Enduring (Non-AI) Legal Issues

With so much attention being given to the legal issues that AI-powered technologies are generating, it can be easy to overlook or underestimate the importance of long-standing legal issues having nothing to do with artificial intelligence. While it would be neither possible nor particularly useful to catalog all of them in a single blog post, it might be helpful to highlight a few key legal issues that are developing alongside developments in AI law.

With so much attention being given to the legal issues that AI-powered technologies are generating, it can be easy to overlook or underestimate the importance of long-standing legal issues having nothing to do with artificial intelligence. While it would be neither possible nor particularly useful to catalog all of them in a single blog post, it might be helpful to highlight a few key legal issues that are developing alongside developments in AI law.

Copyright Law

The core principles of intellectual property remain anchored in traditional law. In that connection, it is important to understand the philosophy of copyright. Copyright is not the only kind of intellectual property there is, but it is by far the most common. Everyone who has ever written a story or a poem, scribbled a doodle, or composed an email message is very likely a copyright owner. Merit is not a requirement. In theory, even that terrible drawing of a turkey you made in first grade by tracing your fingers and hand on paper and drawing a head and two legs on it may be protected by copyright. Whether it makes sense to pay the filing fee to register something like that is a different story.

A key issue in copyright law that continues to develop is fair use. Courts have been grappling with how to interpret and apply the four vaguely worded factors they must to make findings about whether a particular otherwise-infringing use is “fair” or not. The idea of “transformative use” is at the center of this evolving doctrine. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, decided in 2023, is a leading case in this area now. Other limitations on copyright infringement liability, such as the safe harbors set out in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), are also important. There are also evolving protections for sound recordings and licensing. Other topics in copyright law include such things as the registration requirement, damages for infringement, diversity, copyright estoppel, the limitations period, the extent of protection for shorter works, compulsory e-book licensing, and circumvention of copyright protection measures. 

The Internet Archive lawsuit addressed the phenomenon of digitized e-books and the impact on authors of making them freely available to readers via an online digital library. 

The new administrative court for resolving smaller copyright claims, the Copyright Claims Board, is one of the more significant developments in copyright law in a long time. Find out what to know about the new CCB. 

Read about the top copyright cases of 2021.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2022.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2024.

Meanwhile, more and more works continue to enter the public domain. 

Trademark Law

There has been a surge in interest in trademark law ever since the COVID-19 phenomenon. Many small brick-and-mortar businesses had to shut down as people were instructed to quarantine at home. While quarantining at home, a lot of people had the same idea: Starting a home-based, online business. Those new online businesses needed to have names. The USPTO was soon flooded with an unusually large number of trademark registration applications. Competition in the trademark space became fierce. Descriptiveness and likelihood-of-confusion challenges increased. New laws and procedures, such as the Trademark Modernization Act, were enacted to clear more room for new businesses by cancelling unused trademarks and cancelling registrations for classes of goods and services no longer being used by the trademark owners. Interest in nontraditional marks like color marks, trade dress, and sound and olfactory trademarks (smell marks) has also grown.

The clash between First Amendment values and trademark interests continues to surface from time to time. Courts have addressed trademark speech rights on several occasions now. 

And of course, distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and registration disputes are ongoing. 

Other Legal Topics

Constitutional law acquired renewed relevance in 2025, with issues running the gamut from freedom of speech to the separation of powers.

Dramatic changes in family structures and sex roles have been accompanied by major changes in family law, particularly in regard to the custody of children. More jurisdictions are warming up to the ideas of joint custody and shared parenting.

E-commerce law, too, is rapidly evolving, as more and more businesses supplement their physical presence with an online one. A growing number of businesses operate exclusively online. This has raised a wide range of legal issues entailing significant permutations of existing laws, and in some cases, brand new laws and legal frameworks.

As I mentioned at the outset, it would be neither possible nor useful for me to catalog every new legal development in a blog like this. The best I can do is highlight a few of them from time to time.

