damages Archives - Cokato Copyright Attorney: The Law Blog of Thomas James

Enduring (Non-AI) Legal Issues

With so much attention being given to the legal issues that AI-powered technologies are generating, it can be easy to overlook or underestimate the importance of long-standing legal issues having nothing to do with artificial intelligence. While it would be neither possible nor particularly useful to catalog all of them in a single blog post, it might be helpful to highlight a few key legal issues that are developing alongside developments in AI law.

Copyright Law

The core principles of intellectual property remain anchored in traditional law. In that connection, it is important to understand the philosophy of copyright. Copyright is not the only kind of intellectual property there is, but it is by far the most common. Everyone who has ever written a story or a poem, scribbled a doodle, or composed an email message is very likely a copyright owner. Merit is not a requirement. In theory, even that terrible drawing of a turkey you made in first grade by tracing your fingers and hand on paper and drawing a head and two legs on it may be protected by copyright. Whether it makes sense to pay the filing fee to register something like that is a different story.

A key issue in copyright law that continues to develop is fair use. Courts have been grappling with how to interpret and apply the four vaguely worded factors they must to make findings about whether a particular otherwise-infringing use is “fair” or not. The idea of “transformative use” is at the center of this evolving doctrine. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, decided in 2023, is a leading case in this area now. Other limitations on copyright infringement liability, such as the safe harbors set out in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), are also important. There are also evolving protections for sound recordings and licensing. Other topics in copyright law include such things as the registration requirement, damages for infringement, diversity, copyright estoppel, the limitations period, the extent of protection for shorter works, compulsory e-book licensing, and circumvention of copyright protection measures.

The Internet Archive lawsuit addressed the phenomenon of digitized e-books and the impact on authors of making them freely available to readers via an online digital library.

The new administrative court for resolving smaller copyright claims, the Copyright Claims Board, is one of the more significant developments in copyright law in a long time. Find out what to know about the new CCB.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2021.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2022.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2024.

Meanwhile, more and more works continue to enter the public domain.

Trademark Law

There has been a surge in interest in trademark law ever since the COVID-19 phenomenon. Many small brick-and-mortar businesses had to shut down as people were instructed to quarantine at home. While quarantining at home, a lot of people had the same idea: Starting a home-based, online business. Those new online businesses needed to have names. The USPTO was soon flooded with an unusually large number of trademark registration applications. Competition in the trademark space became fierce. Descriptiveness and likelihood-of-confusion challenges increased. New laws and procedures, such as the Trademark Modernization Act, were enacted to clear more room for new businesses by cancelling unused trademarks and cancelling registrations for classes of goods and services no longer being used by the trademark owners. Interest in nontraditional marks like color marks, trade dress, and sound and olfactory trademarks (smell marks) has also grown.

The clash between First Amendment values and trademark interests continues to surface from time to time. Courts have addressed trademark speech rights on several occasions now.

And of course, distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and registration disputes are ongoing.

Foundational Context: Major IP Developments of 2023

This section is a repost of an article I wrote in 2023 describing major developments in various areas of intellectual property law that took place that year. While I have broadened the scope of the discussion, it can still be useful to look back at what went on during that pivotal year, as it provides important context for the developments in IP law that are taking place now.

Copyright: Fair Use

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith et al.

I’ve written about this case before here and here. The Supreme Court issued a ruling in the case in May. The decision is significant because it finally reined in the “transformative use” doctrine that the Court first announced in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music back in 1994. In that case, 2 Live Crew had copied key parts of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh, Pretty Women” to make a parody of the song in its own rap style. The Court held that the 2 Live Crew version, although reproducing portions of both the original song and the original recording of it without permission, transformed it into something else. Therefore, even though it infringed the copyright, the 2 Live Crew version was for a transformative purpose and therefore protected as fair use.

In the thirty years since Campbell, lower courts have been applying the “transformative use” principle announced in Campbell in diverse and divergent ways. Some interpretations severely eviscerated the copyright owner’s exclusive right to make derivative works. Their interpretations often conflicted. What one circuit called transformative “fair use” another circuit called actionable infringement. Hence the need for Supreme Court intervention.

