Does AI Infringe Copyright?

A previous blog post addressed the question whether AI-generated creations are protected by copyright. This could be called the “output question” in the artificial intelligence area of copyright law. Another question is whether using copyright-protected works as input for AI generative processes infringes the copyrights in those works. This could be called the “input question.” Both kinds of questions are now before the courts. Minnesota attorney Tom James describes a framework for analyzing the input question.

The Input Question in AI Copyright Law

by Thomas James, Minnesota attorney

In a previous blog post, I discussed the question whether AI-generated creations are protected by copyright. This could be called the “output question” in the artificial intelligence area of copyright law. Another question is whether using copyright-protected works as input for AI generative processes infringes the copyrights in those works. This could be called the “input question.” Both kinds of questions are now before the courts. In this blog post, I describe a framework for analyzing the input question.

The Cases

The Getty Images lawsuit

Getty Images is a stock photograph company. It licenses the right to use the images in its collection to those who wish to use them on their websites or for other purposes. Stability AI is the creator of Stable Diffusion, which is described as a “text-to-image diffusion model capable of generating photo-realistic images given any text input.” In January, 2023, Getty Images initiated legal proceedings in the United Kingdom against Stability AI. Getty Images is claiming that Stability AI violated copyrights by using their images and metadata to train AI software without a license.

The independent artists lawsuit

Another lawsuit raising the question whether AI-generated output infringes copyright has been filed in the United States. In this case, a group of visual artists are seeking class action status for claims against Stability AI, Midjourney Inc. and DeviantArt Inc. The artists claim that the companies use their images to train computers “to produce seemingly new images through a mathematical software process.” They describe AI-generated artwork as “collages” made in violation of copyright owners’ exclusive right to create derivative works.

The GitHut Copilot lawsuit

In November, 2022, a class action lawsuit was filed in a U.S. federal court against GitHub, Microsoft, and OpenAI. The lawsuit claims the GitHut Copilot and OpenAI Codex coding assistant services use existing code to generate new code. By training their AI systems on open source programs, the plaintiffs claim, the defendants have allegedly infringed the rights of developers who have posted code under open-source licenses that require attribution.

How AI Works

AI, of course, stands for artificial intelligence. Almost all AI techniques involve machine learning. Machine learning, in turn, involves using a computer algorithm to make a machine improve its performance over time, without having to pre-program it with specific instructions. Data is input to enable the machine to do this. For example, to teach a machine to create a work in the style of Vincent van Gogh, many instances of van Gogh’s works would be input. The AI program contains numerous nodes that focus on different aspects of an image. Working together, these nodes will then piece together common elements of a van Gogh painting from the images the machine has been given to analyze. After going through many images of van Gogh paintings, the machine “learns” the features of a typical Van Gogh painting. The machine can then generate a new image containing these features.

In the same way, a machine can be programmed to analyze many instances of code and generate new code.

The input question comes down to this: Does creating or using a program that causes a machine to receive information about the characteristics of a creative work or group of works for the purpose of creating a new work that has the same or similar characteristics infringe the copyright in the creative work(s) that the machine uses in this way?

The Exclusive Rights of Copyright Owners

In the United States, the owner of a copyright in a work has the exclusive rights to:

  • reproduce (make copies of) it;
  • distribute copies of it;
  • publicly perform it;
  • publicly display it; and
  • make derivative works based on it.

(17 U.S.C. § 106). A copyright is infringed when a person exercises any of these exclusive rights without the copyright owner’s permission.

Copyright protection extends only to expression, however. Copyright does not protect ideas, facts, processes, methods, systems or principles.

Direct Infringement

Infringement can be either direct or indirect. Direct infringement occurs when somebody directly violates one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. Examples would be a musician who performs a copyright-protected song in public without permission, or a cartoonist who creates a comic based on the Batman and Robin characters and stories without permission.

The kind of tool an infringer uses is not of any great moment. A writer who uses word-processing software to write a story that is simply a copy of someone else’s copyright-protected story is no less guilty of infringement merely because the actual typewritten letters were generated using a computer program that directs a machine to reproduce and display typographical characters in the sequence a user selects.

Contributory and Vicarious Infringement

Infringement liability may also arise indirectly. If one person knowingly induces another person to infringe or contributes to the other person’s infringement in some other way, then each of them may be liable for copyright infringement. The person who actually committed the infringing act could be liable for direct infringement. The person who knowingly encouraged, solicited, induced or facilitated the other person’s infringing act(s) could be liable for contributory infringement.