In this category is a post I wrote about a continuing legal education program I presented with Donald Hubin (National Parents Organization) and Professor Daniel Fernandez-Kranz:

Joint Custody and Equal Shared Parenting Laws

Pertinent to e-commerce law is an article I wrote about the sales and use tax “nexus” requirement for taxes on online sales: 

“Sales and Use Tax Nexus: The Way Forward for Legislation” by Tom James

 

Foundational Context: Major IP Developments of 2023

This section is a repost of an article I wrote in 2023 describing major developments in various areas of intellectual property law that took place that year. While I have broadened the scope of the discussion, it can still be useful to look back at what went on during that pivotal year, as it provides important context for the developments in IP law that are taking place now.

Copyright: Fair Use

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith et al.

I’ve written about this case before here and here. The Supreme Court issued a ruling in the case in May. The decision is significant because it finally reined in the “transformative use” doctrine that the Court first announced in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music back in 1994. In that case, 2 Live Crew had copied key parts of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh, Pretty Women” to make a parody of the song in its own rap style. The Court held that the 2 Live Crew version, although reproducing portions of both the original song and the original recording of it without permission, transformed it into something else. Therefore, even though it infringed the copyright, the 2 Live Crew version was for a transformative purpose and therefore protected as fair use.

In the thirty years since Campbell, lower courts have been applying the “transformative use” principle announced in Campbell in diverse and divergent ways. Some interpretations severely eviscerated the copyright owner’s exclusive right to make derivative works. Their interpretations often conflicted. What one circuit called transformative “fair use” another circuit called actionable infringement. Hence the need for Supreme Court intervention.

In 1984, Vanity Fair licensed one of photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photographs of Prince to illustrate a magazine article about him. Per the agreement, Andy Warhol made a silkscreen using the photograph for the magazine and Vanity Fair credited the original photograph to Goldsmith. Unknown to her, however, Warhol proceeded to make 15 additional works based on Goldsmith’s photograph withour her permission.. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Arts licensed one of them to Condé Nast as an illustration for one of their magazines. The Foundation received a cool $10,000 for it, with neither payment nor credit given to Goldsmith. The Foundation then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that its use of the photograph was a protected fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The district court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the Foundation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the four-factor “fair use” analysis favored Goldsmith. The Supreme Court sided with the Court of Appeals.

Noting that it was not ruling on whether Warhol’s making of works using the photograph was fair use, the Court limited its analysis to the narrow question whether the Foundation’s licensing of the Warhol work to Condé Nast was fair use. On that point, the Court determined that the use of the photograph to illustrate a story about Prince was identical to the use Goldsmith had made of the photograph (i.e., to illustrate a magazine article about Prince.) Unlike 2 Live Crew’s use of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the purpose of the use in this case was not to mock or parody the original work.

The case is significant for vindicating the Copyright Act’s promise to copyright owners of an exclusive right to make derivative works. While Warhol put his own artistic spin on the photograph – and that might have been sufficient to sustain a fair use defense if he had been the one being sued – the Warhol Foundation’s and Condé Nast’s purpose was no different from Goldsmith’s, i.e., as an illustration for an article about Prince. Differences in the purpose or character of a use, the Court held, “must be evaluated in the context of the specific use at issue.” Had the Warhol Foundation been sued for displaying Warhol’s modifications of the photograph for purposes of social commentary in its own gallery, the result might have been different.

Although the holding is a seemingly narrow one, the Court did take the opportunity to disapprove the lower court practice of ending a fair use inquiry at the moment an infringer asserted that an unauthorized copy or derivative work was created for a purpose different from the original author’s.

Copyright Statute of Limitations and Damages

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review this Eleventh Circuit decision. At issue is whether a copyright plaintiff may recover damages for infringement that occurred outside of the limitations period, that is, infringement occurring more than three years before a lawsuit was filed.

The circuits are split on this question. According to the Second Circuit, damages are recoverable only for acts of infringement that occurred during the 3-year period preceding the filing of the complaint. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have held that as long as the lawsuit is timely filed, damages may be awarded for infringement that occurred more than three years prior to the filing, at least when the discovery rule has been invoked to allow a later filing. In Nealy, the Eleventh Circuit held that damages may be recovered for infringement occurring more than three years before the claim is filed if the plaintiff did not discover the infringement until some time after it first began.

