Tag: human-authorship

The Top 3 Generative-AI Copyright Issues

What are your favorite generative-AI copyright issues? In this capsule summary, Cokato attorney Tom James shares what his three favorites are.

Black hole consuming a star. Photo credit: NASA
Black hole consuming a star. Photo credit: NASA.

Having outlined the top AI legal issues, the time has come now to pick favorites. In this capsule summary, Cokato attorney Tom James shares what his three favorite generative-AI copyright issues are.

Generative artificial intelligence refers collectively to technology that is capable of generating new text, images, audio/visual and possibly other content in response to a user’s prompts. They are trained by feeding them mass quantities of ABC (already-been-created) works. Some of America’s biggest mega-corporations have invested billions of dollars into this technology. They are now facing a barrage of lawsuits, most of them asserting claims of copyright infringement.

Issue #1: Does AI Output Infringe Copyrights?

Copyrights give their owners an exclusive right to reproduce their copyright-protected works and to create derivative works based on them. If a generative-AI user prompts the service to reproduce the text of a pre-existing work, and it proceeds to do so, this could implicate the exclusive right of reproduction. If a generative-AI user prompts it to create a work in the style of another work and/or author, this could implicate the exclusive right to create derivative works.

To establish infringement, it will be necessary to prove copying. Two identical but independently created works may each be protected by copyright. Put another way, a person is not guilty of infringement merely by creating a work that is identical or similar to another if he/she/it came up with it completely on his/her/its own.

Despite “training” their proteges on existing works, generative-AI outfits deny that their tools actually copy any of them. They say that any similarity to any existing works, living or dead, is purely coincidental. Thus, OpenAI has stated that copyright infringement is an “unlikely accidental outcome.”

The “accidental outcome” defense seems to me like a hard one to swallow in those cases where a prompt involves creating a story involving a specified fictional character that enjoys copyright protection. If the character is distinctive enough — and a piece of work in and of itself, so to speak — to enjoy copyright protection (such as, say, Mr. Spock from the Star Trek series), then any generated output would seem to be an unauthorized derivative work, at least if the AI tool is any good.

If AI output infringes a copyright in an existing work, who would be liable for it? Potentially, the person who entered the prompt might be held liable for direct infringement. The AI tool provider might arguably be liable for contributory infringement.

Issue #2: Does AI Training Infringe Copyrights?

AI systems are “trained” to create works by exposing a computer program system to large numbers of existing works downloaded from the Internet.

When content is downloaded from the Internet, a copy of it is made. This process will “involve the reproduction of entire works or substantial portions thereof.” In Comment of OpenAI to the USPTO for example, OpenAI acknowledges that its programs are trained on “large, publicly available datasets that include copyrighted works” and that this process “involves first making copies of the data to be analyzed….” Making these copies without permission may infringe the copyright holders’ exclusive right to make reproductions of their works.

Generative-AI outfits tend to argue that the training process is fair use.

Fair use claims require consideration of four statutory fair-use factors:

  • the purpose and character of the use;
  • the nature of the work copied;
  • the amount and substantiality of the portion copied; and
  • the effect on the market for the work.

OpenAI relies on the precedent set in Authors Guild v. Google for its invocation of “fair use.” That case involved Google’s copying of the entire text of books to construct its popular searchable database.

A number of lawsuits currently pending in the courts are raising the question whether and how, the AI training process is “fair use.” For more information, have a look at Does AI Infringe Copyright? 

Issue #3: Are AI-Generated Works Protected by Copyright?

The Copyright Act affords copyright protection to “original works of authorship.” The U.S. Copyright Office recognizes copyright only in works “created by a human being.” Courts, too, have declined to extend copyright protection to nonhuman authors. (Remember the monkey selfie case?) A recent copyright registration applicant has filed a lawsuit (Thaler v. Perlmutter) against the U.S. Copyright Office alleging that the Office wrongfully denied registration of an AI-generated work. A federal court has now rejected his argument that human authorship is not required for copyright ownership. Thaler v. Perlmutter, 1:22-cv-01564, (D.D.C. Aug 18, 2023) ECF No. 24.

In March 2023, Copyright Office Guidance was published. It states that when AI “determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship.” Moreover, an argument might be made that a general prompt, such as “create a story about a dog in the style of Jack London,” is an idea, not expression. It is well settled that only expression gets copyright protection; ideas do not.

In September 2023, the Copyright Office Review Board affirmed the Office’s refusal to register a copyright in a work that was generated by Midjourney and then modified by the applicant, on the basis that the applicant did not disclaim the AI-generated material.

The Office also has the power to cancel improvidently granted registrations. (Words to the wise: Disclose and disclaim.)

These are my favorite generative-AI legal issues. What are yours?

Visit my extensive Copyright FAQs page.

A Recent Exit from Paradise

In his application for registration, Thaler had listed his computer, referred to as “Creativity Machine,” as the “author” of the work, and himself as a claimant. The Copyright Office denied registration on the basis that copyright only protects human authorship.

