New AI Copyright Guidance

The Copyright Office is providing guidance to copyright applicants who wish to register works with AI-generated content in them.

On Thursday, March 16, 2023, the United States Copyright Office published new guidance regarding the registration of copyrights in AI-generated material. in the Federal Register. Here is the tl;dr version.

The Problem

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are now capable of producing content that would be considered expressive works if created by a human being. These technologies “train” on mass quantities of existing human-authored works and use patterns detected in them to generate like content. This creates a thorny question about authorship: To what extent can a person who uses AI technology to generate content be considered the “author” of such content?

It isn’t a hypothetical problem. The Copyright Office has already started receiving applications for registration of copyrights in works that are either wholly or partially AI-generated.

The U.S. Copyright Act gives the Copyright Office power to determine whether and what kinds of additional information it may need from a copyright registration applicant in order to evaluate the existence, ownership and duration of a purported copyright. On March 16, 2023, the Office exercised that power by publishing Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence in the Federal Register. [Copyright Registration Guidance: Works Containing Material Generated by Artificial Intelligence, 88 Fed. Reg. 16190 (March 16, 2023)]

Sorry, HAL, No Registration for You

Consistent with judicial rulings, the U.S. Copyright Office takes the position that only material that is created by a human being is protected by copyright. In other words, copyrights only protect human authorship. If a monkey can’t own a copyright in a photograph and an elephant can’t own a copyright in a portrait it paints, a computer-driven technology cannot own a copyright in the output it generates. Sorry, robots; it’s a human’s world.

As stated in the Compendium of Copyright Office Practices:

The Copyright Office “will not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention from a human author.”

U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S.
Copyright Office Practices
sec. 313.2 (3d ed. 2021)

Partially AI-Generated Works

A work that is the product of a human being’s own original conception, to which s/he gave visible form clearly has a human author. A work that is entirely the result of mechanical reproduction clearly does not. Things get murkier when AI technology is used to generate content to which a human being applies some creativity.

According to the new guidance, merely prompting an AI technology to generate a poem, drawing or the like, without more, is not enough to establish human authorship if the AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output. This kind of content is not protected by copyright and a registration applicant therefore will need to disclaim it in the application.

On the other hand, if a human being selects and arranges AI-generated content, the selection and arrangement may be protected by copyright even if the content itself is not. Similarly, if a human being makes significant modifications to AI-generated content, then those modifications may receive copyright protection. In all cases, of course, the selection, arrangement or modification must be sufficiently creative in order to qualify for copyright protection.

Disclosure required

The new guidance imposes a duty on copyright registration applicants to disclose the inclusion of AI-generated content in any work submitted for registration.

Standard application

If you use AI technology to any extent in creating the work, you will need to use the Standard application, not the Single application, to register the copyright in it.

Claims and disclaimers

The applicant will need to describe the human author’s contributions to the work in the “Author Created” field of the application. A claim should only be made in this.

Any significant AI-generated content must be explicitly excluded (disclaimed), in the “Limitations of the Claim” section of the application, in the “Other” field, under the “Material Excluded” heading.

Previously filed applications

If you have already filed an application for a work that includes AI-generated material, you will need to make sure that it makes an adequate disclosure about that. The newly-issued guidance says you should contact the Copyright Office’s Public Information Office and report that you omitted AI information from the application. This will cause a notation to the record to be made. When an examiner sees the notation, s/he may contact you to obtain additional information if necessary.

If a registration has already been issued, you should submit a supplemntary registration form to correct it. Failing to do that could result in your registration being cancelled, if the Office becomes aware that information essential to its evaluation of registrability has been omitted. In addition, a court may ignore a registration in an infringement action if it concludes that you knowingly provided the Copyright Office with false information.


Need help with a copyright application or registration?

Contact attorney Tom James.

The CCB’s First 2 Determinations

The Copyright Claims Board (CCB) has issued its first two determinations. Here is what they were about and what the CCB did with them.

The United States Copyright Claims Board (CCB), an administrative tribunal that has been established for the purposes of resolving small copyright claims, began accepting case filings on June 16, 2022. Eight months later, it has issued its first two determinations. Here is a summary of them.

Flores v. Mitrakos, 22-CCB-0035

This was a DMCA case.

Michael Flores filed the claim against Michael Mitrakos. He alleged that Mitrakos filed a knowingly false takedown notice. The parties negotiated a settlement. On February 3, 2023 they submitted a joint request for a final determination dismissing the proceeding. It included a request to include findings that the respondent submitted false information in a takedown notice, resulting in the wrongful removal of the claimant’s material. The parties also agreed the respondent would inform Google that he was rescinding the takedown notice. The CCB incorporated the parties’ agreement into its final determination.

No damages were sought and the CCB did not award any.

Issued on February 15, 2023, this was the CCB’s first Final Determination. You can read it here.

Oppenheimer v. Prutton, 22-CCB-0045

While Flores v. Mitrakos was the first Final Determination the CCB issued, Oppenheimer v. Prutton was its first Final Determination on the merits. It is also the first copyright infringement case the Board has resolved.

The case involved alleged infringement of a copyright in a photograph. The facts, as reported in the CCB’s Final Determination, are as follows:

David G. Oppenheimer owns the copyright in a photograph he took of a federal building in Oakland, California. He registered the copyright in the photograph on July 29, 2017. On June 4, 2018, he discovered it was being displayed on the business website of attorney Douglas A. Prutton. Prutton admitted reproducing and displaying it without permission. He stated that his adult daughter found it on the Internet and put it on his website, in an effort to help improve his website, and that he removed it in 2019 upon receiving a letter from Oppenheimer objecting to the use. Oppenheimer sought an award of statutory damages for the unauthorized use of the photograph.

Prutton asserted two defenses: fair use and unclean hands.

The asserted defenses

Fair use

A person asserting fair use as a defense must address and discuss four factors: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature of the work; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion copied; and (4) effect on the market for the work. Prutton only addressed the fourth factor. The failure to address the first three factors, the CCB ruled, was fatal to this defense.