Vicarious infringement occurs when the law holds one person responsible for the conduct of another because of the nature of the legal relationship between them. The employment relationship is the most common example. An employer generally is held responsible for an employee’s conduct,  provided the employee’s acts were performed within the course and scope of the employment. Copyright infringement is not an exception to that rule.

Programmer vs. User

Direct infringement liability

Under U.S. law, machines are treated as extensions of the people who set them in motion. A camera, for example, is an extension of the photographer. Any images a person causes a camera to generate by pushing a button on it is considered the creation of the person who pushed the button, not of the person(s) who manufactured the camera, much less of the camera itself. By the same token, a person who uses the controls on a machine to direct it to copy elements of other people’s works should be considered the creator of the new work so created. If using the program entails instructing the  machine to create an unauthorized derivative work of copyright-protected images, then it would be the user, not the machine or the software writer, who would be at risk of liability for direct copyright infringement.

Contributory infringement liability

Knowingly providing a device or mechanism to people who use it to infringe copyrights creates a risk of liability for contributory copyright infringement. Under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, however, merely distributing a mechanism that people can use to infringe copyrights is not enough for contributory infringement liability to attach, if the mechanism has substantial uses for which copyright infringement liability does not attach. Arguably, AI has many such uses. For example, it might be used to generate new works from public domain works. Or it might be used to create parodies. (Creating a parody is fair use; it should not result in infringement liability.)

The situation is different if a company goes further and induces, solicits or encourages people to use its mechanism to infringe copyrights. Then it may be at risk of contributory liability. As the United States Supreme Court has said, “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). (Remember Napster?)

Fair Use

If AI-generated output is found to either directly or indirectly infringe copyright(s), the infringer nevertheless might not be held liable, if the infringement amounts to fair use of the copyrighted work(s) that were used as the input for the AI-generated work(s).

Ever since some rap artists began using snippets of copyright-protected music and sound recordings without permission, courts have embarked on a treacherous expedition to articulate a meaningful dividing line between unauthorized derivative works, on one hand, and unauthorized transformative works, on the other. Although the Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive right to create works based on their copyrighted works (called derivative works), courts have held that an unauthorized derivative work may be fair use if it is “transformative.: This has caused a great deal of uncertainty in the law, particularly since the U.S. Copyright Act expressly defines a derivative work as one that transforms another work. (See 17 U.S.C. § 101: “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, . . . or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” (emphasis added).)

When interpreting and applying the transformative use branch of Fair Use doctrine, courts have issued conflicting and contradictory decisions. As I wrote in another blog post, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear and decide Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith. It is anticipated that the Court will use this case to attempt to clear up all the confusion around the doctrine. It is also possible the Court might take even more drastic action concerning the whole “transformative use” branch of Fair Use.

Some speculate that the questions the Justices asked during oral arguments in Warhol signal a desire to retreat from the expansion of fair use that the “transformativeness” idea spawned. On the other hand, some of the Court’s recent decisions, such as Google v. Oracle, suggest the Court is not particularly worried about large-scale copyright infringing activity, insofar as Fair Use doctrine is concerned.

Conclusion

To date, it does not appear that there is any direct legal precedent in the United States for classifying the use of mass quantities of works as training tools for AI as “fair use.” It seems, however, that there soon will be precedent on that issue, one way or the other. In the meantime, AI generating system users should proceed with caution.

The Top Copyright Cases of 2022

Cokato Minnesota attorney Tom James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”) presents his annual list of the top copyright cases of the year.

My selections for the top copyright cases of the year.

“Dark Horse”

Marcus Gray had sued Katy Perry for copyright infringement, claiming that her “Dark Horse” song unlawfully copied portions of his song, “Joyful Noise.” The district court held that the disputed series of eight notes appearing in Gray’s song were not “particularly unique or rare,” and therefore were not protected against infringement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, ruling that the series of eight notes was not sufficiently original and creative to receive copyright protection. Gray v. Hudson.