Over a year ago, Steven Thaler filed an application with the United States Copyright Office to register a copyright in an AI-generated image called “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.” In the application, he listed a machine as the “author” and himself as the copyright owner. The Copyright Office refused registration  on the grounds that the work lacked human authorship. Thaler then filed a lawsuit in federal court seeking to overturn that determination. On August 18, 2023 the court upheld the Copyright Office’s refusal of registration. The case is Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. CV 22-1564 (BAH), 2023 WL 5333236 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2023).

The Big Bright Green Creativity Machine

In his application for registration, Thaler had listed his computer, referred to as “Creativity Machine,” as the “author” of the work, and himself as a claimant. The Copyright Office denied registration on the basis that copyright only protects human authorship.

Stephen Thaler's AI-generated artwork, "A Recent Entrance to Paradise"

Taking the Copyright Office to court

Unsuccessful in securing a reversal through administrative appeals, Thaler filed a lawsuit in federal court claiming the Office’s denial of registration was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law….”

The court ultimately sided with the Copyright Office. In its decision, it provided a cogent explanation of the rationale for the human authorship requirement:

The act of human creation—and how to best encourage human individuals to engage in that creation, and thereby promote science and the useful arts—was thus central to American copyright from its very inception. Non-human actors need no incentivization with the promise of exclusive rights under United States law, and copyright was therefore not designed to reach them.

Id.

A Complex Issue

As I discussed in A Recent Entrance to Complexity, the issue is not as simple as it might seem. There are different levels of human involvement in the use of an AI content-generating mechanism. At one extreme, there are programs like “Paint,” in which users provide a great deal of input. These kinds of programs may be analogized to paintbrushes, pens and other tools that artists traditionally have used to express their ideas on paper or canvas. Word processing programs are also in this category. It is easy to conclude that the users of these kinds of programs are the authors of works that may be sufficiently creative and original to receive copyright protection.

At the other end of the spectrum are AI services like DALL-E and ChatGPT. These tools are capable of generating content with very little user input. If the only human input is a user’s directive to “Draw a picture,” then it would be difficult to claim that the author contributed any creative expression. That is to say, it would be difficult to claim that the user authored anything.

The difficult question – and one that is almost certain to be the subject of ongoing litigation and probably new Copyright Office regulations – is exactly how much, and what kind of, human input is necessary before a human can claim authorship.  Equally as perplexing is how much, if at all, the Copyright Office should involve itself in ascertaining and evaluating the details of the process by which a work was created. And, of course, what consequences should flow from an applicant’s failure to disclose complete details about the nature and extent of machine involvement in the creative process.

Conclusion

The court in this case did not dive into these issues. The only thing we can safely take away from this decision is the broad proposition that a work is not protected by copyright to the extent it is generated by a machine.

Update: Mr. Thaler appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the registration refusal. 

Let’s Stop Analogizing Human Creators to Machines

Of course, policy discussions usually begin with the existing framework, but in this instance, it can be a shaky starting place because generative AI presents some unique challenges—and not just for the practice of copyright law.

[Guest post by David Newhoff, author of The Illusion of More.] Here he weighs in on the human authorship requirement.

Just as it is folly to anthropomorphize computers and robots, it is also unhelpful to discuss the implications of generative AI in copyright law by analogizing machines to authors.[1] In 2019, I explored the idea that “machine learning” could be analogous to human reading if the human happens to have an eidetic memory. But this was a thought exercise, and in that post, I also imagined machine training that serves a computer science or research purpose—not necessarily generative AIs trained on protected works designed to produce works without authors.

In the present discussion, however, certain parties weighing in on AI and copyright seem to advocate policy that is premised on the language and principles of existing doctrine as applicable to the technological processes of both the input and output sides of the generative AI equation. Of course, policy discussions usually begin with the existing framework, but in this instance, it can be a shaky starting place because generative AI presents some unique challenges—and not just for the practice of copyright law.

We should be wary of analogizing machine functions to human activity for the simple reason that copyright law (indeed all law) has never been anything but anthropocentric. Although it is difficult to avoid speaking in terms of machines “learning” or “creating,” it is essential that we either constantly remind ourselves that these are weak, inaccurate metaphors, or that a new glossary is needed to describe what certain AIs may be doing in the world of creative production.

On the input (training) side of the equation, the moment someone says something like, “Humans learn to make art by looking at art, and generative AIs do the same thing,” the speaker should be directed to the break-out session on sci-fi and excused from any serious conversation about applicable copyright law. Likewise, on the output side, comparisons of AI to other technological developments—from the printing press to Photoshop—should be presumed irrelevant unless the AI at issue can plausibly be described as a tool of the author rather than the primary maker of a work of creative expression.

Copyright Office Guidance Highlights Some Key Difficulties

To emphasize the exceptional nature of this discussion, even experts are somewhat confused by both the doctrinal and administrative aspects in the new guidelines published by U.S. Copyright Office directing authors how to disclaim AI-generated material in a registration application. The confusion is hardly surprising because generative AI has prompted the Office to ask an unprecedented question—namely, How was this work made?