Unclean hands

Prutton alleged that Oppenheimer was a copyright troll, earning revenue mostly from copyright litigation rather than from sales or licensing of his works. The CCB ruled that this is not a sufficient basis for a finding of unclean hands.

Damages

The CCB refused to reduce damages to $200 on the basis of “innocent infringement.” The CCB ruled that Prutton should have known the photograph was protected by copyright, emphasizing the fact that he was an attorney.

Oppenheimer requested statutory damages of $30,000. The CCB is limited by statute to awarding no more than $15,000 per work. The Board therefore construed it instead as a request for the maximum amount the Board can award. The CCB declined to award maximum damages.

While the amount of statutory damages does not have to be tied to the amount of actual damage, an award of statutory damages “must bear a plausible relationship to . . . actual damages.” Stockfood Am., Inc. v. Sequoia Wholesale Florist, Inc., 2021 WL 4597080, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2021). Oppenheimer did not submit evidence of actual loss.

In the absence of any evidence of actual damage or harm, statutory damages will normally be set at $750 per work infringed. One member of the Board voted to do just that in this case. The other two members, however, believed a small increase from the minimum was justified for various reasons, such as that it was a commercial use and it had lasted for more than a year. The Board ultimately awarded Oppenheimer $1,000 statutory damages.

You can read the CCB’s Final Determination here.

Contact Thomas B. James, attorney

Need help with a CCB claim or defense? Contact Thomas B. James, Minnesota attorney.

A Recent Entrance to Complexity

The United States Copyright Office recently reaffirmed its position that it will not register AI-generated content, because it is not created by a human. The rule is easy to state; the devil is in the details. Attorney Thomas James explains.

Last year, the United States Copyright Office issued a copyright registration to Kristina Kashtanova for the graphic novel, Zarya of the Dawn. A month later, the Copyright Office issued a notice of cancellation of the registration, along with a request for additional information.

The Copyright Office, consistent with judicial decisions, takes the position that copyright requires human authorship. The Office requested additional information regarding the creative process that resulted in the novel because parts of it were AI-generated. Kashtanova complied with the request for additional information.

This week, the Copyright Office responded with a letter explaining that the registration would be cancelled, but that a new, more limited one will be issued. The Office explained that its concern related to the author’s use of Midjourney, an AI-powered image generating tool, to generate images used in the work:

Because Midjourney starts with randomly generated noise that evolves into a final image, there is no guarantee that a particular prompt will generate any particular visual output”

U.S. Copyright Office letter

The Office concluded that the text the author wrote, as well as the author’s selection, coordination and arrangement of written and visual elements, are protected by copyright, and therefore may be registered. The images generated by Midjourney, however, would not be registered because they were “not the product of human authorship.” The new registration will cover only the text and editing components of the work, not the AI-generated images.

A Previous Entrance to Paradise

Early last year, the Copyright Office refused copyright registration for an AI-generated image. Steven Thaler had filed an application to register a copyright in an AI-generated image called “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.” He listed himself as the copyright owner. The Copyright Office denied registration on the grounds that the work lacked human authorship. Thaler filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking to overturn that determination. The lawsuit is still pending. It is currently at the summary judgment stage.

The core issue

The core issue, of course, is whether a person who uses AI to generate content such as text or artwork can claim copyright protection in the content so generated. Put another way, can a user who deploys artificial intelligence to generate a seemingly expressive work (such as artwork or a novel) claim authorship?

This question is not as simple as it may seem. There can be different levels of human involvement in the use of an AI content generating mechanism. At one extreme, there are programs like “Paint,” in which users provide a great deal of input. These kinds of programs may be analogized to paintbrushes, pens and other tools that artists traditionally have used to express their ideas on paper or canvas. Word processing programs are also in this category. It is easy to conclude that the users of these kinds of programs are the authors of works that may be sufficiently creative and original to receive copyright protection.

At the other end of the spectrum are AI services like DALL-E and ChatGPT. Text and images can be generated by these systems with minimal human input. If the only human input is a user’s directive to “Write a story” or “Draw a picture,” then it would be difficult to claim that the author contributed any creative expression. That is to say, it would be difficult to claim that the user authored anything.

Peering into the worm can

The complicating consideration with content-generative AI mechanisms is that they have the potential to allow many different levels of user involvement in the generation of output. The more details a user adds to the instructions s/he gives to the machine, the more it begins to appear that the user is, in fact, contributing something creative to the project.

Is a prompt to “Write a story about a dog” a sufficiently creative contribution to the resulting output to qualify the user as an “author”? Maybe not. But what about, “Write a story about a dog who joins a traveling circus”? Or “Write a story about a dog named Pablo who joins a traveling circus”? Or “Write a story about a dog with a peculiar bark that begins, ‘Once upon a time, there was a dog named Pablo who joined a circus,’ and ends with Pablo deciding to return home”?

At what point along the spectrum of user-provided detail does copyright protectable authorship come into existence?

A question that is just as important to ask is: How much, if at all, should the Copyright Office involve itself with ascertaining the details of the creative process that were involved in a work?

In a similar vein, should copyright registration applicants be required to disclose whether their works contain AI-generated content? Should they be required to affirmatively disclaim rights in elements of AI-generated content that are not protected by copyright?

Expanding the Rule of Doubt

Alternatively, should the U.S. Copyright Office adopt something like a Rule of Doubt when copyright is claimed in AI-generated content? The Rule of Doubt, in its current form, is the rule that the U.S. Copyright Office will accept a copyright registration of a claim containing software object code, even though the Copyright Office is unable to verify whether the object code contains copyrightable work. If effect, if the applicant attests that the code is copyrightable, then the Copyright Office will assume that it is and will register the claim. Under 37 C.F.R. § 202.20(c)(2)(vii)(B), this may be done when an applicant seeks to register a copyright in object code rather than source code. The same is true of material that is redacted to protect a trade secret.

When the Office issues a registration under the Rule of Doubt, it adds an annotation to the certificate and to the public record indicating that the copyright was registered under the Rule of Doubt.

Under the existing rule, the applicant must file a declaration stating that material for which registration is sought does, in fact, contain original authorship.

This approach allows registration but leaves it to courts (not the Copyright Office) to decide on a case-by-case basis whether material for which copyright is claimed contains copyrightable authorship.  