In 1984, Vanity Fair licensed one of photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photographs of Prince to illustrate a magazine article about him. Per the agreement, Andy Warhol made a silkscreen using the photograph for the magazine and Vanity Fair credited the original photograph to Goldsmith. Unknown to her, however, Warhol proceeded to make 15 additional works based on Goldsmith’s photograph withour her permission.. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Arts licensed one of them to Condé Nast as an illustration for one of their magazines. The Foundation received a cool $10,000 for it, with neither payment nor credit given to Goldsmith. The Foundation then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that its use of the photograph was a protected fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The district court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the Foundation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the four-factor “fair use” analysis favored Goldsmith. The Supreme Court sided with the Court of Appeals.

Noting that it was not ruling on whether Warhol’s making of works using the photograph was fair use, the Court limited its analysis to the narrow question whether the Foundation’s licensing of the Warhol work to Condé Nast was fair use. On that point, the Court determined that the use of the photograph to illustrate a story about Prince was identical to the use Goldsmith had made of the photograph (i.e., to illustrate a magazine article about Prince.) Unlike 2 Live Crew’s use of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the purpose of the use in this case was not to mock or parody the original work.

The case is significant for vindicating the Copyright Act’s promise to copyright owners of an exclusive right to make derivative works. While Warhol put his own artistic spin on the photograph – and that might have been sufficient to sustain a fair use defense if he had been the one being sued – the Warhol Foundation’s and Condé Nast’s purpose was no different from Goldsmith’s, i.e., as an illustration for an article about Prince. Differences in the purpose or character of a use, the Court held, “must be evaluated in the context of the specific use at issue.” Had the Warhol Foundation been sued for displaying Warhol’s modifications of the photograph for purposes of social commentary in its own gallery, the result might have been different.

Although the holding is a seemingly narrow one, the Court did take the opportunity to disapprove the lower court practice of ending a fair use inquiry at the moment an infringer asserted that an unauthorized copy or derivative work was created for a purpose different from the original author’s.

Copyright Statute of Limitations and Damages

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review this Eleventh Circuit decision. At issue is whether a copyright plaintiff may recover damages for infringement that occurred outside of the limitations period, that is, infringement occurring more than three years before a lawsuit was filed.

The circuits are split on this question. According to the Second Circuit, damages are recoverable only for acts of infringement that occurred during the 3-year period preceding the filing of the complaint. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have held that as long as the lawsuit is timely filed, damages may be awarded for infringement that occurred more than three years prior to the filing, at least when the discovery rule has been invoked to allow a later filing. In Nealy, the Eleventh Circuit held that damages may be recovered for infringement occurring more than three years before the claim is filed if the plaintiff did not discover the infringement until some time after it first began.

A decision will be coming in 2024.

Artificial Intelligence

Copyrightability

Thaler v. Perlmutter, et. al.

This was an APA proceeding initiated in the federal district court of the District of Columbia for review of the United States Copyright Office’s refusal to register a copyright in an AI-generated work. In August, the district court upheld the Copyright Office’s decision that an AI-generated work is not protected by copyright, asserting that “human creativity is the sine qua non at the core of copyrightability….” For purposes of the Copyright Act, only human beings can be “authors.” Machines, non-human animals, spirits and natural forces do not get copyright protection for their creations.

An appeal of the decision is pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Infringement

Many cases that were filed or are still pending in 2023 allege that using copyrighted works to train AI, or creating derivative works using AI, infringes the copyrights in the works so used. Most of these cases make additional claims as well, such as claims of unfair competition, trademark infringement, or violations of publicity and DMCA rights.

I have been blogging about these cases throughout the year. Significant rulings on the issues raised in them are expected to be made in 2024.

Trademark: Parody Goods

Jack Daniels’s Properties Inc. v. VIP Products LLC

For more information about this case, read my blog post about it here.

This is the “parody goods” case. VIP Products used the “Bad Spaniels” name to market its dog toys, which were patterned on the distinctive shape of a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle. VIP filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that its product did not infringe the Jack Daniel’s brand. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for trademark infringement and dilution. Regarding infringement, VIP claimed First Amendment protection. Regarding dilution, VIP claimed the use was a parody of a famous mark and therefore qualified for protection as trademark fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to VIP.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that when an alleged infringer uses the trademark of another (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, it is a commercial, not an expressive, use. Accordingly, the First Amendment is not a consideration in such cases.