A decision will be coming in 2024.

Artificial Intelligence

Copyrightability

Thaler v. Perlmutter, et. al.

This was an APA proceeding initiated in the federal district court of the District of Columbia for review of the United States Copyright Office’s refusal to register a copyright in an AI-generated work. In August, the district court upheld the Copyright Office’s decision that an AI-generated work is not protected by copyright, asserting that “human creativity is the sine qua non at the core of copyrightability….” For purposes of the Copyright Act, only human beings can be “authors.” Machines, non-human animals, spirits and natural forces do not get copyright protection for their creations.

An appeal of the decision is pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Infringement

Many cases that were filed or are still pending in 2023 allege that using copyrighted works to train AI, or creating derivative works using AI, infringes the copyrights in the works so used. Most of these cases make additional claims as well, such as claims of unfair competition, trademark infringement, or violations of publicity and DMCA rights.

I have been blogging about these cases throughout the year. Significant rulings on the issues raised in them are expected to be made in 2024.

Trademark: Parody Goods

Jack Daniels’s Properties Inc. v. VIP Products LLC

For more information about this case, read my blog post about it here.

This is the “parody goods” case. VIP Products used the “Bad Spaniels” name to market its dog toys, which were patterned on the distinctive shape of a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle. VIP filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that its product did not infringe the Jack Daniel’s brand. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for trademark infringement and dilution. Regarding infringement, VIP claimed First Amendment protection. Regarding dilution, VIP claimed the use was a parody of a famous mark and therefore qualified for protection as trademark fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to VIP.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that when an alleged infringer uses the trademark of another (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, it is a commercial, not an expressive, use. Accordingly, the First Amendment is not a consideration in such cases.

Rogers v. Grimaldi had held that when the title of a creative work (in that case, a film) makes reference to a trademark for an artistic or expressive purposes (in that case, Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers), the First Amendment shields the creator from trademark liability. In the Jack Daniel’s case, the Court distinguished Rogers, holding that it does not insulate the use of trademarks as trademarks (i.e. as indicators of the source or origin of a product or service) from ordinary trademark scrutiny. Even through the dog toys may have had an expressive purpose, VIP admitted it used Bad Spaniels as a source identifier. Therefore, the First Amendment does not apply.

The Court held that the same rule applies to dilution claims. The First Amendment does not shield parody goods from a dilution claim when the alleged diluter uses a mark (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for its own products or services.

Trademark: International Law

Abitron Austria v. Hetronic International

Here, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act does not have extraterritorial reach. Specifically, the Court held that Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125 (a)(1) extend only to those claims where the infringing use in commerce occurs in the United States. They do not extend to infringement occurring solely outside of the United States, even if consumer confusion occurs in the United States.

The decision is a reminder to trademark owners that if they want to protect their trademark rights in other countries, they should take steps to protect their rights in those countries, such as by registering their trademarks there.

Patents: Enablement

Amgen v. Sanofi

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the validity of certain patents on antibodies used to lower cholesterol under the Patent Act’s enablement requirement (35 U.S.C. 112(a)).  At issue was whether Amgen could patent an entire genus of antibodies without disclosing sufficient information to enable a person skilled in the art to create the potentially millions of antibodies in it. The Court basically said no.

If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. Amgen v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. ____ (2023)

Patents: Executive Power

In December, the Biden administration asserted that it can cite “excessive prices” to justify the exercise of Bayh-Dole march-in rights. The Biden Administration also has continued to support a World Trade Organization TRIPS patent waiver for COVID-19 medicines. These developments are obviously of some concern to pharmaceutical companies and members of the patent bar.

Conclusion

My vote for the most significant IP case of 2023 was Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith. Lower courts had all but allowed the transformative use defense to swallow up the exclusive right of a copyright owner to create derivative works. The Supreme Court provided much-needed correction. I predicted that in 2024, the most significant decisions would also be in the copyright realm, but that they would have to do with AI. The prediction turned out to be accurate.

Voice Cloning

Copyright cannot be claimed in a voice. Copyright law protects only expression, not a person’s corporeal attributes.

