The “Demise” of the Server Test

As with Mark Twain, reports of the death of the server test are greatly exaggerated. In this article, Minnesota attorney Thomas James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney”) explains what happened – and what did not happen – in Emmerich Newspapers, Inc. v. Particle Media, Inc.

The Copyright Act gives a copyright owner the exclusive right to publicly display the work.

In Perfect 10 v. Amazon, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a website is liable for unauthorized public display of a coprighted work only if the image is stored on the website’s server. The court reasoned that “display” means showing a copy of the work. To show a copy, it is necessary to possess one. But it is not necessary for a website owner to possess a copy of a work to write code that instructs a user’s browser to display the content of a file that is hosted somewhere else. Therefore, encoding a website to instruct a user’s browser to display as an embedded image a copy of a work that is hosted on a different server does not infringe the copyright owner’s public display right.

That case involved the display of images in search engine results. Astute readers with remarkably good memories will recall that I have previously written about a case that extended the “server test” announced in Perfect 10 to social media. Specifically, a district court held that directing a user’s browser to an image that is hosted on Instagram’s server does not constitute “display” of the image. Since no direct infringement by means of “public display” occurred, Instagram could not be held secondarily liable for contributing to the unauthorized public display of the image. The Ninth Circuit has since affirmed the decision. See Hunley v. Instagram. I described this as one of the “Top Copyright Cases of 2022.”

As I indicated in that article, a Ninth Circuit affirmance could result in a circuit split. It has.

In McGucken v. Newsweek, LLC, a court in the Second Circuit held that Newsweek publicly displayed another person’s copryighted photograph when it embedded the photograph from the copyright owner’s Instagram page. The photograph was hosted on Instagram’s server, not Newsweek’s. And in Nicklen v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, a New York court explicitly rejected the server test, declaring that it is “contrary to the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act.” Of course, these were district court decisions, not decisions of Circuit Courts of Appeals, so they would not suffice to create a “circuit split.” A recent case out of the Fifth Circuit, however, might. That case is Emmerich Newspapers v. Particle Media.

Emmerich Newspapers v. Particle Media

Particle Media runs NewsBreak, a news aggregator that embeds stories from various news media into a single feed. When a user clicked on an Emmerich story, it opened in a frame that loaded the Emmerich page from Emmerich’s server on the user’s browser. Emmerich filed a copyright infringement lawsuit claiming that Particle Media violated its exclusive aright to publicly display the work.

The district court applied the server test, holding that the framed view of the story did not infringe Emmerich’s exlcusive right to publicly display the work. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the server test.

The Transmit Requirement

For the Fifth Circuit, the inquiry should not be into who possesses a copy of the work, but who transmits it. In many cases, including this one, the outcome will be the same. Emmerich’s story was neither stored on Particle Media’s server nor transmitted by it. Therefore, under either test, it was not liable.

URLs as Copyright Management Information

A second issue raised in Emmerich Newspapers is whether a website URL is a kind of “copyright management information” (CMI) under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). If it is, then removing it would violate the DMCA.

So is it or isn’t it? Well, possibly yes and possibly no. It depends on whether a person looking at the URL would understand it as identifying the work or its owner, on one hand, or as idenfiying only a website address, on the other.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did not resolve the issue in this case. Instead, it remanded it to the district court to decide. Nevertheless, the decision establishes a precedent that a URL, in principle, can be copyright manamgement information for purposes of the DMCA.

Is There Really a Circuit Split?

The Fifth Circuit clearly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s server test. On the other hand, though, both circuits agree that embedding generally does not infringe the copyright owner’s public display right. They disagree about the rationale, but the result is the same. That might not be enough for the Supreme Court to perceive a need to resolve a circuit split.

Conclusion

When assessing the public display right in the embedding context, some courts will apply the server test. Others will apply the transmit requirement. In most cases, merely encoding a website to instruct a third-party server to display content in a user’s browser will not result in liability for infringement of the copright owner’s public display right under either test.

Websites that deploy embedding, however, have reason to be careful about stripping the URL from embedded content. If the URL is perceived as identifying a work or its author, stripping it from the embedded display could violate the DMCA.

Copyright Litigation Update

A roundup of some developments in the copyright world. The Copyright Claims Board issues its first attorney fee award. The Bartz v. Anthropic generative-AI class action settlement is approved. Generative-AI companies have been adding copyright guardrails to their products. Information about a website that is tracking AI lawsuits, and the latest Buc-ee’s trademark lawsuit.

“Go Home, Ball!”