“Shape of You”

Across the pond, another music copyright infringement lawsuit was tossed. This one involved Ed Sheeran’s “Shape of You” and Sam Chokri’s “Oh Why.” In this case, the judge refused to infer from the similarities in the two songs that copyright infringement had occurred. The judge ruled that the portion of the song as to which copying had been claimed was “so short, simple, commonplace and obvious in the context of the rest of the song that it is not credible that Mr. Sheeran sought out inspiration from other songs to come up with it.” Sheeran v. Chokri.

Instagram images

Another case out of California, this one involves a lawsuit filed by photographers against Instagram, alleging secondary copyright infringement. The photographers claim that Instagram’s embedding tool facilitates copyright infringement by users of the website. The district court judge dismissed the lawsuit, saying he was bound by the so-called “server test” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals announced in Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The server test says, in effect, that a website does not unlawfully “display” a copyrighted image if the image is stored on the original site’s server and is merely embedded in a search result that appears on a user’s screen. The photographers have an appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, asking the Court to reconsider its decision in Perfect 10. Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The Court now has the option to either overrule Perfect 10 and allow the photographers’ lawsuit to proceed, or to re-affirm it, thereby creating a circuit split that could eventually lead to U.S. Supreme Court review. Hunley v. Instagram.

Tattoos

Is reproducing a copyrighted image in a tattoo fair use? That is a question at issue in a case pending in New York. Photographer Jeffrey Sedlik took a photograph of musician Miles Davis. Later, a tattoo artist allegedly traced a printout of it to create a stencil to transfer to human skin as a tattoo. Sedlik filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The judge analyzed the claims using the four “fair use” factors. Although the ultimate ruling was that fact issues remained to be decided by a jury, the court issued some important rulings in the course of making that ruling. In particular, the court ruled that affixing an image to skin is not necessarily a protected “transformative use” of an image. According to the court, it is for a jury to decide whether the image at issue in a particular case has been changed significantly enough to be considered “transformative.” It will be interesting to see how this case ultimately plays out, especially if it is still pending when the United States Supreme Court announces its decision in the Warhol case (See below). Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg.

Digital libraries

The book publishers’ lawsuit against Internet Archive, about which I wrote in a previous blog post, is still at the summary judgment stage. Its potential future implications are far-reaching. It is a copyright infringement lawsuit that book publishers filed in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. The gravamen of the complaint is that Internet Archive allegedly has scanned over a million books and has made them freely available to the public via an Internet website without securing a license or permission from the copyright rights-holders. The case will test the “controlled digital lending” theory of fair use that was propounded in a white paper published by David R. Hansen and Kyle K. Courtney. They argued that distributing digitized copies of books by libraries should be regarded as the functional equivalent of lending physical copies of books to library patrons. Parties and amici have filed briefs in support of motions for summary judgment. An order on the motions is expected soon. The case is Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive.

Copyright registration

In Fourth Estate Public Benefits Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2019), the United States Supreme Court interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) to mean that a copyright owner cannot file an infringement claim in federal court without first securing either a registration certificate or an official notice of denial of registration from the Copyright Office. In an Illinois Law Review article, I argued that this imposes an unduly onerous burden on copyright owners and that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to abolish the requirement. Unfortunately, Congress has not done that. As I said in a previous blog post, Congressional inaction to correct a harsh law with potentially unjust consequences often leads to exercises of the judicial power of statutory interpretation to ameliorate those consequences. Unicolors v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz.

Unicolors, owner of the copyrights in various fabric designs, sued H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), alleging copyright infringement. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Unicolor, but H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law. H&M argued that Unicolors had failed to satisfy the requirement of obtaining a registration certificate prior to commencing suit. Although Unicolors had obtained a registration, H&M argued that the registration was not a valid one. Specifically, H&M argued that Unicolors had improperly applied to register multiple works with a single application. According to 37 CFR § 202.3(b)(4) (2020), a single application cannot be used to register multiple works unless all of the works in the application were included in the same unit of publication. The 31 fabric designs, H&M contended, had not all been first published at the same time in a single unit; some had been made available separately exclusively to certain customers. Therefore, they could not properly be registered together as a unit of publication.

The district court denied the motion, holding that a registration may be valid even if contains inaccurate information, provided the registrant did not know the information was inaccurate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Court held that characterizing the group of works as a “unit of publication” in the registration application was a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact. The Court applied the traditional rule of thumb that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, in essence ruling that although a mistake of fact in a registration application might not invalidate the registration for purposes of the pre-litigation registration requirement, a mistake of law in an application will.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. It reversed the Ninth Circuit Court’s reversal, thereby allowing the infringement verdict to stand notwithstanding the improper registration of the works together as a unit of publication rather than individually.

