Top IP Cases

2023 was a big year for U.S. intellectual property law. Major developments occurred in every area. Here are the highlights

2023 was a big year for U.S. intellectual property law. Major developments occurred in every area. Here are the highlights.

Copyright

Fair Use

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith

This was one of the top copyright cases of 2022. It was a case that was pushing the limits of the  transformative fair use of photographs. The Supreme Court issued a ruling in the case in May. The decision is significant because it finally reined in the “transformative use” doctrine that the Court first announced in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music back in 1994. In that case, 2 Live Crew had copied key parts of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh, Pretty Women” to make a parody of the song in its own rap style. The Court held that the 2 Live Crew version, although reproducing portions of both the original song and the original recording of it without permission, transformed it into something else. Therefore, even though it infringed the copyright, the 2 Live Crew version was for a transformative purpose and therefore protected as fair use.

In the thirty years since Campbell, lower courts have been applying the “transformative use” principle announced in Campbell in diverse and divergent ways. Some interpretations severely eviscerated the copyright owner’s exclusive right to make derivative works. Their interpretations often conflicted. What one circuit called transformative “fair use” another circuit called actionable infringement. Hence the need for Supreme Court intervention.

In 1984, Vanity Fair licensed one of photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photographs of Prince to illustrate a magazine article about him. Per the agreement, Andy Warhol made a silkscreen using the photograph for the magazine and Vanity Fair credited the original photograph to Goldsmith. Unknown to her, however, Warhol proceeded to make 15 additional works based on Goldsmith’s photograph withour her permission.. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Arts licensed one of them to Condé Nast as an illustration for one of their magazines. The Foundation received a cool $10,000 for it, with neither payment nor credit given to Goldsmith. The Foundation then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that its use of the photograph was a protected fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The district court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the Foundation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the four-factor “fair use” analysis favored Goldsmith. The Supreme Court sided with the Court of Appeals.

Noting that it was not ruling on whether Warhol’s making of works using the photograph was fair use, the Court limited its analysis to the narrow question whether the Foundation’s licensing of the Warhol work to Condé Nast was fair use. On that point, the Court determined that the use of the photograph to illustrate a story about Prince was identical to the use Goldsmith had made of the photograph (i.e., to illustrate a magazine article about Prince.) Unlike 2 Live Crew’s use of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the purpose of the use in this case was not to mock or parody the original work.

The case is significant for vindicating the Copyright Act’s promise to copyright owners of an exclusive right to make derivative works. While Warhol put his own artistic spin on the photograph – and that might have been sufficient to sustain a fair use defense if he had been the one being sued – the Warhol Foundation’s and Condé Nast’s purpose was no different from Goldsmith’s, i.e., as an illustration for an article about Prince. Differences in the purpose or character of a use, the Court held, “must be evaluated in the context of the specific use at issue.” Had the Warhol Foundation been sued for displaying Warhol’s modifications of the photograph for purposes of social commentary in its own gallery, the result might have been different.

Although the holding is a seemingly narrow one, the Court did take the opportunity to disapprove the lower court practice of ending a fair use inquiry at the moment an infringer asserted that an unauthorized copy or derivative work was created for a purpose different from the original author’s.

Statute of Limitations and Damages

Warner Chappell Music v. Nealy

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this Eleventh Circuit decision. At issue was whether a copyright plaintiff may recover damages for infringement that occurred outside of the limitations period, that is, infringement occurring more than three years before a lawsuit was filed.

The circuits were split on this question. According to the Second Circuit, damages are recoverable only for acts of infringement that occurred during the 3-year period preceding the filing of the complaint. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, had held that as long as the lawsuit is timely filed, damages may be awarded for infringement that occurred more than three years prior to the filing, at least when the discovery rule has been invoked to allow a later filing. In Nealy, the Eleventh Circuit held that damages may be recovered for infringement occurring more than three years before the claim is filed if the plaintiff did not discover the infringement until some time after it first began.

The United States Supreme Court has resolved the Circuit split. Read about the Supreme Court’s decision in Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy.