Rogers v. Grimaldi had held that when the title of a creative work (in that case, a film) makes reference to a trademark for an artistic or expressive purposes (in that case, Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers), the First Amendment shields the creator from trademark liability. In the Jack Daniel’s case, the Court distinguished Rogers, holding that it does not insulate the use of trademarks as trademarks (i.e. as indicators of the source or origin of a product or service) from ordinary trademark scrutiny. Even through the dog toys may have had an expressive purpose, VIP admitted it used Bad Spaniels as a source identifier. Therefore, the First Amendment does not apply.

The Court held that the same rule applies to dilution claims. The First Amendment does not shield parody goods from a dilution claim when the alleged diluter uses a mark (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for its own products or services.

Trademark: International Law

Abitron Austria v. Hetronic International

Here, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act does not have extraterritorial reach. Specifically, the Court held that Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125 (a)(1) extend only to those claims where the infringing use in commerce occurs in the United States. They do not extend to infringement occurring solely outside of the United States, even if consumer confusion occurs in the United States.

The decision is a reminder to trademark owners that if they want to protect their trademark rights in other countries, they should take steps to protect their rights in those countries, such as by registering their trademarks there.

Patents: Enablement

Amgen v. Sanofi

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the validity of certain patents on antibodies used to lower cholesterol under the Patent Act’s enablement requirement (35 U.S.C. 112(a)). At issue was whether Amgen could patent an entire genus of antibodies without disclosing sufficient information to enable a person skilled in the art to create the potentially millions of antibodies in it. The Court basically said no.

If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. Amgen v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. ____ (2023)

Patents: Executive Power

In December, the Biden administration asserted that it can cite “excessive prices” to justify the exercise of Bayh-Dole march-in rights. The Biden Administration also has continued to support a World Trade Organization TRIPS patent waiver for COVID-19 medicines. These developments are obviously of some concern to pharmaceutical companies and members of the patent bar.

Conclusion

My vote for the most significant IP case of 2023 was Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith. Lower courts had all but allowed the transformative use defense to swallow up the exclusive right of a copyright owner to create derivative works. The Supreme Court provided much-needed correction. I predicted that in 2024, the most significant decisions would also be in the copyright realm, but that they would have to do with AI. The prediction turned out to be accurate.

The Copyright Discovery Rule Stands

The Copyright Act imposes a 3-year limitations period for copyright infringement claims. But when does a claim accrue? That is the (potentially) million-dollar question.

Last year, the United States Supreme Court held that as long as a claim is timely filed, damages may be recovered for any loss or injury, including losses incurred more than three years before the claim is filed (Warner Chappell Music. v. Nealy). The Court expressed no opinion about whether the Copyright Act’s three-year limitation period begins to run when the infringing act occurs or when the victim discovers it, leaving that question for another day. “Another day” arrived, but the Court still declined to address it. What, if anything, can be made of that?

Statute of Limitations for Copyright Infringement

The Copyright Act imposes a 3-year limitations period for copyright infringement claims. Specifically:

No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.

17 U.S.C. 507(b).

But when does a claim accrue? That is the (potentially) million-dollar question.

According to the “incident of injury” rule, an infringement claim accrues when an infringing act occurs. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670 (2014). Under this rule, an infringement victim who did not learn about an infringing act until three years after it occurred would be out luck.

Courts in many circuits, however, apply an alternative rule. Known as the “discovery rule,” it holds that a copyright infringement claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.” William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F. 3d 425, 433 (CA3 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Patry on Copyright, this is the majority rule.

If a court applies the discovery rule, then the infringement complaint must be filed within three years after the victim learns or should reasonably have learned of the infringing act, even if that act occurred more than three years earlier.

The Look-Back Period for Damages

As I explained in a previous blog post, the United States Supreme Court did not have the question about the validity of either accrual theory before it in Warner Chappell Music. Accordingly, it did not address the issue. Instead, the Court limited itself to deciding only the specific question before it, namely, whether damages can be claimed for all injuries that occurred before the victim learned (or reasonably should have learned) of an infringing act. The Court held that they can be. And this is true even for losses occurring more than three years before the infringement was discovered. Statutes of limitations only determine when a claim may be filed; they do not limit the look-back period for recovering damages for injury. “The Copyright Act contains no separate time-based limit on monetary recovery.” Warner Chappell Music, supra.