Nipper, painting of dog listening to phonograph, by Francis Barraud (1898-1899)
Painting of Nipper by Francis Barraud (1898-99); subsequently used as a trademark with “His Master’s Voice.”

 

Voice cloning is one of the generative-AI technologies that I have described as a perfect tool for the age of deception. Now the issues it raises are reaching the courts. 

Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc.

On July 10, 2025, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York issued an Order granting in part and denying in part a motion to dismiss a putative class action lawsuit that Paul Lehrman and Linnea Sage commenced against Lovo, Inc. The lawsuit, Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc., alleges that Lovo used artificial intelligence to make and sell unauthorized “clones” of their voices.

Specifically, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are voice-over actors. For a fee, they read and record scripts for their clients. Lovo allegedly sells a text-to-speech subscription service that allows clients to generate voice-over narrations. The service is described as one that uses “AI-driven software known as ‘Generator’ or ‘Genny,'” which was “created using ‘1000s of voices.'” Genny allegedly creates voice clones, i.e., copies of real people’s voices. Lovo allegedly granted its customers “commercial rights for all content generated,” including “any monetized, business-related uses such as videos, audio books, advertising promotion, web page vlogging, or product integration.” (Lovo terms of service.) The complaint alleges that Lovo hired the plaintiffs to provide voice recordings for “research purposes only,” but that Lovo proceeded to exploit them commercially by licensing their use to Lovo subscribers.

This lawsuit ensued.

The complaint sets out claims for:

  • Copyright infringement
  • Trademark infringement
  • Breach of contract
  • Fraud
  • Conversion
  • Unjust enrichment
  • Unfair competition
  • New York civil rights laws
  • New York consumer protection laws.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The copyright claims

Sage alleged that Lovo infringed the copyright in one of her voice recordings by reproducing it in presentations and YouTube videos. The court allowed this claim to proceed.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Lovo’s unauthorized use of their voice recordings in training its generative-AI product infringed their copyrights in the sound recordings. The court ruled that the complaint did not contain enough factual detail about how the training process infringed one of the exclusive rights of copyright ownership. Therefore, it dismissed this claim with leave to amend.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims of output infringement, i.e., claims that the “cloned” voices the AI tool generated infringed copyrights in the original sound recordings.

Copyright protection in a sound recording extends only to the actual recording itself. Fixation of sounds that imitate or simulate the ones captured in the original recording does not infringe the copyright in the sound recording.

This issue often comes up in connection with copyrights in music recordings. If Chuck Berry writes a song called “Johnny B. Goode” and records himself performing it, he will own two copyrights – one in the musical composition and one in the sound recording. If a second person then records himself performing the same song, and he doesn’t have a license (compulsory or otherwise) to do so, that person would be infringing the copyright in the music but not the copyright in the sound recording. This is true even if he is very good at imitating Berry’s voice and guitar work. For a claim of sound recording infringement to succeed, it must be shown that the actual recording itself was copied.

Plaintiffs did not allege that Lovo used Genny to output AI-generated reproductions of their original recordings. Rather, they alleged that Genny is able to create new recordings that mimic attributes of their voices.

The court added that the sound of a voice is not copyrightable expression, and even if it were, the plaintiffs had registered claims of copyright in their recordings, not in their voices.

The trademark claims

In addition to infringement, the Lanham Act creates two other potential bases of trademark liability: (1) false association; and (2) false advertising. 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B). Plaintiffs asserted both kinds of claims. The judge dismissed these claims.

False association

The Second Circuit court of appeals recently held, in Electra v. 59 Murray Enter., Inc. and Souza v. Exotic Island Enters., Inc., that using a person’s likeness to create an endorsement without the person’s permission can constitute a “false association” violation. In other words, a federally-protected, trademark-like interest in one’s image, likeness, personality and identity exists. (See, e.g., Jackson v. Odenat.)

Although acknowledging that this right extends to one’s voice, the judge ruled that the voices in this case did not function as trademarks. They did not identify the source of a product or service. Rather, they were themselves the product or service. For this reason, the judge ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their voices, as such, are protectable trademarks under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.