Artificial Intelligence

Copyrightability

Thaler v. Perlmutter

This was an APA proceeding initiated in the federal district court of the District of Columbia for review of the United State Copyright Office’s refusal to register a copyright in an AI-generated work. In August, 2023, the district court upheld the Copyright Office’s decision that an AI-generated work is not protected by copyright, asserting that “human creativity is the sine qua non at the core of copyrightability….” For purposes of the Copyright Act, only human beings can be “authors.” Machines, non-human animals, spirits and natural forces do not get copyright protection for their creations.

Thaler appealed. Read more about what happened in Last Exit from Paradise.

Infringement

Many cases that are pending allege that using copyrighted works to train AI, or creating derivative works using AI, infringes the copyrights in the works so used. Most of these cases make additional claims as well, such as claims of unfair competition, trademark infringement, or violations of publicity and DMCA rights.

 I have been blogging about these cases for some time and periodically provide updates on them.

Trademark

Parody Goods

Jack Daniel’s Properties v. VIP Products

For more information about this case, read Balancing the First Amendment on Whiskey and Dog Toys.

This is the “parody goods” case. VIP Products used the “Bad Spaniels” name to market its dog toys, which were patterned on the distinctive shape of a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle. VIP filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that its product did not infringe the Jack Daniel’s brand. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for trademark infringement and dilution. Regarding infringement, VIP claimed First Amendment protection. Regarding dilution, VIP claimed the use was a parody of a famous mark and therefore qualified for protection as trademark fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to VIP.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that when an alleged infringer uses the trademark of another (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, it is a commercial, not an expressive, use. Accordingly, the First Amendment is not a consideration in such cases.

Rogers v. Grimaldi had held that when the title of a creative work (in that case, a film) makes reference to a trademark for an artistic or expressive purposes (in that case, Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers), the First Amendment shields the creator from trademark liability. In the Jack Daniel’s case, the Court distinguished Rogers, holding that it does not insulate the use of trademarks as trademarks (i.e. as indicators of the source or origin of a product or service) from ordinary trademark scrutiny. Even though the dog toys may have had an expressive purpose, VIP admitted it used Bad Spaniels as a source identifier. Therefore, the First Amendment does not apply.

The Court held that the same rule applies to dilution claims. The First Amendment does not shield parody goods from a dilution claim when the alleged diluter uses a mark (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for its own products or services.

International Law

Abitron Austria v. Hetronic International

Here, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act does not have extraterritorial reach. Specifically, the Court held that Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125 (a)(1) extend only to those claims where the infringing use in commerce occurs in the United States. They do not extend to infringement occurring solely outside of the United States, even if consumer confusion occurs in the United States.

The decision is a reminder to trademark owners that if they want to protect their trademark rights in other countries, they should take steps to protect their rights in those countries, such as by registering their trademarks there.

Patents

Patents are beyond the scope of this blog. Even so, a couple of developments are worth noting.

Enablement

Amgen v. Sonofi

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the validity of certain patents on antibodies used to lower cholesterol under the Patent Act’s enablement requirement (35 U.S.C. sec. 112(a)).  At issue was whether Amgen could patent an entire genus of antibodies without disclosing sufficient information to enable a person skilled in the art to create the potentially millions of antibodies in it. The Court basically said no.

If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims.

Amgen v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. ____ (2023)

Conclusion

My vote for the most the significant IP decision in recent times is Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith. Lower courts had all but allowed the transformative use defense to swallow up the exclusive right of a copyright owner to create derivative works. The Supreme Court provided much-needed correction. I predict that going forward, the most significant decisions will also be in the copyright realm, but they will have to do with AI.

Visit my extensive Copyright FAQs page.

Copyrights in AI-Generated Content

Copyright registrations are being issued for works created with generative-AI tools, subject to some important qualifications. Also, Internet Archves revisited (briefly)

The long-awaited U.S. Copyright Office report on the copyrightability of works created using AI-generated output, is here. The legality of using copyrighted works to train generative-AI systems is a topic for another day.