Expanding the Rule of Doubt to apply to material generated at least in part by AI might not be the most satisfying solution for AI users, but it is one that could result in fewer snags and delays in the registration process.

Conclusion

The Copyright Office has said that it soon will be developing registration guidance for works created in part using material generated by artificial intelligence technology. Public notices and events relating to this topic may be expected in the coming months.


Need help with a copyright matter? Contact attorney Thomas James.

Getty Images Litigation Update

Getty Images has now filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement in the United States.

In a previous post, I reported on a lawsuit that Getty Images had filed in the United Kingdom against Stability AI. Now the company has filed similar claims against the company in the United States.

The complaint, which has been filed in federal district court in Delaware, alleges claims of copyright infringement; providing false copyright management information; removal or alteration of copyright management information; trademark infringement; trademark dilution; unfair competition; and deceptive trade practices. Both monetary damages and injunctive relief are being sought.

An interesting twist in the Getty litigation is that AI-generated works allegedly have included the Getty Images trademark.

Getty Images logo on AI-generated image
(Reproduction of a portion of the Complaint filed in Getty Images v. Stability AI, Inc. in U.S. district court for the district of Delaware, case no. Case 1:23-cv-00135-UNA (2023). The image has been cropped to avoid reproducing the likenesses of persons appearing in the image and to display only what is needed here for purposes of news reporting and commentary,)

Getty Images, which is in the business of collecting and licensing quality images, alleges (among other things) that affixing its trademark to poor quality AI-generated images tarnishes the company’s reputation. If proven, this could constitute trademark dilution, which is prohibited by the Lanham Act.

AI Legal Issues

Thomas James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”) describes the range of legal issues, most of which have not yet been resolved, that artificial intelligence (AI) systems have spawned.

AI is not new. Its implementation also is not new. In fact, consumers regularly interact with AI-powered systems every day. Online help systems often use AI to provide quick answers to questions that customers routinely ask. Sometimes these are designed to give a user the impression that s/he is communicating with a person.

AI systems also perform discrete functions such as analyzing a credit report and rendering a decision on a loan or credit card application, or screening employment applications.

Many other uses have been found for AI and new ones are being developed all the time. AI has been trained not just to perform customer service tasks, but also to perform analytics and diagnostic tests; to repair products; to update software; to drive cars; and even to write articles and create images and videos. These developments may be helping to streamline tasks and improve productivity, but they have also generated a range of new legal issues.

Tort liability

While there are many different kinds of tort claims, the elements of tort claims are basically the same: (1) The person sought to be held liable for damages or ordered to comply with a court order must have owed a duty to the person who is seeking the legal remedy; (2) the person breached that duty; (3) the person seeking the legal remedy experienced harm, i.e., real or threatened injury; and (4) the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the harm.

The kind of harm that must be demonstrated varies depending on the kind of tort claim. For example, a claim of negligent driving might involve bodily injury, while a claim of defamation might involve injury to reputation. For some kinds of tort claims, the harm might involve financial or economic injury. 

The duty may be specified in a statute or contract, or it might be judge-made (“common law.”) It may take the form of an affirmative obligation (such as a doctor’s obligation to provide a requisite level of care to a patient), or it may take a negative form, such as the common law duty to refrain from assaulting another person.

The advent of AI does not really require any change in these basic principles, but they can be more difficult to apply to scenarios that involve the use of an AI system.

Example. Acme Co. manufactures and markets Auto-Doc, a machine that diagnoses and repairs car problems. Mike’s Repair Shop lays off its automotive technician employees and replaces them with one of these machines. Suzie Consumer brings her VW Jetta to Mikes Repair Shop for service because she has been hearing a sound that she describes as being a grinding noise that she thinks is coming from either the engine or the glove compartment. The Auto-Doc machine adds engine oil, replaces belts, and removes the contents of the glove compartment. Later that day, Suzie’s brakes fail and her vehicle hits and kills a pedestrian in a crosswalk. A forensic investigation reveals that her brakes failed because they were badly worn. Who should be held liable for the pedestrian’s death – Suzie, Mike’s, Acme Co., some combination of two of them, all of them, or none of them?

The allocation of responsibility will depend, in part, on the degree of autonomy the AI machine possesses. Of course, if it can be shown that Suzie knew or should have known that her brakes were bad, then she most likely could be held responsible for causing the pedestrian’s death. But what about the others? Their liability, or share of liability, is affected by the degree of autonomy the AI machine possesses. If it is completely autonomous, then Acme might be held responsible for failing to program the machine in such a way that it would test for and detect worn brake pads even if a customer expresses an erroneous belief that the sound is coming from the engine or the glove compartment. On the other hand, if the machine is designed only to offer suggestions of possible problems and solutions,  leaving it up to a mechanic to accept or reject them, then Mike’s might be held responsible for negligently accepting the machine’s recommendations. 

Assuming the Auto-Doc machine is fully autonomous, should Mike’s be faulted for relying on it to correctly diagnose car problems? Is Mike’s entitled to rely on Acme’s representations about Auto-Doc’s capabilities, or would the repair shop have a duty to inquire about and/or investigate Auto-Doc’s limitations? Assuming Suzie did not know, and had no reason to suspect, her brakes were worn out, should she be faulted for relying on a fully autonomous machine instead of taking the car to a trained human mechanic?  Why or why not?

Criminal liability

It is conceivable that an AI system might engage in activity that is prohibited by an applicable jurisdiction’s criminal laws. E-mail address harvesting is an example. In the United States, for example, the CAN-SPAM Act makes it a crime to send a commercial email message to an email address that was  obtained  by automated scraping of Internet websites for email addresses. Of course, if a person intentionally uses an AI system for scraping, then liability should be clear. But what if an AI system “learns” to engage in scraping?

AI-generated criminal output may also be a problem. Some countries have made it a crime to display a Nazi symbol, such as a swastika, on a website. Will criminal liability attach if a website or blog owner uses AI to generate illustrated articles about World War II and the system generates and displays articles that are illustrated with World War II era German flags and military uniforms? In the United States, creating or possessing child pornography is illegal. Will criminal liability attach if an AI system generates it?