It is hazardous to read too much into the ruling in this case. Copyright claimants certainly should not interpret it to mean that they no longer need to bother with registering a copyright before trying to enforce it in court, or that they do not need to concern themselves with doing it properly. The pre-litigation registration requirement still stands (in the United States), and the Court has not held that it condones willful blindness of legal requirements. Copyright claimants ignore them at their peril.

Andy Warhol, Prince Transformer

I wrote about the Warhol case in a previous blog post. Basically, it is a copyright infringement case alleging that Lynn Goldsmith took a photograph of Prince in her studio and that Andy Warhol later based a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations on it without a license or permission. The Andy Warhol Foundation sought a declaratory judgment that Warhol’s use of the photograph was “fair use.” Goldsmith counterclaimed for copyright infringement. The district court ruled in favor of Warhol and dismissed the photographer’s infringement claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court misapplied the four “fair use” factors and that the derivative works Warhol created do not qualify as fair use. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in October, 2022. A decision is expected next year.

Because this case gives the United States Supreme Court an opportunity to bring some clarity to the extremely murky “transformative use” area of copyright law, it is not only one of this year’s most important copyright cases, but it very likely will wind up being one of the most important copyright cases of all time. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith.

New TM Office Action Deadlines

The deadline for responding to US Trademark Office Actions has been shortened to three months, in many cases. Attorney Thomas B. James shares the details.

by Thomas B. James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”)

Effective December 3, 2022 the deadline for responding to a U.S. Trademark Office Action is shortened from 6 months to 3 months. Here is what that means in practice.

Historically, applicants for the registration of trademarks in the United States have had 6 months to respond to an Office Action. Beginning December 3, 2022 the time limit has been shortened to 3 months.

Applications subject to the new rule

The new, shorter deadline applies to most kinds of trademark applications, including:

  • Section 1(a) applications (application based on use in commerce)
  • Section 1(b) applications (application based on intent to use)
  • Section 44(e) applications (foreign application)
  • Section 44(d) applications (foreign application)

Applications not subject to the new rule

The new deadline does not apply to:

  • Section 66(a) applications (Madrid Protocol)
  • Office actions issued before December 3, 2022
  • Office actions issued after registration (But note that the new deadline will apply to post-registration Office Actions beginning October 7, 2023)
  • Office actions issued by a work unit other than the law offices, such as the Intent-to-Use Unit or the Examination and Support Workload and Production Unit
  • Office actions that do not require a response (such as an examiner’s amendment)
  • Office actions that do not specify a 3-month response period (e.g., a denial of a request for reconsideration, or a 30-day letter).

Extensions

For a $125 fee, you can request one three-month extension of the time to respond to an Office Action. You will need to file the request for an extension within three months from the “issue date” of the Office Action and before filing your response. If your extension request is granted, then you will have six months from the original “issue date” to file your response.

Use the Trademark Office’s Request for Extension of Time to File a Response form to request an extension. The Trademark Office has issued a warning that it will not process requests that do not use this form.

The form cannot be used to request an extension of time to respond to an Office Action that was issued for a Madrid Protocol section 66(a) application, an Office Action that was issued before December 3, 2022, or to an Office Action to which the new deadline does not apply.

Consequences

Failing to meet the new three-month deadline will have the same consequences as failing to meet the old six-month deadline did. Your application will be deemed abandoned if you do not respond to the Office Action or request an extension on or before the three-month deadline. Similarly, your application will be deemed abandoned if you you are granted an extension but fail to file a response on or before the six-month deadline.

The Trademark Office does not refund registration filing fees for abandoned applications.

As before, in some limited circumstances, you might be able to revive an abandoned application by filing a petition and paying a fee. Otherwise, you will need to start the application process all over again.

More information

Here are links to the relevant Federal Register Notice and Examination Guide

Contact attorney Thomas James

Need help with trademark registration? Contact Thomas B. James, Minnesota attorney.

The Internet Archive Lawsuit

Thomas James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”) explains how Hachette Book Group et al. v. Internet Archive, filed in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York on June 1, 2020, tests the limits of authors’ and publishers’ digital rights in their copyright-protected works.