Key takeaways:

  • Copyright protects the elements of a work that are created by a human, but does not protect elements that were AI-generated (probably the key take-away from the Report) The is the “human authorship” requirement that the Copyight Office invoked in denying registration of Stephen Thaler’s AI-generated output. I wrote about that a couple of years ago in “AI Can Create But Is It Art?” and also have commented on new AI copyright guidance from the Office before. 
  • The Copyright Office believes existing law is adequate to deal with AI copyright issues; it does not believe any new legislation is needed
  • Using AI to assist in the creative process does not affect copyrightability
  • Prompts do not provide sufficient control over the output to be considered creative works.
  • Protection exists for the following, if they involve sufficient human creativity:
    • Selection, coordination, and arrangement of AI-generated output (compilation)
      •  Modification of AI-generated content  (Derivative works)
        • Human-created elements distinguishable from AI-generated elements.

Prompts

A key question for the Copyright Office was whether a highly detailed prompt could suffice as human creative expression. The Office says no; “[P]rompts alone do not provide sufficient human control to make users of an AI system the authors of the output. Prompts essentially function as instructions that convey unprotectable ideas. While highly detailed prompts could contain the user’s desired expressive elements, at present they do not control how the AI system processes them in generating the output.”

How much control does a human need over the output-generation process to be considered an author? The answer, apparently, is “So much control that the AI mechanism’s contribution was purely rote or mechanical. “The fact that identical prompts can generate multiple different outputs further indicates a lack of human control.”

Expressive prompts

If the prompt itself is sufficiently creative and original, the expression contained in the prompt may qualify for copyright protection. For example, if a user prompts an AI tool to change a story from first-person to third-person point of view, and includes the first-person version in the prompt, then copyright may be claimed in the story that was included in the prompt. The author could claim copyright in the story as a “human-generated element” distinguishable from anything AI thereafter did to it. The human-created work must be perceptible in the output.

Registration of hybrid works

The U.S. Copyright Office has now issued several registrations for works that contain a combination of both human creative expression and AI-generated output. Examples:

Irontic, LLC has a registered copyright in Senzia Opera a, a sound recording with “music and singing voices by [sic] generated by artificial intelligence,” according to the copyright registration. That material is excluded from the claim. The registration, however, does provide protection for the story, lyrics, spoken words, and the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the sound recording.

Computer programs can be protected by copyright, but if any source code was generated by AI, it must be excluded from the claim. Thus, the Adobe GenStudio for Performance Marketing computer program is protected by copyright, but any source code in it that was AI-generated is not.

A record company received a copyright registration for human additions and modifications to AI-generated art.

As an example of a “selection, coordination and arrangement” copyright, there is the registration of a work called “A Collection of Objects Which Do Not Exist,” consisting of a collage of AI-generated images. “A Single Piece of American Cheese,” is another example of a registered copyright claim based on the selection, coordination, or arrangement of AI-generated elements.

Woman's face superimposed on a sheet of computer programming code, signifying an AI-generated image

China

A Chinese court has taken a contrary position, holding that an AI-generated image produced by Stable Diffusion is copyrightable because the prompts he chose reflected his aesthetic choices.

Internet Archive Postscript

In January, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in Hachette Book Group, Inc. v. Internet Archive. This came as no surprise. A couple of important things that bear repeating came out of this decision, though.

First, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that fair use is an affirmative defense. As such, the defendant bears the burden of establishing the level of market harm the use has caused or may cause. While a copyright owner may reasonably be required to identify relevant markets, he/she/it is not required to present empirical data to support a claim of market harm. The defendant bears the burden of proof of a fair use defense, including proof pertinent to each of the four factors comprising the defense.

Confusion seems to have crept into some attorneys’ and judges’ analysis of the issue. This is probably because it is well known that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof of damages, which can also involve evidence of market harm. The question of damages, however, is separate and distinct from the “market harm” element of a fair use defense.

The second important point the Second Circuit made in Hatchette is that the “public benefit” balancing that Justice Breyer performed in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. needs to focus on something more than just the short-term benefits to the public in getting free access to infringing copies of works. Otherwise, the “public benefit” in getting free copies of copyright-protected stuff would outweigh the rights of copyright owners every time.  The long-term benefits of protecting the rights of authors must also be considered.