Some of these kinds of issues can be resolved through traditional legal analysis of the intent and scienter elements of the definitions of crimes. A jurisdiction might wish to consider, however, whether AI systems should be regulated to require system creators to implement measures that would prevent illegal uses of the technology. This raises policy and feasibility questions, such as whether and what kinds of restraints on machine learning should be required, and how to enforce them. Further, would prior restraints on the design and/or use of AI-powered expressive-content-generating systems infringe on First Amendment rights?  

Product liability

Related to the problem of allocating responsibility for harm caused by the use of an AI mechanism is the question whether anyone should be held liable for harm caused when the mechanism is not defective, that is to say, when it is operating as it should.

 Example.  Acme Co. manufactures and sells Auto-Article, a software program that is designed to create content of a type and kind the user specifies. The purpose of the product is to enable a website owner to generate and publish a large volume of content frequently, thereby improving the website’s search engine ranking. It operates   by scouring the Internet and analyzing instances of the content the user specifies to produce new content that “looks like” them. XYZ Co. uses the software to generate articles on medical topics. One of these articles explains that chest pain can be caused by esophageal spasms but that these typically do not require treatment unless they occur frequently enough to interfere with a person’s ability to eat or drink. Joe is experiencing chest pain. He does not seek medical help, however, because he read the article and therefore believes he is experiencing esophageal spasms. He later collapses and dies from a heart attack. A medical doctor is prepared to testify that his death could have been prevented if he had sought medical attention when he began experiencing the pain.

Should either Acme or XYZ Co. be held liable for Joe’s death? Acme could argue that its product was not defective. It was fit for its intended purposes, namely, a machine learning system that generates articles that look like articles of the kind a user specifies. What about XYZ Co.? Would the answer be different if XYZ had published a notice on its site that the information provided in its articles is not necessarily complete and that the articles are not a substitute for advice from a qualified medical professional? If XYZ incurs liability as a result of the publication, would it have a claim against Acme, such as for failure to warn it of the risks of using AI to generate articles on medical topics?

Consumer protection

AI system deployment raises significant health and safety concerns. There is the obvious example of an AI system making incorrect medical diagnoses or treatment recommendations. Autonomous (“self-driving”) motor vehicles are also examples. An extensive body of consumer protection regulations may be anticipated.

Forensic and evidentiary issues

In situations involving the use of semi-autonomous AI, allocating responsibility for harm resulting from the operation of the AI  system  may be difficult. The most basic question in this respect is whether an AI system was in use or not. For example, if a motor vehicle that can be operated in either manual or autonomous mode is involved in an accident, and fault or the extent of liability depends on that (See the discussion of tort liability, above), then a way of determining the mode in which the car was being driven at the time will be needed.

If, in the case of a semi-autonomous AI system, tort liability must be allocated between the creator of the system and a user of it, the question of fault may depend on who actually caused a particular tortious operation to be executed – the system creator or the user. In that event, some method of retracing the steps the AI system used may be essential. This may also be necessary in situations where some factor other than AI contributed, or might have contributed, to the injury. Regulation may be needed to ensure that the steps in an AI system’s operations are, in fact, capable of being ascertained.

Transparency problems also fall into this category. As explained in the Journal of Responsible Technology, people might be put on no-fly lists, denied jobs or benefits, or refused credit without knowing anything more than that the decision was made through some sort of automated process. Even if transparency is achieved and/or mandated, contestability will also be an issue.

Data Privacy

To the extent an AI system collects and stores personal or private information, there is a risk that someone may gain unauthorized access to it.. Depending on how the system is designed to function, there is also a risk that it might autonomously disclose legally protected personal or private information. Security breaches can cause catastrophic problems for data subjects.

Publicity rights

Many jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for violation of a person’s publicity rights (sometimes called “misappropriation of personality.”) In these jurisdictions, a person has an exclusive legal right to commercially exploit his or her own name, likeness or voice. To what extent, and under what circumstances, should liability attach if a commercialized AI system analyzes the name, likeness or voice of a person that it discovers on the Internet? Will the answer depend on how much information about a particular individual’s voice, name or likeness the system uses, on one hand, or how closely the generated output resembles that individual’s voice, name or likeness, on the other?

Contracts

The primary AI-related contract concern is about drafting agreements that adequately and effectively allocate liability for losses resulting from the use of AI technology. Insurance can be expected to play a larger role as the use of AI spreads into more areas.

Bias, Discrimination, Diversity & Inclusion

Some legislators have expressed concern that AI systems will reflect and perpetuate biases and perhaps discriminatory patterns of culture. To what extent should AI system developers be required to ensure that the data their systems use are collected from a diverse mixture of races, ethnicities, genders, gender identities, sexual orientations, abilities and disabilities, socioeconomic classes, and so on? Should developers be required to apply some sort of principle of “equity” with respect to these classifications, and if so, whose vision of equity should they be required to enforce? To what extent should government be involved in making these decisions for system developers and users?

Copyright

AI-generated works like articles, drawings, animations, music and so on, raise two kinds of copyright issues:

  1. Input issues, i.e., questions like whether AI systems that create new works based on existing copyright-protected works infringe the copyrights in those works
  2. Output issues, such as who, if anybody, owns the copyright in an AI-generated work.

I’ve written about AI copyright ownership issues and AI copyright infringement issues in previous blog posts on The Cokato Copyright Attorney.

Patents and other IP

Computer programs can be patented. AI systems can be devised to write computer programs. Can an AI-generated computer program that meets the usual criteria for patentability (novelty, utility, etc.) be patented?

Is existing intellectual property law adequate to deal with AI-generated inventions and creative works? The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) apparently does not think so. It is formulating recommendations for new regulations to deal with the intellectual property aspects of AI.

Conclusion

AI systems raise a wide range of legal issues. The ones identified in this article are merely a sampling, not a complete listing of all possible issues. Not all of these legal issues have answers yet. It can be expected that more AI regulatory measures, in more jurisdictions around the globe, will be coming down the pike very soon.

Contact attorney Thomas James

Contact Minnesota attorney Thomas James for help with copyright and trademark registration and other copyright and trademark related matters.