The gravamen of the complaint is that Internet Archive (“IA”) allegedly scanned books and made them freely available to the public via an Internet website without the permission of copyright rights-holders. Book publishers filed this lawsuit alleging that IA’s activities infringe their exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution under the United States Copyright Act.

As of this writing, the case is at the summary judgment stage, with briefing currently scheduled to end in October, 2022. Whatever the outcome, an appeal seems very likely. Here is an overview to bring you up to speed on what the case is about.

The undisputed facts

Per the parties’ stipulation, the following facts are not disputed:

The case involves numerous published books which the publishers who filed this lawsuit (Hachette Book Group, HarperCollins, Penguin Random House, and John Wiley &  Sons) have exclusive rights, under the United States Copyright Act, to reproduce and distribute.

Internet Archive and Open Library of Richmond are nonprofit organizations the IRS has classified as 501(c)(3) public charities. These organizations purchased print copies of certain books identified in the lawsuit.

The core allegations

The plaintiffs allege that IA obtains print books that are protected by copyright, scans them into a digital format, uploads them to its servers, and then distributes these digital copies to members of the public via a website – all without a license and without any payment to authors and publishers. Plaintiffs allege that IA has already scanned 1.3 million books and plans to scan millions more. The complaint describes this as “willful digital piracy on an industrial scale.”

Defenses?

First sale doctrine

One justification that is sometimes advanced for making digital copies of a work available for free online without paying the author or publisher is the so-called “first sale” doctrine. This is an exception to copyright infringement liability that essentially allows the owner of a lawfully acquired copy of a work to sell, transfer or lend it to other people without incurring copyright infringement liability. For example, a person who buys a print edition of a book may lend it to a friend or sell it at a garage sale without having to get the copyright owner’s permission. More to the point, a library may purchase a copy of a print version of a book and proceed to lend it to library patrons without fear of incurring infringement liability for doing so.

The doctrine does not apply to all kinds of works, but it does generally apply  to print books.

The first sale doctrine only provides an exception to infringement liability for the unauthorized distribution of a work, however. It does not provide an exception to liability for unauthorized reproduction of a work. (See 17 U.S.C. § 109.) Scanning books to make digital copies is an act of reproduction, not distribution. Accordingly, the first sale doctrine does not appear to be a good fit as a defense in this case.

“Controlled digital lending”

Public libraries lend physical copies of the books in their collections to library patrons for no charge.  Based on this practice, a white paper published by David R. Hansen and Kyle K. Courtney makes the case for treating the distribution of digitized copies of books by libraries as fair use, where the library maintains a one-to-one ratio between the number of physical copies of a book it has and the number of digital “check-outs” of the digital version it allows at any given time.

The theory, known as controlled digital lending (“CDL”), relies on an assumption that the distribution of a work electronically is the functional equivalent of distributing a physical copy of it, so long as the same limitations on the ability to “check out” the work from the library are imposed.

Publishers dispute this assumption. They take the position that there are important differences between e-books and print books. They maintain that these differences justify the distribution of e-books under a licensing program separate and distinct from their print book purchasing programs. They also question whether e-books are, in fact, distributed subject to the same limitations that apply to a print version of the book.

Fair use

Whether a particular kind of use of a copyright-protected work is “fair use” or not requires consideration of four factors: (1) the nature of the work; (2) the character and purpose of the use; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion copied; and (4) the effect of the use on the market for the work.

Supporters of free access to copyrighted works for all tend to focus on the “character and purpose” factor. They can be relied upon to argue that free access to literary works is a great benefit to the public. Authors and publishers tend to focus on the other factors. In this case, it seems possible that the factors relating to the amount copied and the effect of the use on the market for the work could weigh against a finding of fair use.  

The federal district court in this case is being called upon to evaluate those factors and decide whether they weigh in favor of treating CDL – or at least, CDL as IA has applied and implemented it – as fair use or not.

Subscribe to The Cokato Copyright Attorney

The Cokato Copyright Attorney (Minnesota lawyer Thomas B. James) will be following this case closely. Subscribe for updates as the case makes its way through the courts.

Contact attorney Thomas James

Need help registering a copyright or trademark, or with a copyright or trademark problem? Contact Cokato, Minnesota attorney Tom James.