It must be kept in mind that the discovery rule has an important proviso. The clock starts clicking on a claim from the first date a victim actually knew or should have known of an infringement. In many cases, it may become more difficult to convince a judge that the victim’s unawareness of the infringing act was reasonable if a lot of time has gone by since the infringement occurred. Reasonableness, however, depends on all the facts and circumstances, so it has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

RADesign, Inc. v. Ruthie Davis et al.

Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. sued RADesign, Inc. and others for copyright infringement. The complaint alleged that the defendant’s infringing use of a copyright-protected photograph began on August 16, 2017, and that the plaintiff discovered it on February 8, 2021. The complaint was filed in October, 2021. As a result, the claim would be barred under the “incident of injury” rule because it was filed more than three years after the alleged infringement occurred. The complaint, however, was filed in the Second Circuit, a jurisdiction that recognizes the discovery rule. Therefore, the question became whether the failure to discover the infringement within three years was reasonable. The district court held that it was not. The court described the copyright owner in this case as “sophisticated” in detecting and litigating infringements and therefore not entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, declaring, “This ‘sophisticated plaintiff’ rationale has no mooring to our cases.”

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari

RADesign, Inc. filed a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The sole question presented was “Whether a claim ‘accrue[s]’ under the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. 507(b), when the infringement occurs (the ‘injury rule’) or when a plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the infringement (the ‘discovery rule’).” The petition argued that the Copyright Act does not explicitly provide for a discovery rule and asserted that the courts of appeal should not have adopted one.

Unlike in Warner Chappell Music, the Court now had the validity of the discovery rule in copyright infringement cases squarely before it. The Court, however, declined the invitation to review that question. On June 16, 2025, it denied certiorari.

What a Denial of Certiorari Means

Really, the only legal effect of a denial of certiorari is that the lower court’s decision stands. In this case, that would mean that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision remains in effect for that specific case. For the time being, anyway, attorneys can cite the reasoning and holding of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision as legal precedent in other cases.

What a Denial of Certiorari Does Not Mean

A denial of certiorari does not mean that the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeal’s decision sets a precedent in the Second Circuit, but the denial of certiorari does not have that effect. It simply means the Supreme Court has decided not to trouble itself with the question at this time.

Caveats

Copyright owners and practitioners should not read too much into this decision. Even if the discovery rule forecloses a finding of untimeliness on the face of a complaint, a defendant may still be able to assert untimeliness as an affirmative defense. Again, the reasonableness of delayed acquisition of knowledge of infringement must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Copyright owners and their attorneys should be vigilant in detecting infringement of protected works and diligent in timely filing claims.

Read more about Warner Chappell Music and other important cases in Top Copyright Cases of 2024.

Copyrights in AI-Generated Content

Copyright registrations are being issued for works created with generative-AI tools, subject to some important qualifications. Also, Internet Archves revisited (briefly)

The U.S. Copyright Office has issued its long-awaited report on the copyrightability of works created using AI-generated output. The legality of using copyrighted works to train generative-AI systems is a topic for another day.

Key takeaways:

Copyright protects the elements of a work that are created by a human, but does not protect elements that were AI-generated (probably the key take-away from the Report) The is the “human authorship” requirement that the Copyight Office invoked in denying registration of Stephen Thaler’s AI-generated output. I wrote about that a couple of years ago in “AI Can Create But Is It Art?” and also have commented on new AI copyright guidance from the Office before.
The Copyright Office believes existing law is adequate to deal with AI copyright issues; it does not believe any new legislation is needed
Using AI to assist in the creative process does not affect copyrightability
Prompts do not provide sufficient control over the output to be considered creative works.
Protection exists for the following, if they involve sufficient human creativity:
- Selection, coordination, and arrangement of AI-generated output (compilation)
  - Modification of AI-generated content
    - Human-created elements distinguishable from AI-generated elements.