Does AI Infringe Copyright?

A previous blog post addressed the question whether AI-generated creations are protected by copyright. This could be called the “output question” in the artificial intelligence area of copyright law. Another question is whether using copyright-protected works as input for AI generative processes infringes the copyrights in those works. This could be called the “input question.” Both kinds of questions are now before the courts. Minnesota attorney Tom James describes a framework for analyzing the input question.

The Input Question in AI Copyright Law

by Thomas James, Minnesota attorney

In a previous blog post, I discussed the question whether AI-generated creations are protected by copyright. This could be called the “output question” in the artificial intelligence area of copyright law. Another question is whether using copyright-protected works as input for AI generative processes infringes the copyrights in those works. This could be called the “input question.” Both kinds of questions are now before the courts. In this blog post, I describe a framework for analyzing the input question.

The Cases

The Getty Images lawsuit

Getty Images is a stock photograph company. It licenses the right to use the images in its collection to those who wish to use them on their websites or for other purposes. Stability AI is the creator of Stable Diffusion, which is described as a “text-to-image diffusion model capable of generating photo-realistic images given any text input.” In January, 2023, Getty Images initiated legal proceedings in the United Kingdom against Stability AI. Getty Images is claiming that Stability AI violated copyrights by using their images and metadata to train AI software without a license.

The independent artists lawsuit

Another lawsuit raising the question whether AI-generated output infringes copyright has been filed in the United States. In this case, a group of visual artists are seeking class action status for claims against Stability AI, Midjourney Inc. and DeviantArt Inc. The artists claim that the companies use their images to train computers “to produce seemingly new images through a mathematical software process.” They describe AI-generated artwork as “collages” made in violation of copyright owners’ exclusive right to create derivative works.

The GitHut Copilot lawsuit

In November, 2022, a class action lawsuit was filed in a U.S. federal court against GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI. The lawsuit claims the GitHut Copilot and OpenAI Codex coding assistant services use existing code to generate new code. By training their AI systems on open source programs, the plaintiffs claim, the defendants have allegedly infringed the rights of developers who have posted code under open-source licenses that require attribution.

How AI Works

AI, of course, stands for artificial intelligence. Almost all AI techniques involve machine learning. Machine learning, in turn, involves using a computer algorithm to make a machine improve its performance over time, without having to pre-program it with specific instructions. Data is input to enable the machine to do this. For example, to teach a machine to create a work in the style of Vincent van Gogh, many instances of van Gogh’s works would be input. The AI program contains numerous nodes that focus on different aspects of an image. Working together, these nodes will then piece together common elements of a van Gogh painting from the images the machine has been given to analyze. After going through many images of van Gogh paintings, the machine “learns” the features of a typical Van Gogh painting. The machine can then generate a new image containing these features.

In the same way, a machine can be programmed to analyze many instances of code and generate new code.

The input question comes down to this: Does creating or using a program that causes a machine to receive information about the characteristics of a creative work or group of works for the purpose of creating a new work that has the same or similar characteristics infringe the copyright in the creative work(s) that the machine uses in this way?

The Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners

In the United States, the owner of a copyright in a work has the exclusive rights to:

  • reproduce (make copies of) it;
  • distribute copies of it;
  • publicly perform it;
  • publicly display it; and
  • make derivative works based on it.

(17 U.S.C. § 106). A copyright is infringed when a person exercises any of these exclusive rights without the copyright owner’s permission.

Copyright protection extends only to expression, however. Copyright does not protect ideas, facts, processes, methods, systems or principles.

Direct Infringement

Infringement can be either direct or indirect. Direct infringement occurs when somebody directly violates one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. Examples would be a musician who performs a copyright-protected song in public without permission, or a cartoonist who creates a comic based on the Batman and Robin characters and stories without permission.

The kind of tool an infringer uses is not of any great moment. A writer who uses word-processing software to write a story that is simply a copy of someone else’s copyright-protected story is no less guilty of infringement merely because the actual typewritten letters were generated using a computer program that directs a machine to reproduce and display typographical characters in the sequence a user selects.

Contributory and Vicarious Infringement

Infringement liability may also arise indirectly. If one person knowingly induces another person to infringe or contributes to the other person’s infringement in some other way, then each of them may be liable for copyright infringement. The person who actually committed the infringing act could be liable for direct infringement. The person who knowingly encouraged, solicited, induced or facilitated the other person’s infringing act(s) could be liable for contributory infringement.

Vicarious infringement occurs when the law holds one person responsible for the conduct of another because of the nature of the legal relationship between them. The employment relationship is the most common example. An employer generally is held responsible for an employee’s conduct,  provided the employee’s acts were performed within the course and scope of the employment. Copyright infringement is not an exception to that rule.

Programmer vs. User

Direct infringement liability

Under U.S. law, machines are treated as extensions of the people who set them in motion. A camera, for example, is an extension of the photographer. Any images a person causes a camera to generate by pushing a button on it is considered the creation of the person who pushed the button, not of the person(s) who manufactured the camera, much less of the camera itself. By the same token, a person who uses the controls on a machine to direct it to copy elements of other people’s works should be considered the creator of the new work so created. If using the program entails instructing the  machine to create an unauthorized derivative work of copyright-protected images, then it would be the user, not the machine or the software writer, who would be at risk of liability for direct copyright infringement.

Contributory infringement liability

Knowingly providing a device or mechanism to people who use it to infringe copyrights creates a risk of liability for contributory copyright infringement. Under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, however, merely distributing a mechanism that people can use to infringe copyrights is not enough for contributory infringement liability to attach, if the mechanism has substantial uses for which copyright infringement liability does not attach. Arguably, AI has many such uses. For example, it might be used to generate new works from public domain works. Or it might be used to create parodies. (Creating a parody is fair use; it should not result in infringement liability.)

The situation is different if a company goes further and induces, solicits or encourages people to use its mechanism to infringe copyrights. Then it may be at risk of contributory liability. As the United States Supreme Court has said, “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). (Remember Napster?)

Fair Use

If AI-generated output is found to either directly or indirectly infringe copyright(s), the infringer nevertheless might not be held liable, if the infringement amounts to fair use of the copyrighted work(s) that were used as the input for the AI-generated work(s).