Copyright Small Claims Court Opens

The Copyright Claims Board (aka “Copyright small claims court”) opened on schedule, on June 16, 2022. Echion CLE is offering educational courses.

The Copyright Claims Board (“copyright small claims court”) launched today (June 16, 2022), on schedule.

The New Copyright Claims Board

The new “copyright small claims court” is not really a court. It is an administrative tribunal. It will, however, function very much like a court.

Court rules, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, do not directly apply.

The new tribunal was created by the CASE Act of 2020. The filing fee is considerably lower than court filing fees. It is empowered to hear and decide copyright infringement and DMCA notification misrepresentation claims. Claims in excess of $30,000 (exclusive of attorney fees and costs) are not eligible.

Some worry it will give copyright trolls more ammunition. There are, however, some provisions in the Act that offer protections from copyright trolls.

“Copyright Small Claims Court” CLE

I will be teaching a CLE webinar for attorneys and paralegals about this new tribunal – jurisdiction, applicable law, procedure, forms (claim, response and counterclaims), evidence, hearings, appeals, potential constitutional challenges, and more.

Dates and times:

June 22, 2022 – Live Webinar – 1:00 – 3:00 p.m. EDT; 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m. CDT; 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 MDT; 10:00 a.m. – 12:00 noon PDT/MST; 9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. AKDT.

July 13, 2022 – Video Replay – 1:00 – 3:00 p.m. EDT; 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m. CDT; 11:00 a.m. – 1:00 MDT; 10:00 a.m. – 12:00 noon PDT/MST; 9:00 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. AKDT.

Attorney CLE credits:

This course has been approved for 2.0 attorney CLE credits by the Minnesota Board of Continuing Legal Education. Because Minnesota is an approved jurisdiction, attorney CLE credits may also be available in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Guam, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Northern Mariana Islands, Wisconsin, and other jurisdictions. Check the Echion CLE course page for information and updates.

Paralegal CLE credits:

NALA has approved this course for 2.0 paralegal continuing education credits.

Cost: $50.

Registration link for the 6/22/2022 webinar: https://us06web.zoom.us/…/651…/WN_y-Xq-od2QKyAPV9WYRM9IQ

Registration link for the 7/13/2022 replay: https://us06web.zoom.us/…/811…/WN_iekZGOfIS6WFl1qynJMImg

Read more about the instructor.

Image: Chris Potter, CC BY 2.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Unicolors v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz

Unicolors | Cokato attorney Thomas James shows how Congressional inaction to fix a bad law can lead to unusual interpretive gymnastics in the judicial branch.

By Thomas James, Minnesota attorney

In Fourth Estate Public Benefits Corp. v. Wall-Street.com LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 889 (2019), the United States Supreme Court interpreted 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) to mean that a copyright owner cannot file an infringement claim in federal court without first securing either a registration certificate or an official notice of denial of registration from the Copyright Office. In an Illinois Law Review article, I argued that this imposes an unduly onerous burden on copyright owners and that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to abolish the requirement. Unfortunately, Congress has not done that.

Congressional inaction to correct a harsh law with potentially unjust consequences predictably leads to judicial decisions exercising the power of statutory interpretation to ameliorate the consequences. The Court’s decision today in Unicolors v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, __ U.S. __ (No. 20-915, February 24, 2022) is a case in point.

The district court proceedings

Unicolors owns the copyrights in various fabric designs. The company sued H&M Hennes & Mauritz (H&M), claiming that H&M had infringed them. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Unicolor, but H&M moved for judgment as a matter of law (notwithstanding the jury verdict). H&M argued that Unicolors had failed to satisfy the requirement of obtaining a registration certificate prior to commencing suit. Although Unicolors had obtained a registration, H&M argued that the registration was not a valid one.

Specifically, H&M argued that Unicolors had improperly applied to register multiple works with a single application. According to 37 CFR § 202.3(b)(4) (2020), a single application cannot be used to register multiple works unless all of the works in the application were included in the same unit of publication. The 31 fabric designs, H&M contended, had not all been first published at the same time in a single unit; some had been made available separately exclusively to certain customers. Therefore, they could not be registered together as a unit of publication.

The district court denied the motion, holding that a registration may be valid even if contains inaccurate information, provided the registrant did not know the information was inaccurate.