Prompts

A key question for the Copyright Office was whether a highly detailed prompt could suffice as human creative expression. The Office says no; “[P]rompts alone do not provide sufficient human control to make users of an AI system the authors of the output. Prompts essentially function as instructions that convey unprotectable ideas. While highly detailed prompts could contain the user’s desired expressive elements, at present they do not control how the AI system processes them in generating the output.”

How much control does a human need over the output-generation process to be considered an author? The answer, apparently, is “So much control that the AI mechanism’s contribution was purely rote or mechanical. “The fact that identical prompts can generate multiple different outputs further indicates a lack of human control.”

Expressive prompts

If the prompt itself is sufficiently creative and original, the expression contained in the prompt may qualify for copyright protection. For example, if a user prompts an AI tool to change a story from first-person to third-person point of view, and includes the first-person version in the prompt, then copyright may be claimed in the story that was included in the prompt. The author could claim copyright in the story as a “human-generated element” distinguishable from anything AI thereafter did to it. The human-created work must be perceptible in the output.

Registration of hybrid works

The U.S. Copyright Office has now issued several registrations for works that contain a combination of both human creative expression and AI-generated output. Examples:

Irontic, LLC has a registered copyright in Senzia Opera, a sound recording with “music and singing voices by [sic] generated by artificial intelligence,” according to the copyright registration. That material is excluded from the claim. The registration, however, does provide protection for the story, lyrics, spoken words, and the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the sound recording.

Computer programs can be protected by copyright, but if any source code was generated by AI, it must be excluded from the claim. Thus, the Adobe GenStudio for Performance Marketing computer program is protected by copyright, but any source code in it that was AI-generated is not.

A record company received a copyright registration for human additions and modifications to AI-generated art.

As an example of a “selection, coordination and arrangement” copyright, there is the registration of a work called “A Collection of Objects Which Do Not Exist,” consisting of a collage of AI-generated images. “A Single Piece of American Cheese,” is another example of a registered copyright claim based on the selection, coordination, or arrangement of AI-generated elements.

China

A Chinese court has taken a contrary position, holding that an AI-generated image produced by Stable Diffusion is copyrightable because the prompts he chose reflected his aesthetic choices.

Internet Archives Postscript

In January, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive. This came as no surprise. A couple of important things that bear repeating came out of this decision, though.

First, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that fair use is an affirmative defense. As such, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the level of market harm the use has caused or may cause. While a copyright owner may reasonably be required to identify relevant markets, he/she/it is not required to present empirical data to support a claim of market harm. The defendant bears the burden of proof of a fair use defense, including proof pertinent to each of the four factors comprising the defense.

Confusion seems to have crept into some attorneys’ and judges’ analysis of the issue. This is probably because it is well known that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof of damages, which can also involve evidence of market harm. The question of damages, however, is separate and distinct from the “market harm” element of a fair use defense.

The second important point the Second Circuit made in Hatchette is that the “public benefit” balancing that Justice Breyer performed in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. needs to focus on something more than just the short-term benefits to the public in getting free access to infringing copies of works. Otherwise, the “public benefit” in getting free copies of copyright-protected stuff would outweigh the rights of copyright owners every time. The long-term benefits of protecting the rights of authors must also be considered.

True, libraries and consumers may reap some short-term benefits from access to free digital books, but what are the long-term consequences? [Those consequences, i.e.,] depriv[ing] publishers and authors of the revenues due to them as compensation for their unique creations [outweigh any public benefit in having free access to copyrighted works.]

Id.

They reined in Google v. Oracle.

Thomas James is a human. No part of this article was AI-generated.

Top Copyright Cases of 2024

Many AI-related copyright lawsuits continued to proceed through the courts

Copyright has clearly risen to the top of the list of AI legal issues I identified in a previous post. Not all copyright cases implicate AI, however, as the first in my collection of the top copyright cases of 2024 demonstrates.

Warner Chappell Music Inc. v. Nealy

The Copyright Act imposes a three-year period of limitations for copyright infringement claims. There has been a split in the circuits about whether this means that damages could be claimed only for infringement occurring during the three-year period or whether damages could be recovered for earlier acts of infringement so long as the claim is timely filed. The Supreme Court has now resolved the split.