Ever since some rap artists began using snippets of copyright-protected music and sound recordings without permission, courts have embarked on a treacherous expedition to articulate a meaningful dividing line between unauthorized derivative works, on one hand, and unauthorized transformative works, on the other. Although the Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive right to create works based on their copyrighted works (called derivative works), courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work may be fair use if it is “transformative.: This has caused a great deal of uncertainty in the law, particularly since the U.S. Copyright Act expressly defines a derivative work as one that transforms another work. (See 17 U.S.C. § 101: “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” (emphasis added).)

When interpreting and applying the transformative use branch of Fair Use doctrine, courts have issued conflicting and contradictory decisions. As I wrote in another blog post, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear and decide Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith. It is anticipated that the Court will use this case to attempt to clear up all the confusion around the doctrine. It is also possible the Court might take even more drastic action concerning the whole “transformative use” branch of Fair Use.

Some speculate that the questions the Justices asked during oral arguments in Warhol signal a desire to retreat from the expansion of fair use that the “transformativeness” idea spawned. On the other hand, some of the Court’s recent decisions, such as Google v. Oracle, suggest the Court is not particularly worried about large-scale copyright infringing activity, insofar as Fair Use doctrine is concerned.

Conclusion

To date, it does not appear that there is any direct legal precedent in the United States for classifying the use of mass quantities of works as training tools for AI as “fair use.” It seems, however, that there soon will be precedent on that issue, one way or the other. In the meantime, AI generating system users should proceed with caution.

Newly Public Domain Works 2023

Thousands of books, movies, songs and other creative works entered the public domain in the United States in 2023. Here is a partial list compiled by Cokato Minnesota attorney Thomas James.

Thousands of books, movies, songs and other creative works enter the public domain in the United States this year. Here is a partial list. (Click here for last year’s list).

Sherlock Holmes

Last year, it was Winnie the Pooh. This year, Sherlock Holmes officially enters the public domain. Pooh’s release from copyright protection sparked some creative uses of A. Milne’s fictional bear, from a comic strip in which Pooh Bear appears completely naked (i.e., without his red shirt on) to a slasher film called Winnie the Pooh: Blood and Honey, coming soon to a theater near you.

Sherlock Holmes and his sidekick, Dr. Watson, have actually been in the public domain for a long time, since Arthur Conan Doyle began publishing stories about them in the late nineteenth century. The copyrights in those works had already expired when Congress extended copyright terms in 1998. Legal controversies continued to arise, however, over which elements of those characters were still protected by copyright. New elements that were added in later stories potentially could still be protected by copyright even if the copyrights in previous stories in the series had expired. Now, however, the copyright in the last two Sherlock Holmes stories Doyle wrote have expired. Therefore, it appears that all elements of Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories are in the public domain now.

One can only imagine what creative uses people will make of the Holmes and Watson characters now that they are officially in the public domain, too.

Sherlock Holmes, public domain character in attorney Tom James article

The Tower Treasure (Hardy Boys)

The Tower Treasure is the first book in the Hardy Boys series of mystery books that Franklin W. Dixon wrote. As of this year, it is in the public domain.

Again, however, only the elements of the characters and the story in that particular book are in the public domain now. Elements that appeared only in later volumes in the series might still be protected by copyright.

Steppenwolf

Herman Hesse’s Der Steppenwolf, in the original German, is now in the public domain. This version is to be distinguished from English translations of the work, which might still be protected by copyright as derivative works. It is also to be distinguished from the classic rock band by the same name. It is always important to distinguish between trademark and other kinds of uses of a term.

The Bridge of San Luis Rey

Thornton Wilder’s Pulitzer Prize winning novel about an investigation into the lives and deaths of people involved in the collapse of a Peruvian rope bridge has now entered the public domain.

Mosquitoes

William Faulkner’s satiric novel enters the public domain this year. This work is to be distinguished from the insect by the same name. The insect, annoyingly, has been in the public domain for centuries.

The Gangs of New York

Herbert Asbury’s The Gangs of New York is now in the public domain.

Amerika

Franz Kafka’s Amerika (also known as Lost In America) — was published posthumously in 1927. It is now in the public domain.

The Jazz Singer

The Jazz Singer is a 1927 American film and one of the first to feature sound. Warner Brothers produced it using the Vitaphone sound-on-disc system and it featured six songs performed by Al Jolson. The short story on which it is based, “The Day of Atonement,” has already been in the public domain for some time. Now the film is, too.

The Battle of the Century

The Laurel and Hardy film, The Battle of the Century, is now in the public domain. Other Laurel and Hardy films, however, may still be protected by copyright.

Metropolis

Science fiction fans are most likely familiar with this 1927 German science fiction silent movie written by Thea von Harbou and Fritz Lang based on von Harbou’s 1925 novel. It was one of the first feature-length movies in that genre. The film is also famous for the phrase, “The Mediator Between the Head and the Hands Must Be the Heart.”

The Lodger

Alfred Hitchcock’s first thriller has entered the public domain.

“We All Scream for Ice Cream”

The song, “I Scream; You Scream; We All Scream for Ice Cream” is now in the public domain. Don’t worry if you uttered this phrase prior to January 1, 2023. Titles and short phrases are not protected by copyright. Now, it would be a different story if you’ve publicly performed the song, or published or recorded the song and/or the lyrics. Merely uttering those words, however, is not a crime.

“Puttin’ on the Ritz”

This song was originally written by Irving Berlin in 1927. Therefore it is now in the public domain. Taco released a performance of a cover version of this song in 1982. This version of the song made it all the way to number 53 in VH1’s 100 Greatest One-Hit Wonders of the 80’s special. Note that even if the original musical composition and lyrics are in the public domain now, recorded performances of the song by particular artists may still be protected. The copyrights in a musical composition and a recording of a performance of it are separate and distinct things. Don’t go copying Taco’s recorded performance of the song without permission. Please.

“My Blue Heaven”

This song, written by Walter Donaldson and George Whiting, is now in the public domain. It was used in the Ziegfeld Follies and was a big hit for crooner Gene Austin. It is not to be confused with the 1990 Steve Martin film with that name, which is still protected by copyright.