PerfectPinz LLC v. K9 King, LLC

PerfectPinz LLC (“PerfectPinz”) sells golf paraphernalia. It created four cartoon images depicting scenes from the Adam Sandler movie, Happy Gilmore.

One of the images is a cartoon image of the Happy Gilmore character on the ground, yelling at a golf ball to get in the cup (“Go home, ball!”) Another cartoon image of Mr. Gilmore is captioned “Just Tap It In.” A third one is a cartoonized version of the scene in the movie in which he brawls with Bob Barker. It is captioned, “The Price Is Wrong.” The last image depicts the Gilmore and Chubbs characters and is captioned “It’s All in the Hips.”

K9 King also produced golf paraphernalia based on these same scenes from Happy Gilmore.

Apparently, neither party secured permission from Universal Pictures to copy or make derivative works based on the movie.

PerfectPinz LLC filed a copyright infringement claim against K9 King, LLC in the Copyright Claims Board (CCB). The Board denied the claim.

To prevail on a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized exercise of one of the exclusive rights of copyright ownership, such as the right to make copies of the original elements of the work. The Board rested its decision on the second requirement, ruling that PerfectPinz had not established that K9 King copied enough elements of the works that were original to PerfectPinz to qualify as infringement.

Comparisons of Happy Gilmore movie stills with cartoon images created by PerfectPinz and K9King
Images for comparison, from the complaint filed with the CCB

Because the copied elements were copies of scenes from the movie, they were not original to PerfectPrinz. Therefore, the Board ruled that K9 King had not copied any content original to PerfectPinz’s images.

Sanctions

The Board found that PerfectPinz acted in bad faith in failing to mention that the scenes it depicted in its images were copies of scenes in Happy Gilmore. This was not mentioned in the copyright registrations, either. This omission, the Board held, warranted an award of attorney fees to K9 King, in the amount of $900.

This is the first time the CCB has awarded attorney fees in a case. It is also one of those very rare times when a company that has made an unauthorized derivative work sues another company for also making an unauthorized derivative of the same work.

Bartz v. Anthropic Settlement Approved

Bartz et al. v. Anthropic PBC

As I described in a 2025 blog post (“Ai OK; Piracy Not: Bartz v. Anthropic“), a federal district court in California last year determined that Anthropic is liable for copyright infringement in connection with its unauthorized copying of copyright-protected works to use in training its generative AI. Since then, the parties have entered into a settlement.

On July 20, 2026, the court issued an Order approving the settlement and awarding attorney fees. The settlement fund consists of $1.5 billion plus interest. $101,561,111 of it will go to the attorneys and several million dollars will be applied toward reimbursement of costs and expenses incurred and to be incurred in the future.

Copyright Infringement Guardrails

While this is not news about a court case, it is about a response to copyright infringement litigation.

As I explained in Generative AI: The Top 12 Lawsuits, OpenAI has been sued more than once for copyright infringement in connection with the training of its generative AI product, ChatGPT.

In Tremblay v. OpenAI, Inc., authors alleged that ChatGPT was trained on the text of books they and other proposed class members authored, without their permission, and that it facilitates output copyright infringement. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized dozens of AI copyright lawsuits against OpenAI into a single venue: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. In Re OpenAI, Inc. Copyright Infringement Litigation. Tremblay is included in this consolidation.

Silverman et al. v. OpenAI is another such lawsuit. Sarah Silverman (comedian/actress/writer) and others alleged that OpenAI, by using copyright-protected works without permission to train ChatGPT, infringed copyrights. The case was subsequently consolidated into the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) in the Southern District of New York.

Blocking users from reproducing large swaths of text from books or creating derivative works based on books used during training are “guardrails” against output infringement. According to Ars Technica, OpenAI’s ChatGPT is now refusing user requests to generate text that mimics the style of famous authors.

To test this, I prompted ChatGPT to “write something in the style of Tom James.” Here is the response I received:

ChatGPT response to prompt to write in the style of Tom James, author of Tuber Tips

As it happens, I am indeed the author of Tuber Tips, an offbeat compilation of whimsical and completely worthless suggestions of uses for sweet potatoes, along with some actual recipes. I had kind of hoped my name might bring to mind E-Commerce Law or IP Law for Non-IP Attorneys, but such is life.

The snippet it produced was completely bereft of humor. Everything in it was completely practical. The guardrails appear to be working.

AI Litigation Tracker

The website ExhibitAI.info is tracking “every lawsuit shaping the future of advanced AI.” The coverage spans 190 cases, 342 claims, 47 defendants, 117 plaintiff firms, and 44 courts.

The dataset reportedly is “updated continuously as new cases are filed and decided across jurisdictions.”