As noted in several posts, copyrightability has always been agnostic with regard to the creative process. Copyright rights attach to works that show a modicum of originality, and the Copyright Office does not generally ask what tools, methods, etc. the author used to make a work.[2] But this historic practice was then confronted by the now widely reported applications submitted by Stephen Thaler and Kris Kashtanova, both claiming copyright in visual works made with generative AI.

In both cases, the Copyright Office rejected registration applications for the visual works based on the longstanding, bright-line doctrine that copyright rights can only attach to works made by human beings. In Thaler’s case, the consideration is straightforward because the claimant affirmed that the image was produced entirely by a machine. Kashtanova, on the other hand, asserts more than de minimis authorship (i.e., using AI as a tool) to produce the visual works elements in a comic book.

Whether in response to Kashtanova—or certainly anticipating applications yet to come—the muddiness of the Office guidelines is an attempt to address the difficult question as to whether copyright attaches to a work that combines authorship and AI generation, and how to draw distinctions between the two. This is not only new territory for the Office as a doctrinal matter but is a potential mess as an administrative one.

The Copyright Office has never been tasked with separating the protectable expression attributable to a human from the unprotectable expression attributable to a machine. Even if it could be said that photography has always provoked this tension (a discussion on its own), the analysis has never been an issue for the Office when registering works, but only for the courts in resolving claims of infringement. In fact, Warhol v. Goldsmith, although a fair use case, is a prime example of how tricky it can be to separate the factual elements of a photograph from the expressive elements.

But now the Copyright Office is potentially tasked with a copyrightability question that, in practice, would ask both the author and the examiner to engage in a version of the idea/expression dichotomy analysis—first separating the machine generated material from the author’s material and then considering whether the author has a valid claim in the protectable expression.

This is not so easy to accomplish in a work that combines author and machine-made elements in a manner that may be subtly intertwined; it begs new questions about what the AI “contributed” to a given work; and the inquiry is further complicated by the variety of AI tools in the market or in development. Then, because neither the author/claimant nor the Office examiner is likely a copyright attorney (let alone a court), the inquiry is fraught with difficulty as an administrative process—and that’s if the author makes a good-faith effort to disclaim the AI-generated material in the first place.

Many independent authors are confused enough by the Limit of Claim in a registration application or the concept of “published” versus “unpublished.” Asking these same creators to delve into the metaphysics implied by the AI/Author distinction seems like a dubious enterprise, and one that is not likely to foster more faith in the copyright system than the average indie creator has right now.

Copyrightability Could Remain Blind But …

It is understandable that some creators (e.g., filmmakers using certain plug-ins) may be concerned that the Copyright Office has already taken too broad a view—connoting a per se rule that denies copyrightability for any work generated with any AI technology. This concern is a reminder that AI should not be discussed as a monolithic topic because not all AI enhanced products do the same thing. And again, this may imply a need for some new terms rather than the words we use to describe human activities.

In this light, one could follow a different line of reasoning and argue that the agnosticism of copyrightability vis-à-vis process has always implied a presumption of human authorship where other factors—from technological enhancements to dumb luck—invisibly contribute to the protectable expression. Relatedly, a photographer can add a filter or plug-in that changes the expressive qualities of her image, but doing so is considered part of the selection and arrangement aspect of her authorship and does not dilute the copyrightability of the image.

Some extraordinary visual work has already been produced by professional artists using AI to yield results that are too strikingly well-crafted to believe that the author has not exerted considerable influence over the final image. In this regard, then, perhaps the copyrightability question at the registration stage, no matter how sophisticated the “filter” becomes, should remain blind to process. The Copyright Office could continue to register works submitted by valid claimants without asking the novel How question.

But the more that works may be generated with little or no human spark, the more this agnostic, status-quo approach could unravel the foundation of copyright rights altogether. And it would not be the first time that major tech companies have sought to do exactly that. It is no surprise that an AI developer or a producer using AI would seek the financial benefits of copyright protection; but without a defensible presence of human expression in the work, the exclusive rights of copyright cannot vest in a person with the standing to defend those rights. Nowhere in U.S. law do non-humans have rights of any kind, and this foundational principle reminds us that although machine activity can be compared to human activity as an allegorical construct, this is too whimsical for a serious policy discussion.

Again, I highlight this tangle of administrative and doctrinal factors to emphasize the point that generative AI does not merely present new variations on old questions (e.g., photography), but raises novel questions that cannot easily be answered by analogies to the past. If the challenges presented by generative AI are to be resolved sensibly, and in a way that will serve independent creators, policymakers and thought leaders on copyright law should be skeptical of arguments that too earnestly attempt to transpose centuries of doctrine for human activity into principles applied to machine activity.

[1] I do not distinguish “human” authors, because there is no other kind.

[2] I say “generally” only because I cannot account for every conversation among claimants and examiners.