“The Best Things In Life Are Free”

This song was written by Buddy DeSylva, Lew Brown and Ray Henderson for the 1927 musical Good News. Many performers have covered it since then. The (ahem) good news is that it is now in the public domain.

Caveats

The works described in this blog post have entered the public domain under U.S. copyright law. The terms of copyrights in other countries are not the same. In the European Union, for example, Herman Hesse’s Der Steppenwolf is still protected by copyright as of January 1, 2023.

And again, remember that even if a work has entered the public domain, new elements first appearing in a derivative work based on it might still be protected by copyright.

The featured image in this article is “The Man with the Twisted Lip.” It appeared in The Strand Magazine in December, 1891. The original caption was “The pipe was still between his lips.” The drawing is in the public domain.

The Top Copyright Cases of 2022

Cokato Minnesota attorney Tom James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”) presents his annual list of the top copyright cases of the year.

My selections for the top copyright cases of the year.

“Dark Horse”

Marcus Gray had sued Katy Perry for copyright infringement, claiming that her “Dark Horse” song unlawfully copied portions of his song, “Joyful Noise.” The district court held that the disputed series of eight notes appearing in Gray’s song were not “particularly unique or rare,” and therefore were not protected against infringement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the series of eight notes was not sufficiently original and creative to receive copyright protection. Gray v. Hudson.

“Shape of You”

Across the pond, another music copyright infringement lawsuit was tossed. This one involved Ed Sheeran’s “Shape of You” and Sam Chokri’s “Oh Why.” In this case, the judge refused to infer from the similarities in the two songs that copyright infringement had occurred. The judge ruled that the portion of the song as to which copying had been claimed was “so short, simple, commonplace and obvious in the context of the rest of the song that it is not credible that Mr. Sheeran sought out inspiration from other songs to come up with it.” Sheeran v. Chokri.

Instagram images

Another case out of California, this one involves a lawsuit filed by photographers against Instagram, alleging secondary copyright infringement. The photographers claim that Instagram’s embedding tool facilitates copyright infringement by users of the website. The district court judge dismissed the lawsuit, saying he was bound by the so-called “server test” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals announced in Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The server test says, in effect, that a website does not unlawfully “display” a copyrighted image if the image is stored on the original site’s server and is merely embedded in a search result that appears on a user’s screen. The photographers have an appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, asking the Court to reconsider its decision in Perfect 10. Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The Court now has the option to either overrule Perfect 10 and allow the photographers’ lawsuit to proceed, or to re-affirm it, thereby creating a circuit split that could eventually lead to U.S. Supreme Court review. Hunley v. Instagram.

Tattoos

Is reproducing a copyrighted image in a tattoo fair use? That is a question at issue in a case pending in New York. Photographer Jeffrey Sedlik took a photograph of musician Miles Davis. Later, a tattoo artist allegedly traced a printout of it to create a stencil to transfer to human skin as a tattoo. Sedlik filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The judge analyzed the claims using the four “fair use” factors. Although the ultimate ruling was that fact issues remained to be decided by a jury, the court issued some important rulings in the course of making that ruling. In particular, the court ruled that affixing an image to skin is not necessarily a protected “transformative use” of an image. According to the court, it is for a jury to decide whether the image at issue in a particular case has been changed significantly enough to be considered “transformative.” It will be interesting to see how this case ultimately plays out, especially if it is still pending when the United States Supreme Court announces its decision in the Warhol case (See below). Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg.

Digital libraries

The book publishers’ lawsuit against Internet Archive, about which I wrote in a previous blog post, is still at the summary judgment stage. Its potential future implications are far-reaching. It is a copyright infringement lawsuit that book publishers filed in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. The gravamen of the complaint is that Internet Archive allegedly has scanned over a million books and has made them freely available to the public via an Internet website without securing a license or permission from the copyright rights-holders. The case will test the “controlled digital lending” theory of fair use that was propounded in a white paper published by David R. Hansen and Kyle K. Courtney. They argued that distributing digitized copies of books by libraries should be regarded as the functional equivalent of lending physical copies of books to library patrons. Parties and amici have filed briefs in support of motions for summary judgment. An order on the motions is expected soon. The case is Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive.

Copyright registration

In Fourth Estate Public Benefits Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2019), the United States Supreme Court interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) to mean that a copyright owner cannot file an infringement claim in federal court without first securing either a registration certificate or an official notice of denial of registration from the Copyright Office. In an Illinois Law Review article, I argued that this imposes an unduly onerous burden on copyright owners and that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to abolish the requirement. Unfortunately, Congress has not done that. As I said in a previous blog post, Congressional inaction to correct a harsh law with potentially unjust consequences often leads to exercises of the judicial power of statutory interpretation to ameliorate those consequences. Unicolors v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz.

Unicolors, owner of the copyrights in various fabric designs, sued H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), alleging copyright infringement. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Unicolor, but H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law. H&M argued that Unicolors had failed to satisfy the requirement of obtaining a registration certificate prior to commencing suit. Although Unicolors had obtained a registration, H&M argued that the registration was not a valid one. Specifically, H&M argued that Unicolors had improperly applied to register multiple works with a single application. According to 37 CFR § 202.3(b)(4) (2020), a single application cannot be used to register multiple works unless all of the works in the application were included in the same unit of publication. The 31 fabric designs, H&M contended, had not all been first published at the same time in a single unit; some had been made available separately exclusively to certain customers. Therefore, they could not properly be registered together as a unit of publication.

The district court denied the motion, holding that a registration may be valid even if contains inaccurate information, provided the registrant did not know the information was inaccurate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court held that characterizing the group of works as a “unit of publication” in the registration application was a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact. The Court applied the traditional rule of thumb that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, in essence ruling that although a mistake of fact in a registration application might not invalidate the registration for purposes of the pre-litigation registration requirement, a mistake of law in an application will.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. It reversed the Ninth Circuit Court’s reversal, thereby allowing the infringement verdict to stand notwithstanding the improper registration of the works together as a unit of publication rather than individually.