The dataset can be filtered by case type (copyright, tort, trademark, etc.), claims, date filed, defendants, forum, etc.

It looks like it could be a useful resource.

Buc-ee’s Redux

In a previous post (“Last Exit from Paradise“) I mentioned a trademark infringement lawsuit that Buc-ee’s, a popular chain of gas-and-convenience stores in the South. filed against Mickey’s gas stations. Well, now it has filed another one. This time, it is against Ohio-based Hanes Road Carryout, Inc.

Hanes Road Carryout, Inc. operates Beaver’s Mini Mart in Beavercreek, Ohio.. The complaint alleges that their logo is confusingly similar to Buc-ee’s because it “incorporate[s] a cartoon beaver with wide eyes and a smile” and “uses red as a predominant color in its exterior signage with its anthropomorphic representation of a cartoon beaver mascot.”

Beaver's MiniMart sign

(Top: Buc-ee’s logo. Bottom: Beaver’s Mini Mart logo.)

What do you think, Beave?

Jerry Mathers (Leave It To Beaver actor)

Need help with a CCB case?

If you need help with a CCB case or other copyright matter, contact the Law Office of Tom James.

Copyrights in Architecture

Copyrights in architectural designs may be registered as architectural works or as drawings (“pictorial, graphical or sculptural works”). The decision can be critical to the viability of an infringement claim. Here’s why.

Samphel v. Wu

Tenzin Samphel, Xiaoyu Gu, Chef Creative Offices, Inc., and Design Next Agency, Inc. filed a complaint against Lily Qiaorong Wu, Shuxian Yu, Shuaicheng Zhang, Moge Tee Blacksburg, LLC, and Blacksburg Fusion Restaurants, LLC alleging claims of defamation and infringement of copyrights in architectural and interior designs. Defendants moved to dismiss copyright infringement claims. The court granted the motion. Samphel v. Lily Qiaorong Wu, No. 7:25-cv-00710-EKD-CKM (W.D. Va. Jul. 15, 2026).

The complaint alleged that plaintiffs, through companies they operate, were hired to provide design and constuction services for a bubble tea shop and a restaurant. The owners allegedly terminated the contracts and hired other people to complete the work. Plaintiffs allege that defendants made false and defamatory statments about them.

The complaint also includes claims for copyright infringement, alleging that the owners and their companies, in completing the work on the buildings, used their designs without permission to construct and operate the buildings with interiors that were “nearly identical or substantially similar” to those designs.

The parties did not dispute that the plaintiffs, through one of their companies, owned registered copyrights in the drawings as pictorial, graphic or sculptural works under 17 U.S.C. § 101 and 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). The court, however, ruled that protection for the drawings themselves does not extend to the contruction of a structure depicted in the drawings. If they had wanted that kind of protection, the court ruled, then they should have registered them as architectural works under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8).

Two kinds of copyrights

The Copyright Act defines “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” as “two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).

It defines “architectural work” as:

“the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design but does not include individual standard features.”

17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).

As the language of the Act demonstrates, architectural plans can be registered as pictorial works or as architectural works (or both). This is because an individual who creates an architectural work by depicting it in a drawing will have two distinct copyrights: one in the drawing (section 102(a)(5)) and one in the architectural work (section 102(a)(8)). See T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 109–10 (1st Cir. 2006)

Scope of protection for pictorial works

A copyright in a pictorial work protects only the drawing itself. It prohibits copying the drawing itself. It does not protect against the construction of a buliding based on the architectural design depicted in the drawing.

Scope of protection for architectural works

Copyright protection in an architectural work extends to the as-built structure.

The distinction may seem confusing, but it makes more sense when it is remembered that copyrights in architectural works are a special kind of copyright, an exception to the usual rule that copyright may only be claimed in expression, not ideas or designs. Ideas about the composition and arrangement of spaces in a building are not protected by a copyright in a drawing of a building. They can only be protected by a copyright in an architectural work.

Derivative works?

The owner of a copyright in a drawing or other expressive work has an exclusive right to make derivative works based on the copyrighted work. A sculpture based on a pictorial work is a derivative work of the pictorial work. A sculpture, in copyright law, is any three-dimensional structure. This could include a building.

Might the owner of a copyright in an architectural drawing who registered it only as a pictorial work be able to argue that constructing a building based on it is the unauthorized makiing of a derivative work, and therefore copyright infringement? What factors should a court consider to assess the viability of such a claim?

Your answers are due by next Friday.*

*Just kidding. This is not a real homework assignment.


Have a question about copyright law? Visit my Copyright FAQs page. Need help registering a copyright? Contact me.