The issue arises in cases where a claimant invokes the discovery rule. The general rule is that a limitations period runs from the date of the act giving rise to the cause of action. The discovery rule, by contrast, measures the limitations period from the date the infringing act is discovered. Thus, for example, if an infringing act occurred in 2012 but the copyright owner did not learn about it until 2022, then under the traditional rule, the claim would be time-barred. Under the discovery rule, it would not be.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in this case is to the effect that if the discovery rule applies in the jurisdiction where suit is filed, and a claimant properly invokes it, then damages are not limited to the three years preceding suit. Rather, any damages incurred since the date of the infringing act are recoverable.

The Court did not rule on the validity of the discovery rule.

Warner Chappell Music Inc.. v. Nealy, 601 U.S. ____ (2024).

Read more about the Warner Chappell Music decision.

Hachette Book Group Inc. v. Internet Archive

I wrote about Hachette Book Group v. Internet Archive back in 2022, when it was at the summary judgment stage in the district court for the Southern District of New York. Astute readers with much better memory than I possess will recall that I included in my list of the top copyright cases os 2022. The complaint, filed by book publishers, alleged that the Internet Archive made digital copies of over a million print books and then freely distributed the copies to members of the public, all without the permission of the copyright owners. In 2023, the district judge ruled in favor of the publishers, holding that the enterprise was not “fair use.” It subsequently issued an injunction against further scanning and distribution of books. This year, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

To some, the decision might seem like a no-brainer. Copying other people’s books and giving them away for free, without the copyright owners’ permission, sounds like core copyright infringement, right? Yet, before the Warhol v. Goldsmith decision in 2023, courts had been applying such an expansive view of the “transformative use” branch of fair use that some people thought that making digital copies of a print book was categorically “transformative” and therefore fair use. This decision makes it clear that no, it isn’t.

The Internet Archive has said it will not appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court.

Hachette Book Group Inc. et al. v. Internet Archive, No. 23-1260 (2^nd Cir. 2024)

Griner v. King

U.S. Representative Steve King’s campaign committee used a copyright-protected photograph in his campaign without permission. King’s committee had argued fair use and that it had an “implied license” to use the image because it had been widely circulated as a meme on the Internet. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an Iowa jury’s verdict for the copyright owner.

Griner et al. v. King et al., No. 23-2117, (8^th Cir. 2024)

The Intercept Media v. OpenAI

This isn’t really a momentous decision, in terms of precedential value, but it is the first major victory for Big AI in the plethora of AI-related lawsuits they are facing.

The Intercept Media, Inc. sued OpenAI and Microsoft Corporation for alleged Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) violations in connection with training the AI tool, ChatGPT. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On November 21, 2024 the New York court dismissed claims against Microsoft with prejudice. The court dismissed the 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) claim against OpenAI but allowed the claim under 17 U.S.C. §1202(b)(1) to proceed.

Section 1202(b)(1) prohibits unauthorized removal or alteration of copyright management information, including author information and the copyright notice.

The Intercept Media Inc. v. OpenAI Inc., No. 1:24-cv-01515, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024).

Stay tuned…

Many AI-related copyright lawsuits continued to proceed through the courts in 2024, with decisions expected in 2025 or later.

Copyright Infringement Damages

Are damages for copyright infringement always limited to the three-year period before suit is filed? The Supreme Court says no.

Library of Congress building - illustration for Thomas B James blog post

Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy

Are damages for copyright infringement always limited to the three-year period before suit is filed? The Supreme Court says no.

The Limitations Period for Copyright Infringement

The Copyright Act imposes a three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement claims: “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. 507(b). It turns out the rule was easier for legislators to write than for courts to apply.

Sherman Nealy’s Infringement Claims

In the 1980s, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler formed Music Specialist, Inc. The company released several recordings before the venture was dissolved. Nealy subsequently served two terms in prison, one from 1989 to 2008, and the other from 2012 to 2015.

Meanwhile, Butler licensed songs from the Music Specialist catalog to Warner Chappell Music, without Nealy’s knowledge. Warner Chappell, in turn, licensed them to popular recording artists and television shows.