It is hazardous to read too much into the ruling in this case. Copyright claimants certainly should not interpret it to mean that they no longer need to bother with registering a copyright before trying to enforce it in court, or that they do not need to concern themselves with doing it properly. The pre-litigation registration requirement still stands (in the United States), and the Court has not held that it condones willful blindness of legal requirements. Copyright claimants ignore them at their peril.

Andy Warhol, Prince Transformer

I wrote about the Warhol case in a previous blog post. Basically, it is a copyright infringement case alleging that Lynn Goldsmith took a photograph of Prince in her studio and that Andy Warhol later based a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations on it without a license or permission. The Andy Warhol Foundation sought a declaratory judgment that Warhol’s use of the photograph was “fair use.” Goldsmith counterclaimed for copyright infringement. The district court ruled in favor of Warhol and dismissed the photographer’s infringement claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court misapplied the four “fair use” factors and that the derivative works Warhol created do not qualify as fair use. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in October, 2022. A decision is expected next year.

Because this case gives the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to bring some clarity to the extremely murky “transformative use” area of copyright law, it is not only one of this year’s most important copyright cases, but it very likely will wind up being one of the most important copyright cases of all time. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith.

New TM Office Action Deadlines

The deadline for responding to US Trademark Office Actions has been shortened to three months, in many cases. Attorney Thomas B. James shares the details.

by Thomas B. James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”)

Effective December 3, 2022 the deadline for responding to a U.S. Trademark Office Action is shortened from 6 months to 3 months. Here is what that means in practice.

Historically, applicants for the registration of trademarks in the United States have had 6 months to respond to an Office Action. Beginning December 3, 2022 the time limit has been shortened to 3 months.

Applications subject to the new rule

The new, shorter deadline applies to most kinds of trademark applications, including:

  • Section 1(a) applications (application based on use in commerce)
  • Section 1(b) applications (application based on intent to use)
  • Section 44(e) applications (foreign application)
  • Section 44(d) applications (foreign application)

Applications not subject to the new rule

The new deadline does not apply to:

  • Section 66(a) applications (Madrid Protocol)
  • Office actions issued before December 3, 2022
  • Office actions issued after registration (But note that the new deadline will apply to post-registration Office Actions beginning October 7, 2023)
  • Office actions issued by a work unit other than the law offices, such as the Intent-to-Use Unit or the Examination and Support Workload and Production Unit
  • Office actions that do not require a response (such as an examiner’s amendment)
  • Office actions that do not specify a 3-month response period (e.g., a denial of a request for reconsideration, or a 30-day letter).

Extensions

For a $125 fee, you can request one three-month extension of the time to respond to an Office Action. You will need to file the request for an extension within three months from the “issue date” of the Office Action and before filing your response. If your extension request is granted, then you will have six months from the original “issue date” to file your response.

Use the Trademark Office’s Request for Extension of Time to File a Response form to request an extension. The Trademark Office has issued a warning that it will not process requests that do not use this form.

The form cannot be used to request an extension of time to respond to an Office Action that was issued for a Madrid Protocol section 66(a) application, an Office Action that was issued before December 3, 2022, or to an Office Action to which the new deadline does not apply.

Consequences

Failing to meet the new three-month deadline will have the same consequences as failing to meet the old six-month deadline did. Your application will be deemed abandoned if you do not respond to the Office Action or request an extension on or before the three-month deadline. Similarly, your application will be deemed abandoned if you you are granted an extension but fail to file a response on or before the six-month deadline.

The Trademark Office does not refund registration filing fees for abandoned applications.

As before, in some limited circumstances, you might be able to revive an abandoned application by filing a petition and paying a fee. Otherwise, you will need to start the application process all over again.

More information

Here are links to the relevant Federal Register Notice and Examination Guide

Contact attorney Thomas James

Need help with trademark registration? Contact Thomas B. James, Minnesota attorney.

Court agrees to hear parody goods case

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear Jack Daniel’s v. VIP Products, the “dog toy” trademark case. Cokato Copyright Attorney Thomas James explains.

In my last blog post (“MSCHF Testing the Limits of Free Speech“) I wrote about the Wavy Baby Shoes case in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Now, in a different case raising similar issues, the United States Supreme Court will have an opportunity to resolve a circuit split on the parody goods question. On Monday, the Court granted certiorari in Jack Daniel’s Properties v. VIP Products.

The “Bad Spaniels” Dog Toy

Jack Daniel’s Products claims trademark rights, including trade dress, in the distinctive shape and label of its whiskey product. VIP Products has made a dog toy called “Bad Spaniels.” It has a very similar shape and label. Jack Daniel’s sued VIP, asserting trademark infringement and dilution claims.

The district court ruled in favor of Jack Daniel’s, finding that the dog toy was likely to confuse consumers about the source of the product and tarnish the Jack Daniel’s brand. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals however, reversed. The dog toys, the Court ruled, are parody goods protected as expression by the First Amendment.

The Second, Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have taken different approaches regarding the scope of First Amendment protection for parody goods. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split in the circuits.

The Trademark Dilution Revision Act

The Trademark Dilution Revision Act expressly excludes parody from dilution liability. It applies, however, only when the challenged use is “other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). Thus, the Act covers parody advertisements or other parodic references to a product in a magazine, movie or other traditional form of artistic or literary expression, but it does not reach situations where a parody mark is used as a designation of source.

Rogers v. Grimaldi

As discussed in a previous blog post, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), that the use of a trademark in the title of a film or other artistic work is not actionable unless “the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Id. at 999.

In the Jack Daniel’s case, the district court held that the rule articulated in Rogers is limited to the use of a trademark in the title of a film or other artistic work. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not agree that the rule is so limited.

The case squarely raises the question whether and to what extent the First Amendment insulates makers and sellers of parody goods from trademark liability.

Conclusion

A decision in this case will be coming in a few months. It is difficult to predict what it will be. Many legal scholars, I am sure, will frame the issue as whether the Court will choose to extend Grimaldi to parody goods, on one hand, or to limit the case to its facts, on the other. Another possibility, however, is that the Court might choose to disapprove Grimaldi altogether. As usual, we will just have to wait and see.

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