False Advertising

Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1)(B)) prohibits misrepresentations about “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities.” The plaintiffs claimed that Lovo marketed their voices under different names (“Kyle Snow” and “Sally Coleman.”) The court determined that this was not fraudulent, however, because Lovo marketed them as what they were, namely, synthetic clones of the actors’ voices, not as their actual voices.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Lovo’s marketing materials falsely stated that the cloned voices “came with all commercial rights.” They asserted that they had not granted those rights to Lovo. The court ruled, however, that even if Lovo was guilty of misrepresentation, it was not the kind of misrepresentation that comes within Section 43(a)(1)(B), as it did not concern the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of the voices.

State law claims

Although the court dismissed the copyright and trademark claims, it allowed some state law claims to proceed. Specifically, the court denied the motion to dismiss claims for breach of contract, violations of sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, and violations of New York consumer protection law.

Both the common law and the New York Civil Rights Law prohibit the commercial use of a living person’s name, likeness or voice without consent. Known as “misappropriation of personality” or violation of publicity or privacy rights, this is emerging as one of the leading issues in AI law.

The court also allowed state law claims of false advertising and deceptive trade practices to proceed. The New York laws are not subject to the “nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” limitation set out in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

Conclusion

I expect this case will come to be cited for the rule that copyright cannot be claimed in a voice. Copyright law protects only expression, not a person’s corporeal attributes. The lack of copyright protection for a person’s voice, however, does not mean that voice cloning is “legal.” Depending on the particular facts and circumstances, it may violate one or more other laws.

It also should be noted that after the Joe Biden voice-cloning incident of 2024, states have been enacting statutes regulating the creation and distribution of voice clones. Even where a specific statute is not applicable, though, a broader statute (such as the FTC Act or a similar state law) might cover the situation.

Images and references in this blog post are for illustrative purposes only. No endorsement, sponsorship or affiliation with any person, organization, company, brand, product or service is intended, implied, or exists.

Joe Biden portrait
Official portrait of Vice President Joe Biden in his West Wing Office at the White House, Jan. 10, 2013. (Official White House Photo by David Lienemann)

 

What Is In the Public Domain?

How to determine what is in the public domain in the United States, explained by attorney Thomas B. James

Mickaey Mouse in "Steamboat Willie" illustration for Thomas B James article on "Public Domain"

Creative expressions generally are protected by copyright law. Sometimes, however, they are not. When that is the case, a work is said to be in “the public domain.”

The rules specifying the conditions for copyright protection vary from country to country. In the United States, they are set out in the Copyright Act, which is codified in Title 17 of the United States Code. The fact that a work is or is not in the public domain in the United States, however, is not determinative of its public domain status in another country. A work that is in the public domain in the United States might still be protected by copyright in another country.

This blog post focuses on the public domain rules set out in U.S. copyright law.

The 3 ways a work enters the public domain

There are three reasons a work may be in the public domain:

  • It was never protected by copyright. Some kinds of expression do not receive copyright protection. Federal government publications created by federal employees, for example, are not protected by copyright.
  • Failure to comply with a formal requirement. At one time, it was possible to lose copyright protection by failing to comply with a legal requirement, such as the requirement to display a copyright notice on a published work.
  • Expiration of the copyright term. Unlike trademarks, copyrights are time-limited. That is to say, the duration of a copyright is limited to a specified term. Congress has altered the durations of copyrights several times.

It is important to keep in mind that once a work enters the public domain, the copyright is gone. This is true even if copyright was lost only because of failure to comply with a formal requirement that has since been abolished. For example, if a work was published in 1976 without a copyright notice, it entered the public domain. The elimination of the copyright notice requirement in 1989 did not have the effect of reviving it. A few very limited exceptions exist, but in general, the elimination of a formal requirement does not have the effect of reviving copyrights in works that have already entered the public domain.

Guidelines for determining the copyright term

The following rules may be used for determining whether a work of a kind that is protected by copyright is in the public domain or not.

Different sets of rules apply to sound recordings, architectural works, and works first published outside the United States by a foreign national or a U.S. citizen living abroad. They are not covered in this blog post.