The  Ninth Circuit’s reversal

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that Unicolors had failed to satisfy the “single unit of publication” requirement. The Court, however, viewed Unicolors’ characterization of the group of works, in its application, as a “unit of publication” as a mistake of law rather than fact. It is normally a bedrock principle of the law that although mistake of fact may sometimes be asserted as an excuse, ignorance of the law generally cannot be. Since Unicolors had known the relevant facts, namely, that some of the designs had been reserved for some customers separately from the others, its characterization of the group, in the copyright application, as a “unit of publication” was a mistake of law, not fact. Applying the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, the Ninth Circuit held that Unicolor’s registration was not valid.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court’s reversal of the reversal

Section 411(b)(1) says that a registration is valid unless it contains information that the applicant knew was inaccurate. Bucking the traditional maxim that ignorance of the law is not an excuse, the Court interpreted the word know, in this context, to include knowledge of either an applicable fact or an applicable law.  The Court drew upon legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to deny infringers the ability to exploit loopholes.

This is actually a good point. A major objective of international copyright treaties and conventions has been to eliminate formalities in the enforcement of copyrights. Registration is one such formality. One may legitimately ask, however, whether Congress’s decision to impose a requirement of obtaining either a certificate of registration or an official denial of registration from the Copyright Office as a precondition to enforcing a copyright reflected an intention to impose and enforce formalities despite the clear intent of treaties by which the United States has agreed to be bound. Not all other countries impose this formal prerequisite to copyright enforcement. In fact, legal scholars both here and abroad have criticized the United States for enacting and enforcing this formality.

The Court dismissed the traditional legal maxim that ignorance of the law is not an excuse by suggesting it only applies to criminal laws. As Justice Thomas points out in his dissent, however, a requirement to “know” a law (or a legal requirement) ordinarily is satisfied, even in civil cases, by constructive knowledge; actual knowledge is not necessary. Citizens generally are charged with the responsibility of knowing what the laws are, whether they are criminal or civil laws. It is not a defense to the imposition of punitive damages in a tort case, for example, that the defendant did not know that he might be subject to a larger damages award if he acted with intentional or reckless disregard for other people’s rights or lives. That ignorance of the law is not an excuse is a large part of the reason for the existence of legal advisers and the legal profession in general.

Thomas points out that in a previous cases, the Court has distinguished between a “willfulness” requirement, which requires proof of actual knowledge, and a “knowledge” requirement, as to which either actual or constructive knowledge normally may suffice. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201–203 (1991); Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 589 U. S. ___ (2020) (slip op., at 6–7). Indeed, the Court has acknowledged that other “knowledge” requirements in the Copyright Act may be satisfied by either actual or constructive knowledge.

Reading between the lines a little, I think there is room for speculation that some members of the Court regard the prelitigation registration requirement as a formality which, as such, is not really in keeping with the spirit of international treaties calling for the abolition of copyright formalities. Rather than allow a formality to stand in the way of an attempt to enforce a copyright, it is conceivable that the Court chose to deploy its power of judicial interpretation to effect what it believed to be the most just result in this case.

Conclusion

Another old legal maxim I remember from law school is “Hard cases make bad law.” It is too soon to tell how the Court’s decision in this case will play out in practice, but the Court’s allowance of an infringement action to proceed despite the fact that the plaintiff provided false information (whether factual or legal) when securing the registration does seem to open a fairly large can of worms.

Of course, the Court’s decision does not rule out a dismissal of an infringement action if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff had actual knowledge that he or she was providing false information at the time of applying for registration. Actual knowledge, however, can be very difficult to prove.

More importantly, how much mileage are courts going to let people get out of a claim that they did not know the law when they applied for registration? For example, will a person who purchases a copy of a book and then files an application to register the copyright in it be allowed to proceed with an infringement claim because he “did not know” that merely buying a copy of a work does not amount to a purchase of the copyright? (cf. these guys.)

Of course, copyright ownership can still be disputed in an infringement proceeding even after the Court’s decision in this case. Except in the rare case where it can be proven that an applicant actually knew his works did not qualify for the kind of registration application he used, however, it seems like the Court’s decision opens up the copyright registration application process to a great deal of potential abuse, at least when the “error” is not obvious enough for the Copyright Office to detect from the face of the application itself.

Once again, I would suggest that perhaps Congress should just consider abolishing the pre-litigation registration requirement.

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