True, libraries and consumers may reap some short-term benefits from access to free digital books, but what are the long-term consequences? [Those consequences, i.e.,] depriv[ing] publishers and authors of the revenues due to them as compensation for their unique creations [outweigh any public benefit in having free access to copyrighted works.]

Id.

They reined in Google v. Oracle.

Thomas James is a human.

Visit my extensive Copyright FAQs page.

 

Top Copyright Cases of 2024

Many AI-related copyright lawsuits continued to proceed through the courts

Warner Chappell Music Inc. v. Nealy

The Copyright Act imposes a three-year period of limitations for copyright infringement claims. There has been a split in the circuits about whether this means that damages could be claimed only for infringement occurring during the three-year period or whether damages could be recovered for earlier acts of infringement so long as the claim is timely filed. The Supreme Court has now resolved the split.

The issue arises in cases where a claimant invokes the discovery rule. The general rule is that a limitations period runs from the date of the act giving rise to the cause of action. The discovery rule, by contrast, measures the limitations period from the date the infringing act is discovered. Thus, for example, if an infringing act occurred in 2012 but the copyright owner did not learn about it until 2022, then under the traditional rule, the claim would be time-barred. Under the discovery rule, it would not be.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in this case is to the effect that if the discovery rule applies in the jurisdiction where suit is filed, and a claimant properly invokes it, then damages are not limited to the three years preceding suit. Rather, any damages incurred since the date of the infringing act are recoverable.

The Court did not rule on the validity of the discovery rule.

Warner Chappell Music Inc.. v. Nealy, 601 U.S. ____ (2024).

 Hachette Book Group Inc. v. Internet Archive

I wrote about Hachette Book Group v. Internet Archive back in 2022, when it was at the summary judgment stage in the district court for the Southern District of New York. Astute readers with much better memory than I possess will recall that I included in my list of the top copyright cases os 2022. The complaint, filed by book publishers, alleged that the Internet Archive made digital copies of over a million print books and then freely distributed the copies to members of the public, all without the permission of the copyright owners. In 2023, the district judge ruled in favor of the publishers, holding that the enterprise was not “fair use.” It subsequently issued an injunction against further scanning and distribution of books. (See A Copyright Win in the Internet Archive Lawsuit.) This year, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

To some, the decision might seem like a no-brainer. Copying other people’s books and giving them away for free, without the copyright owners’ permission, sounds like core copyright infringement, right? Yet, before the Warhol v. Goldsmith decision in 2023, courts had been applying such an expansive view of the “transformative use” branch of fair use that some people thought that making digital copies of a print book was categorically “transformative” and therefore fair use. This decision makes it clear that no, it isn’t.

The Internet Archive has said it will not appeal the decision to the United States Supreme Court.

Hachette Book Group Inc. et al. v. Internet Archive, No. 23-1260 (2nd Cir. 2024)

Griner v. King

U.S. Representative Steve King’s campaign committee used a copyright-protected photograph in his campaign without permission. King’s committee had argued fair use and that it had an “implied license” to use the image because it had been widely circulated as a meme on the Internet. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an Iowa jury’s verdict for the copyright owner.

Griner et al. v. King et al., No. 23-2117, (8th Cir. 2024)

The Intercept Media v. OpenAI

This isn’t really a momentous decision, in terms of precedential value, but it is the first major victory for Big AI in the plethora of AI-related lawsuits they are facing.

The Intercept Media, Inc. sued OpenAI and Microsoft Corporation for alleged Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) violations in connection with training the AI tool, ChatGPT. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On November 21, 2024 the New York court dismissed claims against Microsoft with prejudice. The court dismissed the 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) claim against OpenAI but allowed the claim under 17 U.S.C. §1202(b)(1) to proceed.  

Section 1202(b)(1) prohibits unauthorized removal or alteration of copyright management information, including author information and the copyright notice.

The Intercept Media Inc. v. OpenAI Inc., No. 1:24-cv-01515, (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2024).

Stay tuned…

Many AI-related copyright lawsuits continued to proceed through the courts in 2024, with decisions expected in 2025 or later.

Visit my extensive Copyright FAQs page.