Note that the term of a copyright runs through the end of the calendar year in which it would otherwise expire. That is to say, a work enters the public domain on the first day of the year following the expiration of its term.

Unpublished and unregistered works

General rule: Life of the author + 70 years. If the author’s date of death is not known, then the term is 120 years from the date of creation.

Anonymous or pseudonymous works: 120 years from the date of creation.

Works made for hire: 120 years from the date of creation.

Works registered or first published in the US

Before 1929

All works registered or first published in the United States before 1929 are in the public domain now.

1929 to 1963

  • Published without a copyright notice: In the public domain.
  • Published with a copyright notice, but not renewed: In the public domain.
  • Published with a copyright notice, and renewed: 95 years after the first publication date.

1964 to 1977

  • Published without a copyright notice: In the public domain.
  • Published with a copyright notice: 95 years after the first publication date.

1978 to March 1, 1989

  • Created before 1978 and first published, with a copyright notice, between 1978 and March 1, 1989: Either 70 years after the death of the author or December 31, 2047, whichever occurs later. (For works made for hire, it is (a) 95 years after the date of first publication or 120 years after creation, whichever occurs first, or (b) December 31, 2047, whichever occurs later.
  • Created after 1977 and published with a copyright notice: 70 years after the death of the author (For works made for hire, it is 95 years after the date of first publication or 120 years after creation, whichever occurs first.)
  • Published without a copyright notice, and without subsequent registration within 5 years: In the public domain.
  • Published without a copyright notice but with subsequent registration within 5 years: Life of the author + 70 years (For works made for hire, it is 95 years after first publication or 120 years after creation, whichever occurs first.)

March 1, 1989 to 2002

  • Created before 1978 and first published between March 1, 1989 and 2002: The greater of (a) The life of the author + 70 years (For works made for hire, it is 95 years after first publication or 120 years after creation, whichever occurs first); or (b) December 1, 2047.
  • Created after 1977: Life of the author + 70 years (For works made for hire, it is 95 years after first publication or 120 years after creation, whichever occurs first.)

after 2002

  • Life of the author + 70 years
  • Works made for hire: 95 years after the date of publication or 120 years after the date of creation, whichever occurs first.

Sound recordings, architecture, and foreign works

The foregoing rules do NOT apply to sound recordings, architectural works, and works that were first published outside the United States by a foreign national or a U.S. citizen living abroad. Special sets of rules apply when determining the public domain status of those kinds of works.

To learn about other works that have entered the public domain, read Newly Public Domain Works. To learn about the other kinds of legal developments in traditional areas of the law that are occurring in the shadow of the AI issues, read Enuring (Non-AI) Legal Issues. 

Contact attorney Tom James for copyright help

Contact Tom James (“The Cokato Copyright Attorney) for copyright help.

A copyright win in the Internet Archive lawsuit

Book publishers have won their lawsuit against the Internet Archive. What does it mean for copyright owners? Cokato Copyright Attorney Tom James explains.

New York Public Library public domain image; this is NOT the library that is involved in this lawsuit.

 

In a previous post about the Internet Archive lawsuit, I explained that  book publishers Hachette Book Group et al. prevailed in a lawsuit against Internet Archive (“IA”) et al. The lawsuit alleges that IA scans copyright-protected printed books into a digital format, uploads them to its servers, and distributes these digital copies to members of the public via a website – all without a license and without paying the authors and publishers. The lawsuit asserts claims of copyright infringement.

A permanent injunction

Judge John Koeltl has now approved a consent judgment providing for a permanent injunction that prohibits Internet Archive from scanning and distributing copyrighted books. It applies only to books that copyright owners have already published and made available in e-book format. As Judge Koeltl put it: “The Court has narrowly tailored the injunctive relief in this case to cover only copyrighted works, like the Works in Suit, that are available from the Publishers in electronic form.”

IA reportedly plans to appeal.

A new lawsuit

This month, Sony Music Entertainment et al. filed a similar copyright infringement lawsuit against IA. This complaint alleges that IA digitized and distributed digital copies of 78 rpm records by Frank Sinatra, Billie Holiday, and other recording artists in violation of the rights of copyright owners.