In 2018, Nealy sued Warner Chappell for copyright infringement. He sought damages and profits for infringement occurring between 2008 and 2018. A significant portion of this claim would have been time-barred if “accrual,” as used in Section 107(b), referred only to the date on which an infringing act occurred. Some courts have held, however, that the rule does not apply if the copyright owner neither knew nor should have known that infringement was occurring. In that situation, a claim accrues when a “plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered,” the infringing act. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U. S. 663, 670 (2014). Once a copyright claimant learns that infringement has occurred, he or she then has three years from that time to file suit. Nealy alleged that he did not learn of the infringement until 2016, which was within the three-year limitations under the discovery rule.

The district court ruled that although his claims were timely filed, he could recover damages only for infringement occurring during the three-year period preceding his commencement of the lawsuit.

The Circuit Split

The district court’s ruling was consistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in Sohn v. Scholastic, Inc. 959 F.3d 39, 51-52 (2nd. Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit, however, allows recovery for all infringing acts, even beyond the three-year period, when a claim is timely filed under the discovery rule. Starz Entertainment v. MGM, 39 F. 4th 1236, 1244 (CA9 2022)). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Ninth Circuit’s view. It therefore reversed the district court.

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Court has never ruled on the validity of the discovery rule. That question, however, was not before it in this case. Warner Chappell had not challenged the rule in the lower court, so the Court limited its review to the scope of recovery under the discovery rule.

Its ruling on that question was simple. The Act prescribes a three-year limitation for filing suit. It imposes no limit on the time for recovering damages. The Act says only that an infringer is liable for damages and profits made from the infringing act. “The Copyright Act contains no separate time-based limit on monetary recovery.” Id.

Justices Gorsuch, Thomas and Alito dissented. In their view, the discovery rule is not valid. Accordingly, they would have dismissed the petition as improvidently granted. They would have preferred for the Court to wait for a case that squarely raises the validity of the discovery rule instead of deciding an issue that requires them to assume, arguendo, that it is.

The Take-Away

The decision obviously is a victory for copyright owners and claimants. As long as they file an infringement claim within three years of learning they have one, it does not matter how long ago the infringement occurred. Recovery is not limited to the three years prior to the commencement of the action. It is important, however, to be aware of two limitations on the Court’s decision.

Known infringement

First, the three-year limitation period still exists.

Example: Chuck learns in 2019 that Robert has been infringing his copyright for years. The infringement is ongoing. He waits until 2023, however, to file a claim. Because he did not file a claim within three years of learning of the pre-2019 infringing acts, he will not be able to recover damages or profits for them. In this situation, his recovery will be limited to the three-year period prior to commencing an action.

The validity of the discovery rule

As the dissenters observed, the Court has never directly ruled on the validity of the discovery rule. It is possible that if a litigant were to raise that issue, the question could make its way to the Supreme Court. It is also possible that the Court could decide against its validity at that time.

It does seem to be a just and fair rule. After all, why should infringers be permitted to benefit from their victims’ lack of knowledge? The Court, however, could decide against adopting a per se rule of validity, instead leaving it to trial courts to balance the equities in each individual case. We simply have no way of knowing, at this point, what approach the Court would take if the validity of the discovery rule were to come squarely before it.

Subject to these caveats, the decision is cause for celebration in the creative community.

Read about other non-AI-related legal issues.

Continuing education

Interested in learning how to do a trademark search? On June 10, 11 and 12, I will be presenting a series of 1-hour webinars covering: basic trademark law and “likelihood of confusion” analysis; searching the USPTO database; and advanced searching with RegEx. For more information, visit the Echion CLE course page.

Top IP Developments of 2023

2023 was a big year for U.S. intellectual property law. Major developments occurred in every area. Here are the highlights

2023 was a big year for U.S. intellectual property law. Major developments occurred in every area. Here are the highlights.

Copyright

Fair Use

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith et al.

The case is significant for vindicating the Copyright Act’s promise to copyright owners of an exclusive right to make derivate works. While Warhol put his own artistic spin on the photograph – and that might have been sufficient to sustain a fair use defense if he had been the one being sued – the Warhol Foundation’s and Condé Nast’s purpose was no different from Goldsmith’s, i.e., as an illustration for an article about Prince. Differences in the purpose or character of a use, the Court held, “must be evaluated in the context of the specific use at issue.” Had the Warhol Foundation been sued for displaying Warhol’s modifications of the photograph for purposes of social commentary in its own gallery, the result might have been different.