a defensible presence of human expression in the work, the exclusive rights of copyright cannot vest in a person with the standing to defend those rights. Nowhere in U.S. law do non-humans have rights of any kind, and this foundational principle reminds us that although machine activity can be compared to human activity as an allegorical construct, this is too whimsical for a serious policy discussion.

Again, I highlight this tangle of administrative and doctrinal factors to emphasize the point that generative AI does not merely present new variations on old questions (e.g., photography), but raises novel questions that cannot easily be answered by analogies to the past. If the challenges presented by generative AI are to be resolved sensibly, and in a way that will serve independent creators, policymakers and thought leaders on copyright law should be skeptical of arguments that too earnestly attempt to transpose centuries of doctrine for human activity into principles applied to machine activity.


[1] I do not distinguish “human” authors, because there is no other kind.

[2] I say “generally” only because I cannot account for every conversation among claimants and examiners.

Balancing the First Amendment on Whiskey and Dog Toys

The US Supreme Court has heard oral arguments and will soon decide the fate of the “Bad Spaniels” dog toy.

The United States Supreme Court has weighed First Amendment rights in the balance against many things: privacy, national security, the desire to protect children from hearing a bad word on the radio, to name a few. Now the Court will need to balance them against trademark interests. The Court heard oral arguments in Jack Daniel’s Props. v. VIP Prods., No. 22-148, on March 22, 2023.

I’ve written about this case before. To summarize, it is a dispute between whiskey manufacturer Jack Daniel’s and dog-toy maker VIP Products. The dog toy in question is shaped like a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey and has a label that looks like the famous whiskey label. Instead of “Jack Daniel’s,” though, the dog toy is called “Bad Spaniels.” Instead of “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee sour mash whiskey,” the dog toy label reads, “Old No. 2 on your Tennessee carpet.”

VIP sued for a declaratory judgment to the effect that this does not amount to trademark infringement or dilution. Jack Daniel’s filed a counterclaim alleging that it does. The trial court ruled in favor of the whiskey maker, finding a likelihood of consumer confusion existed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed. The appeals court held that the dog toys came within the “noncommercial use” exception to dilution liability. Regarding the infringement claim, the court held, basically, that the First Amendment trumps private trademark interests. A petition for U.S. Supreme Court review followed.

Rogers v. Grimaldi

Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) is a leading case on collisions of trademark and First Amendment rights. In that case, Ginger Rogers, Fred Astaire’s famous dance partner, brought suit against the makers of a movie called “Ginger and Fred.” She claimed that the title created the false impression that the movie was about her or that she sponsored, endorsed or was affiliated with it in some way. The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling against her, on the basis that the title of the movie was artistic expression, protected by the First Amendment as such.

When the medium is the message

Some commentators have suggested that the balance struck in favor of the First Amendment in Rogers v. Grimaldi should only apply in cases involving traditional conveyors of expressive content, i.e., books, movies, drawings, and the like. They would say that when the product involved has a primarily non-expressive purpose (such as an object for a dog to chew), traditional trademark analysis focused on likelihood of confusion should apply sans a First Amendment override.

Does this distinction hold water, though? True, commercial speech receives a lower level of protection than artistic or political speech does, but both dog toys and movies are packaged and marketed commercially. Books, movies, music, artwork, video games, software, and many other items containing expressive content are packaged and marketed commercially. Moreover, if a banana taped to a wall is a medium of artistic expression, on what basis can we logically differentiate a case where a dog toy is used as the medium of expression?

A decision is expected in June.

Is Jazz Confusingly Similar to Music?

Is jazz confusingly similar to music? No, that wasn’t the issue in this case. It was a contest between APPLE JAZZ and APPLE MUSIC involving tacking.

Bertini v. Apple Inc., No. 21-2301 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Apple, Inc. attempted to register the trademark APPLE MUSIC for both sound recordings and live musical performances (among other things). Bertini, a professional musician, filed an opposition, claiming to have used the mark APPLE JAZZ in connection with live performances since 1985, and to have started using it in connection with sound recordings in the 1990s. Bertini argued that APPLE MUSIC would likely cause confusion with APPLE JAZZ.

The first question that popped into my head, of course, was whether a consumer would really be likely to confuse jazz with music. I mean, come on.

Sadly, however, that was not the legal issue in this case. The legal issue was whether, and in what circumstances, priority of use can be established by “tacking” a new trademark registration onto an earlier one for a mark in a different category of goods or services.

The Opposition Proceeding

Apple applied to register APPLE MUSIC as a trademark in several categories of services in IC 41, including the production and distribution of sound recordings, and organizing and presenting live musical performances. Bertini, a professional jazz musician, filed a notice of opposition to Apple’s application, on the basis that he has used the mark APPLE JAZZ in connection with live performances since 1985. In the mid-1990s, Bertini began using APPLE JAZZ to issue and distribute sound recordings. Bertini opposed Apple’s registration of APPLE MUSIC on the ground that it would likely cause confusion with Bertini’s common law trademark APPLE JAZZ.

The Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (TTAB) dismissed the opposition. Bertini appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Appeal

On appeal, the parties did not dispute that there was a likelihood consumers would confuse Bertini’s use of APPLE JAZZ and Apple’s use of APPLE MUSIC. The only dispute on appeal was priority of use.

Apple, Inc. began using APPLE MUSIC in 2015, when it launched its music streaming service, nearly thirty years after Bertini had begun using APPLE JAZZ. Apple, however, argued that it was entitled to an earlier priority dating back to a 1968 registration of the mark APPLE for “Gramophone records featuring music” and “audio compact discs featuring music.” (The company had purchased the registration from Apple Corps, the Beatles’ record company.)

The TTAB agreed with Apple’s argument, holding that Apple was entitled to tack its 2015 use of APPLE MUSIC onto Apple Corp’s 1968 use of APPLE and therefore had priority over Bertini’s APPLE JAZZ.

The appellate court reversed, holding that Apple cannot tack its use of APPLE MUSIC for live musical performances onto Apple Corps’ use of APPLE for gramophone records, and that its application to register APPLE MUSIC must therefore be denied.

The Court of Appeals construed the tacking doctrine narrowly. Framing the question as “[W]hether a trademark applicant can establish priority for every good or service in its application merely because it has priority through tacking in a single good or service listed in its application,” the Court answered no. While Apple might have been able to use tacking to claim priority in connection with the production and distribution of sound recordings, it could not use that priority to establish priority with respect to other categories of services, such as organizing and presenting live performances.

Contact attorney Thomas James for help with trademark registration.

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